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The emergence and rapid spread of business improvement districts
("BIDs") is one of the most important recent developments in American cit-
ies. BIDs have been controversial, with both supporters and proponents
viewing the districts as part of a trend toward the privatization of the public
sector. By examining the legal and political structures that determine BID
formation, functions, finances and governance, this Article determines that
BIDs are not private entities but are, instead, a distinctive hybrid of public
and private elements. Moreover, although the particular fusion of public
and private institutions, values and concerns embodied in the BID is
unique, Professor Briffault demonstrates that an interplay of public and pri-
vate themes is a longstanding tradition in American local government law.
BIDs depart from the norm of democratic governance and they raise ques-
tions concerning equity in the delivery of local services. BiDs, however, are
ultimately subject to municipal control and they provide a mechanism for
providing the public services and investment that financially strapped cities
need if they are to survive. With appropriate municipal oversight and limits,
BIDs, and the experimentation in combining public and private roles that
BiDs represent, can make a significant contribution to the quality of urban
public life.
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INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF BIDS
The Business Improvement District ("BID") is one of the most in-
triguing and controversial recent developments in urban governance.
Combining public and private, as well as city government and neighbor-
hood elements, BIDs undertake a diverse array of programs and services,
including sanitation, policing, social services, infrastructure improve-
ments and business recruitment and retention. In an era when "no new
taxes" is a political mantra and voters regularly reject tax proposals and
approve tax limitations, BIDs have been created to impose additional
taxes, with the firms and landowners subject to taxation taking the lead-
ing role in establishing the BIDs. BIDs also provide for an unusual de-
gree of neighborhood-level decisionmaking, although, unlike other
forms of neighborhood government, they empower property owners or
businesses rather than residents.
There are more than one thousand BIDs in the United States,' and
BIDs are active from coast to coast. There are more than forty BIDs in
1. There is no comprehensive tabulation of the number of BIDs in the United States.
Indeed, given the considerable interstate variation in the powers and structure of BIDs and
the fact that many states provide for the creation of local entities that perform some of the
functions of BIDs but do not use the term "business improvement district," any count of
BIDs is likely to be subject to challenge. Figures between one and two thousand have been
used by several commentators, see, e.g., Lawrence 0. Houstoun,Jr., Business Improvement
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New York City, fifty-four in Wisconsin, thirty-five in NewJersey, sixteen in
San Diego, and one or more in Anchorage, Baltimore, Buffalo, Dallas,
Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Memphis, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Seattle,
and Washington, D.C. 2 Although the most prominent BIDs-such as
New York City's Times Square BID and Philadelphia's Center City
District-are located in the midtown and downtown areas of major cities,
many BIDs have been established along small commercial strips within
big cities, in small towns, and in suburbs.
BIDs emerged out of legal structures and concepts that go back
more than a century, but the specific form of the business improvement
district is a relatively recent phenomenon. Arguably, the first modern
BID in the United States3 was the Downtown Development District of
New Orleans, which was established in 1975.4 Most BIDs were created
after 1980, many after 1990.5 The popularity of BDs continued to mount
throughout the 1990s. In a single recent month-September 1997-
newspapers reported local deliberations concerning the creation or re-
newal of BIDs in Cincinnati, Ohio; Madison, Wisconsin; Omaha,
Districts, 20 Econ. Dev. Commentary 4, 4 (1996) [hereinafter Houstoun, BIDs]; Richard
Bradley, Downtown Renewal: The Role of Business Improvement Districts," 77 Public
MgmL 9, 9 (1995). They should be treated as providing an order of magnitude rather
than a precise measure.
2. See Recent Local Laws, 3 City Law, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 131; Diamond District Starts
a New BID, 3 City Law, May-June 1997, at 58; City Creates 5 new BIDs, 2 City Law, Dec.
1996, at 133 (BIDs in New York City); New York State Conference of Mayors (NY COM),
Guide to New York State Business Improvement Districts 2 (1996) (BIDs in Buffalo)
[hereinafter NY COM]; Roberta Gassman, Downtown Partners Really Are Revitalizing State
Street, Capital Times, Mar. 9, 1998, at 1B (BIDs in Wisconsin); Jessica Nesterak,
Downtowns are Going Back to the Future, Asbury Park Press, Sept. 21, 1997, at AA1 (BIDs
in NewJersey); Ronald W. Powell, Council OKs Pacific Beach Plan, The San Diego Union-
Trib., Dec. 11, 1996, at B3 (BIDs in San Diego); S. Jane Szabo, B's A-Buzzing Downtown:
Brooms, Bicycles and Banners Spruce Up Heart of Anchorage, Anchorage Daily News, Apr.
27, 1998, at 2E (BIDs in Anchorage); Charter of Baltimore City, Art. II, § 61 (BIDs in
Baltimore); Downtown Improvement District, A Proposal to Renew Dallas' Downtown
Improvement District (1995) (BIDs in Dallas) [hereinafter Downtown Improvement
District]; Alan Snel, Law Would Let Golden Triangle Property Owners Raise Their Taxes,
Denver Post, Sept. 23, 1997, at B6 (BIDs in Denver); Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Betting
on BIDs, 54 Urban Land 13, 15 (1994) [hereinafter Houstoun, Betting] (BIDs in
Houston); Deborah Sullivan, Shoppers Delight: Valley to Spice Up Main Streets, Daily
News of LA, Mar. 1, 1998, at NI (ten BIDs in Los Angeles; eleven more planned in San
Fernando Valley); Cornell Christion, Council Approves Central Business District
Expansion, The Commercial Appeal, Jan. 8, 1997, at 2B (BIDs in Memphis); Center City
District, State of Center City 1997 (Jan. 1997) (BIDs in Philadelphia); Washington Makes a
BID to Clean Up Its Image Downtown, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 31, 1997, at IID (BIDs
in St. Louis); Retail Core Business Improvement Area, 1995/96 Annual Report (BIDs in
Seattle); New Uniforms, Wash. Times, Mar. 16, 1998, at D6 (three BIDs in Washington).
3. The first BID in North America was created in Toronto in 1970. See Lawrence 0.
Houstoun, Jr., Business Improvement Districts 8 (1997) [hereinafter Houstoun, ULI].
4. See id. at 23-24.
5. See Janet Rothenberg Pack, BIDs, DIDs, SIDs, and SADs: Private Governments in
Urban America, 10 The Brookings Rev. 18 (1992).
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Nebraska; Idaho Falls, Idaho; Charleston, South Carolina; Denver,
Colorado; and Nashville, Tennessee. 6
What exactly are BIDs, and why are they spreading so rapidly across
the country? There is no canonical definition of a business improvement
district and no single model in use nationwide. The state laws and local
ordinances authorizing BIDs take differing approaches to such basic
questions as district formation, functions, finances, and governance. 7
Yet, most BIDs share a few basic characteristics: A BID is a territorial
subdivision of a city in which property owners or businesses are subject to
additional taxes. The revenues generated by these district-specific taxes
are reserved to fund services and improvements within the district and to
pay for the administrative costs of BID operations. BIDs' services are pro-
vided in addition to those offered by city governments. Most BIDs focus
6. See Robert Behre, Streetscape May Be Done by 2000, The Post & Courier, Sept. 25,
1997, at B3 (Charleston); Guy Boulton & Perry Brothers, Council Panel OKs Downtown
District, Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 4, 1997, at B16 (Cincinnati); Jennifer Dukes, Council
Approves Holiday Light Tax, Omaha World-Herald, Oct. 1, 1997, at 15 (Omaha); Gene
Fadness, I.F. City Council Approves District to Redo Downtown, Idaho Falls Post Register,
Sept. 26, 1997, at Al (Idaho Falls); Rob Moritz, Proposed CBID Tax Could Hit Dead End,
The Nashville Banner, Sept. 10, 1997, at BI (Nashville); Pat Schneider, Biz Leaders Tout
State St. Taxing District, Capital Times, Oct. 1, 1997, at 2A (Madison); Snel, supra note 2,
at B6 (Denver).
7. Many states avoid the term "business improvement district" altogether, and instead
provide for such entities as an "improvement district[ ] for enhanced municipal services,"
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48-575 (West 1998); a "municipal special services district," Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-339m to -339t (West 1998); "commercial district management
authority," Md. Ann. Code art. 23A, § 2(35) (1998); "special improvement district," NJ.
Stat. Ann. § 50:56-66b (West 1998); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1710 (West 1998); "economic
improvement district," Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.114 (1993); or a "public improvement district,"
Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 372.001 (West 1999). In some states, no legislation
authorizes BIDs per se; instead the powers of special districts and public authorities have
been expanded to enable them to exercise functions associated with BIDs. See, e.g., Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §§ 302(1), 306(w) (West 1998) (Municipal Authorities Act of 1945
amended to create authorities with powers to produce and finance business
improvements). Some states authorize particular BID-like districts instead of, or in
addition to, adopting general enabling legislation. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 33:2740.3 (West 1998) ("Downtown Development District of the City of New Orleans").
These variations make determining how many states authorize BIDs almost as difficult
as calculating the number of BIDs. The International Downtown Association states that 49
states and the District of Columbia have BID enabling legislation, see Memorandum from
Jill M. Frick, Manager of Membership Services, International Downtown Association, to
Richard Briffault, Vice Dean & Professor, Columbia Law School (May 21, 1997) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review), but they were unable to provide the statutory sources for a
number of states. Recent commentators have disagreed on the number of states
authorizing BIDs. Compare David J. Kennedy, Note, Restraining the Power of Business
Improvement Districts: The Case of the Grand Central Partnership, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev.
283, 290 & n.61 (1996) (40 states provide for the formation of BIDs) with Mark S. Davies,
Business Improvement Districts, 52 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 187, 187-88 n.2 (1997)
(listing 17 states that authorize BIDs and 10 states that have "passed similar legislation
under different names"). My count approximates Kennedy's-about 40 states and the
District of Columbia-although given the variation in district names, functions, and
structure, the tabulation is imprecise.
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on traditional municipal activities, such as garbage collection, street
maintenance, and security patrols. A few provide assistance to the home-
less. Some engage in street repairs, undertake landscaping, provide
street furniture, maintain parks, and create public amenities. Many spon-
sor street fairs and special events, produce promotional brochures, and
engage in other direct efforts to draw shoppers, tourists, and businesses
into their districts.
BIDs are funded primarily by district-specific taxes, although some
enjoy other sources of financial support, including payments from gov-
ernments.8 As the name implies, the property in a "business improve-
ment district" is primarily devoted to business purposes, although many
districts include some residential property. In nearly all states, establish-
ment of a BID requires the approval of the local government, but the
impetus for creating a district typically comes from neighborhood prop-
erty owners or businesses, who also take the lead in mapping the district's
boundaries and in developing its service and financing plan. Many states
provide for property owner- or business-dominated advisory, administra-
tive, or management boards which implement the BID's program and
manage its operations.
BIDs are popular for a variety of reasons. For city governments, they
provide a means of funding downtown services and improvements with-
out raising general taxes.9 BIDs appeal to many--albeit not all-com-
mercial area merchants and property owners because the districts kill two
birds with one stone: They provide a means of solving the free rider
problem that plagues the efforts of chambers of commerce and
merchants' associations to raise funds to pay for services for their areas,10
while ensuring that the revenues generated by the supplemental taxes
imposed on district businesses and property owners are reserved for pro-
grams these taxpayers want, and are controlled by their representatives.
By assessing all properties or firms in an area, instead of depending on
contributions from civic-minded volunteers, a BID provides a "stable
stream of income for activities and projects"' '-but the income is set
aside for business-supported activities and projects in the district. As the
executive director of one Washington, D.C. business association involved
8. These include municipal appropriations, federal and state grants, private
donations, fees from the sale of BID services or the use of BID facilities, and voluntary
payments by owners of tax-exempt property.
9. See Heather Barr, More Like Disneyland: State Action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
Business Improvement Districts in NewYork, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 393, 397 (1997).
10. See, e.g., International Downtown Association, Business Improvement Districts 2
(1997) [hereinafter IDA].
11. Project for Public Spaces, Inc., Successful Downtown Development, Design &




in the creation of the first BID in the nation's capital put it, "[e]very
penny collected for the BID goes back into the BID." 12
City officials and downtown interests have found BIDs to be a low-
cost tool for providing the public safety and street maintenance services
urban areas need to compete effectively with suburban and edge city
shopping malls, office parks, and commercial centers. BIDs do this for
the most part without drawing on the general municipal treasury or di-
verting municipal funds from other programs. A BID can provide a
neighborhood with an institutional means for crafting and implementing
strategies for area development, marketing, and attracting new invest-
ment. In large cities with multiple BIDs, like New York City, Los Angeles,
and Washington, BIDs may enable smaller commercial areas, which are
typically overshadowed by the central business district, to articulate their
distinctive concerns.
BIDs are also popular because of the widespread belief that, unlike
municipal government, "BIDs [r]eally [w]ork."' 3 News stories regularly
trumpet the successes of BIDs in tackling crime, grime, and social disor-
der.14 BIDs are "more effective than government,"15 efficient,16 "in-
novati[ve]," 17 and "trailblazers in solving . . . urban quality-of-life
problems."' 8 BIDs are credited with playing an important role in restor-
ing urban morale and making older downtowns more attractive places to
shop, visit, do business, and seek entertainment. There is actually little
hard evidence that BIDs have caused property values to rise, or that prop-
erty values have grown more rapidly in BIDs than in comparable areas
without BIDs, but most landowners appear satisfied with BID services.19
12. Kristan Trugman, 2 Northwest Areas Seek Security in Special Taxes, Wash. Times,
Jan. 6, 1997, at C5 (quoting Marcia Rosenthall, executive director of Franklin Square
Association). See also David Henry & Barbara Selvin, Other Districts Make Good on a
Smaller Scale, N.Y. Newsday, Mar. 23, 1992, at 29 (quoting a merchant in the small Myrtle
Avenue BID in Queens, New York: "In a sense, we've formed our own government,
because all the money comes back to us.").
13. Heather MacDonald, BIDs Really Work, 6 The City J., Spring 1996, at 29, 29.
States and localities cite the successes of BIDs elsewhere in authorizing new BIDs. See Del.
Code Ann. tit. 22, § 1501(3) (1997); Business Improvements Act of 1996 § 23, 43 D.C. Reg.
1684 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Cities Seek Disney-Style Cleanliness and Safety,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 21, 1997, at 1.
15. James Traub, Can Associations of Businesses Be True Community-Builders?, 6 The
Responsive Community, Spring 1996, at 29, 31.
16. See Pack, supra note 5, at 19.
17. Fred Siegel, Reclaiming Our Public Spaces, 2 The CityJ., Spring 1992, at 35, 42.
18. MacDonald, supra note 13, at 30.
19. See, e.g.,John Shors, Taking Matters Into Their Own Hands, Business Record-Des
Moines, Aug. 18, 1997, at 20 (12% of property owners opposed formation of Center City
BID in 1990, but only 1% objected to 1994 renewal; only 2 out of 1400 property owners
objected to renewal of Baltimore BID); Rebecca Walsh, Alliance Director Fights for
Downtown, Salt Lake Trib., Aug. 3, 1997, at BI (only 3% of owners objected to 1994
renewal of Salt Lake City BID). Lawrence Houstoun, a leading proponent of BIDs,
acknowledges the "absence of comparative research" on the effectiveness of BIDs but urges
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Even BID critics rarely challenge claims that BID programs have im-
proved safety and sanitation within the districts.
20
BIDs, however, are controversial. In New York City, for example,
BIDs have been embroiled in disputes concerning the election of BID
boards, treatment of the homeless, the use of BID funds to increase the
presence of New York City police in the Wall Street area, and compliance
with city oversight requirements. Critics contend that BIDs are undemo-
cratic21 and produce wealth-based inequalities in the delivery of public
services.2 2 Many fear that areas managed by BIDs will no longer be open
to the poor, the homeless, and street vendors,2
3 and that the successes of
BIDs will further sunder the ties between rich and poor areas of large
cities.
At the heart of the debate is the assumption that BIDs are essentially
"private" entities. Advocates, 2 4 critics,2 5 and media observers26 alljoin in
emphasizing the private nature of BDs. All see the rise of BDs as reflect-
ing and reinforcing the general trend away from the public and toward
the private sector that has so marked governance in late-twentieth-cen-
tury America.
that the "most telling" measure of BIDs' success "is the willingness of assessees to continue
to pay." Houstoun, ULI, supra note 3, at 108-09.
20. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 9, at 396-97; David Henry, As City Cuts Services, Firms
Tax Themselves to Keep Streets Clean and Safe; It Works But Is It Good Policy, N.Y.
Newsday, Mar. 23, 1992, at 27 (community board chair who had opposed creation of New
York City's 34th Street BID acknowledges, "It is no question that the streets are cleaner.").
21. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Central Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 132 (2d Cir.
1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting) ("the constitutional threat posed by the growth of
unrepresentative and non-democratically elected BDs"); Doug Lasdon & Sue Halpern,
When Neighborhoods Are Privatized, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1995, at A29 ("Business
improvement districts . . . ignore democratic principles and have furthered the class
divisions in our cities.").
22. See, e.g., Andrew Stark, America, The Gated?, 22 Wilson Q., Winter 1998, at 60, 75
(describing the "twin-governments trick" of exclusive gated communities like the Los
Angeles suburb of Hidden Hills, and discussing the limitations of baseline service
agreements that BIDs negotiate with city governments).
23. See Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities 36 (1995) (BIDs "nurture a visible social
stratification").
24. See, e.g., Andrew Manshel, Public Oversight: Business Improvement District
Accountability, 1 City Law, Dec. 1995, at 104 (BIDs are "essentially private organizations");
John Podhoretz, An Ill-Advised Assault on an Urban Visionary, N.Y. Post, Aug. 14, 1998, at
27.
25. See, e.g., Zukin, supra note 23, at 64-66; Tom Gallagher, Trespasser on Main St.
(Youl), The Nation, Dec. 18, 1995, at 787 ("[BIDs have] been quietly and modestly eating
away at the nation's democratic underpinnings in urban commercial
neighborhoods. .. ").
26. See, e.g.,James Krohe, Jr., Bunker Metropolis: "Private Government" Can Deliver
Good Service-For a Price, Chi. Enterprise, Sept. 1993, at 16; Thomas J. Lueck, Business
Districts Grow At Price of Accountability, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1994, at Al; Tony Walker,
Private Sector Revitalises New York's Mean Streets, Fin. Times, July 2, 1998, at 8.
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For BID champions, the districts' private nature is the source of their
success.2 7 Freed "of bureaucracies, entrenched interests, electoral calcu-
lations, or even ideology," BIDs are animated by the spirit of "private en-
terprise,"28 and "offer the virtues of the private sector"29 to the public
sector. In the words of the then-chairman of New York's Grand Central
BID-the nation's largest BID in terms of the size of its budget-"[o]ur
whole purpose is to help government do what it's not been capable of
doing."3° According to the Grand Central BID's general counsel, "the
essential theory of the BID program .. .lies in allowing a private entity
the freedom, relatively unencumbered by process and procedure, to ex-
periment with new ideas and supplement traditional government activi-
ties in new ways."3 1 Other advocates note that "much of the utility of
improvement districts is related to the ability to apply business judge-
ments"3 2 and "harnes[s] private-sector creativity to solve public
problems. 3 3
The language used by some BID proponents suggests that the dis-
tricts are scarcely governmental at all, but are instead "self-help ven-
tures"3 4 or "local businesses tax[ing] themselves." 3 5 Some states empha-
size this notion of BIDs as business self-help organizations-like
chambers of commerce-in the very names they give their districts: "Self-
Help Business Improvement Districts" in Alabama,36 and "Self-Supported
Municipal Improvement Districts" in Iowa.37 Former Speaker of the
House Newt Gingrich once capitalized on this theme, referring to BIDs as
"local, voluntary, get-together organizations."38 Other BID proponents
acknowledge the public nature of BID financing yet stress that BIDs are
"unencumbered by urban politics."39
27. See Douglas Feiden, Midtown Bonds Spark BID Controversy, Crain's N.Y. Bus.,Apr. 6-12, 1992, at 1, 30 (quoting statement of BID counsel that a BID is a private agency
and "[tihat's why we can run faster and jump higher" than a city agency).
28. Dan Finnigan, Private Efforts to Clean Up Downtowns May Sweep America, L.A.
Times, June 25, 1992, at A5.
29. Traub, supra note 15, at 31.
30. See Feiden, supra note 27, at 1.
31. Manshel, supra note 24, at 106.
32. Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Six Tests for State Enabling Legislation, in IDA, supra
note 10, at 36.
33. MacDonald, supra note 13, at 30.
34. Richard G. Williams, Business Improvement Districts-Main Street Asset
Management (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.irem.inter.net/bid> (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
35. See George L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows 113 (1996)(BIDs "in which property owners voluntarily tax themselves"); Fred Siegel, The FutureOnce Happened Here 195 (1997) (describing BIDs as "local businesses taxiing]
themselves").
36. Ala. Code § 11-54B-1(a)(4) (1994).
37. Iowa Code Ann. § 386.1 (West 1989).
38. Traub, supra note 15, at 30.
39. Houstoun, ULI, supra note 3, at 38.
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Critics also emphasize the private nature of BIDs, but find that to be
a cause for concern, not celebration. They argue that by empowering
property owners and businesses, BIDs threaten democratic control in ur-
ban areas. As a result, the turn to BIDs threatens the principle of "public
stewardship"40 of public spaces, and necessarily "represent[s] a narrowing
of the public sphere."41 By offering more services to neighborhoods will-
ing to pay more in taxes, BIDs undermine the norm of equal provision of
public services. 42 For their critics, BIDs are a species of privatization, first
cousin to gated communities, and one more instance of the "secession of
the successful" 43 that they believe is currently undermining the public
sector and public life.
The conflict over BIDs mirrors the contemporary debate over the
roles of the public and private sectors in American society. Yet, in its
assumption of a sharp public-private divide, the argument about BIDs un-
intentionally reflects the limitations of that debate. Like many other as-
pects of governance in late-twentieth-century America, BIDs are neither
wholly public nor fully private, but, rather, combine attributes of both
public and private. BIDs are publicly created, they wield public powers,
they provide public services, and they are subject to public control. Their
empowerment of business and landowner interests and their provision of
extra services to business districts based on special assessments paid
within those districts, however, are distinctly "private" elements at odds
with some of the basic features of public governance. Indeed, it is pre-
cisely because they are part of the public sector that the organization and
financing of, and the enhanced services provided by, BIDs may seem so
troubling. BIDs constitute a distinct challenge to the democratic ac-
countability of public institutions and the equal treatment normally re-
quired in the provision of public services.
The intermingling of public and private that marks the BID has long
been characteristic of local government, even if the particular synthesis
represented by the BID is a new form. Local government is both the
most and least "public" form of government. The small size of local gov-
ernments, relative to the states and the nation, is said to afford ordinary
citizens a greater opportunity to voice their views, contact and oversee
elected officials, inform themselves about issues, participate in public life,
40. Zukin, supra note 23, at 32.
41. Howard Wolfson, New York Bets on BIDs, Metropolis: The Urban Magazine of
Architecture and Design, Apr. 1992, at 15, 21 (quoting Leanne Rivlin, Professor of
Environmental Psychology at the City University of New York).
42. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Central Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 152 F.3d 92, 124-25 (2d Cir.
1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 306 (quoting the oft-cited article by Robert B.
Reich, The Secession of the Successful, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 3);
Richard Stengel, Bowling Together: Civic Engagement in America Isn't Disappearing But
Reinventing Itself, Time, July 22, 1996, at 35 (BIDs and gated communities "represent a
secession of a smaller, more privileged community from the larger one").
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and engage in democratic self-determination. The "polis" metaphor cap-
tures this vision of local government as grass-roots democracy.44
Localities also provide the physical setting for much of public life.
The streets of the city "more than any other human artifact, have come to
symbolize public life, with all its human contact, conflict, and toler-
ance."45 City streets, sidewalks, parks, town commons, and central
squares are "our great scenes of the civic, visible and accessible, our bind-
ing agents,"46 the places where the public itself emerges out of the
omnium gatherum of people of different classes, backgrounds, and
beliefs.47
Yet, local government is also the most "private" level of government.
Local autonomy fragments states into hundreds ofjurisdictions, each fo-
cused narrowly on the well-being of the constituency within its bounda-
ries rather than on the state or region as a whole,48 each struggling with
its neighbors for the resources it needs to satisfy its constituents' de-
mands. Interlocal tax base differences can produce enormous disparities
in revenues and public services. Moreover, the interlocal competition for
a tax base provides mobile taxpayers-particularly businesses and afflu-
ent residents-with strategic leverage to influence local tax, service, and
regulatory policies. To attract investment, local governments often focus
on the provision of "the environment of private opportunity,"49 not the
promotion of public discourse. Moreover, American local governments
have long been closely associated with the regulation of land and the pro-
vision of services and amenities that enhance the usefulness-and the
profitability-of land. Property owners, as a result, have usually played an
important role in local governance.
BIDs have emerged from this longstanding interplay of public and
private themes in American local government. But their distinctive com-
bination of public and private attributes, along with the important role
they play in many major cities, raises significant legal and policy issues.
44. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 346, 392-99 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism I].
45. Trevor Boddy, Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous City, inVariations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of Public Space 123(Michael Sorkin ed., 1992) [hereinafter Variations on a Theme Park].
46. Michael Sorkin, Introduction: Variations on a Theme Park, in Variations on a
Theme Park, supra note 45, at xv.
47. As sociologist David Brain put it, "the city has been seen as both historical location
and sociological bases for modem democratic politics." David Brain, From Public Housing
to Private Communities: The Discipline of Design and the Materialization of the Public/
Private Distinction in the Built Environment, in Public and Private in Thought and
Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy 238-39 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar
eds., 1997).
48. On the centrality of boundaries to the powers and duties of local governments,
see Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48
Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1128-32 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, Boundary Problem].
49. Sam Bass Warner, The Private City- Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth
3-21 (rev. ed. 1987).
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Resolving the questions posed by BIDs may also provide some insight into
the more general question of whether and how we can reconcile the
growing role of private and quasi-private institutions in providing services
considered public with the norms of public governance.
Parts I and II of this Article review the basic elements, and the legal
and political background, of BIDs. Part I examines the state laws of BID
formation, functions, finances, and governance. It provides an account
of the rules, procedures, and requirements that make BIDs a distinctive
legal fusion of public and private institutions, values, and concerns. Part
II then provides something of a genealogy of BIDs. It considers their
roots in the legal institutions of the special assessment and the special
purpose district as well as in the urban development policies of the last
half-century, suggests how this background affected BIDs' development,
and provides a context for considering the central legal and policy
questions.
Part I examines some of the federal and state constitutional
problems that BIDs raise. Most states that provide for elective BID boards
either limit the franchise to property owners or structure BID elections to
assure property owner or business control. This would violate the one
person, one vote doctrine-if that doctrine applies to BIDs. The
Supreme Court has held that one person, one vote applies to local gov-
ernments but has exempted many special districts from the rule.5 0 A BID
is nominally a special district, but the wide range of BID activities and the
broad impact of BIDs in their districts make the application of the special
district exemption to BIDs highly problematic. In a case involving the
largest BID in the United States, a divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently sustained the constitu-
tionality of NewYork's law providing for property owner voting control of
BIDs, 5 1 but it is far from clear that this decision lays the issue to rest. I
will suggest that close municipal government oversight of BIDs may justify
an exemption from one person, one vote, but I acknowledge that the
question is difficult and my answer relies on structures of municipal con-
trol that are impressive in theory, but may fall short in practice.
The one person, one vote challenge to BIDs assumes that property
owners have too great a say in BID elections; however, most of the litiga-
tion against BIDs actually comes from property owners who claim they
are unfairly burdened by BID assessments. Many state constitutions re-
strict property taxes in ways that would preclude the higher levels of taxa-
tion in city subunits that are characteristic of BID financing. State courts
50. See Ball v.James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). See generally Richard Briffault, Who Rules
at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339 (1993)
[hereinafter Briffault, Who Rules at Home?] (examining the scope of federal
constitutional protection of the right to vote at the local level, and factors that complicate
strict application of one person, one vote to local government).
51. See Kessler v. Grand Central Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998),
affg 960 F. Supp. 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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generally exempt special assessments from these constraints, but BID as-
sessments often seem more like property taxes than like traditional spe-
cial assessments. BID charges have, so far, survived state constitutional
challenge.52 In so doing, they have contributed to a reshaping of the
state constitutional law of taxation that may undermine the traditional
norm of uniformity of taxation within municipal borders.
These legal issues are intertwined with and symptomatic of the
broader policy questions of how BIDs fit with requirements of democratic
control and equal treatment that are normally applicable to local govern-
ments. Part IV examines those policy issues. The one person, one vote
question is the legal system's way of asking whether BIDs are accountable
to democratic control. Although most state laws provide ample opportu-
nities for oversight by elected municipal officials, it is unclear how effec-
tively cities monitor the BIDs within their jurisdiction, or whether, as BID
advocates maintain, more effective oversight will cripple the ability of
BIDs to function. I will suggest that some legal changes can improve the
prospects for effective municipal oversight, but I recognize that, at bot-
tom, the question is one of municipal will rather than legal authority.
Similarly, the state constitutional issues point to the differences in
tax and service levels within a city that result from the creation of a BID.
But whereas the legal challenge to BID assessments asserts that BID prop-
erty owners or businesses are being taxed too much, the policy issue fo-
cuses on the higher levels of services provided in BIDs-higher levels of
service based not on greater need or on municipal determination of ap-
propriate service levels but on the willingness and ability of businesses or
property owners to pay additional taxes.53 BIDs create distinctive fiscal
and service enclaves. They threaten to replicate within cities the frag-
mented political and fiscal structure and the interlocal public service ine-
qualities characteristic of most American metropolitan areas. At present,
BID budgets are just a small fraction of city finances, so the inequalities
are relatively minor. Moreover, BID services supplement city-provided
services while non-BID neighborhoods continue to receive preexisting
levels of services. But once the principle of additional taxes for addi-
tional services is established, the inequalities could grow. The rise of
52. See, e.g., McGowan v. Capital Center, Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d 642 (S.D. Miss. 1998)
(BID assessment not a tax and thus not subject to requirement of "uniformity" of taxation);
Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (BID assessment not a
"special tax" subject to Proposition 13); S.O.L. Club, Inc. v. City of Williamsport, 443 A.2d
410, 411-12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (BID assessment not a tax and thus not subject to
requirement of "uniformity" of taxation); City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc.,
787 P.2d 39, 49 (Wash. 1990) (same). California's recently adopted Proposition 218 may
have tightened the benefit-assessment nexus in ways that will be difficult for BIDs to satisfy.
See infra text accompanying notes 486-499.
53. For other contemporary instances of the use of distinctive tax, service, or
regulatory strategies in subcity areas, see Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures




BIDs, therefore, forces us to consider the place of equality in the delivery
of urban public services and whether, under what circumstances, and to
what extent some wealth-based service inequality is appropriate within
cities.
I conclude this Article by considering the implications of BIDs for
the urban public sphere and the public/private debate. Although both
advocates and critics have tended to see BIDs as a form of privatization,
they are public institutions with a public mission. Emerging after decades
of urban decline-and of public policies that failed to arrest that de-
cline-BIDs are a mechanism for providing the public services and invest-
ment that financially-strapped cities need if they are to survive. Their
distinctly urban focus on creating and maintaining public places that are
clean, safe, and attractive has permitted them to contribute to the en-
hancement of the physical environment-the streets, parks, squares, and
other outdoor meeting places-necessary for public life.
5 4
Drawing on both the public and private sides of governance, BIDs
are like local government generally-only more so. In an era of tightly
limited city budgets, and powerful rhetorical challenges to the very legiti-
macy of urban government action, the BID is a public-private hybrid that
can function as an asset, not a threat, to the local public sphere. To be
sure, BIDs require a degree of oversight by municipal government which,
however authorized by law, may be difficult to achieve in practice. The
BID model of a district-level mechanism used to raise and spend addi-
tional funds entirely within that district also needs to be limited to those
districts that serve a broader city interest, lest the BID device degenerate
into a mechanism for increasing intracity inequality. Nevertheless, when
properly monitored and limited, BIDs can advance many of the values
associated with public governance.
I. THE BAsIcs oF BIDs
A. The Law and Politics of BID Formation
1. BID Enabling Legislation. - The law of BID formation varies con-
siderably from state to state, 55 but the creation of a BID generally involves
54. A leading analysis of the central role of the physical environment in healthy cities
is Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961).
55. The rules may even vary considerably within one state. Several states-California,
Pennsylvania, and Texas-provide more than one means of creating BIDs and BID-like
bodies. Compare Parking and Business Improvement Area Law of 1965, Cal. Sts. & High.
Code §§ 36000-36081 (West 1969), with Parking and Business Improvement Area Law of
1989, Cal. Sts. & High. Code §§ 36500-36551 (West Supp. 1999), and Property and
Business Improvement District Law of 1994, Cal. Sts. & High. Code §§ 36600-36651 (West
Supp. 1999). Compare Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 372.001-372.030 (West 1988)
(public improvement districts), with id. §§ 375.001-375.281 (West Supp. 1999) (municipal
management districts). Compare Pennsylvania Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 53, §§ 301-322 (West 1997) (amended 1980), with Business Improvement
District Act of 1996, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5401-5406 (West 1997) (originally enacted
as Business Improvement District Act of 1967, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 1551).
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formal actions by both the city government and the private sector. Prop-
erty owners or businesses-depending on whether the BID is financed by
taxes on property or on business-typically initiate the process and play
the leading role, but the rules and procedures are determined by state
and city governments, and, in nearly all jurisdictions, the consent of the
city government is necessary to establish the BID. Although many com-
mentators claim BID formation requires a majority vote of property own-
ers (or businesses) in the proposed district,5 6 formal private sector ap-
proval is often not necessary, and district-level voting on the creation of a
BID is rarely required.5 7 Still, a BID is not likely to be established without
substantial district-level private sector support.
The BID formation process is typically initiated by a petition signed
by the owners of some significant fraction of the property (or businesses)
that would be subject to BID assessment. The petition proposes the dis-
trict's boundaries and outlines basic aspects of its financial and service
plan. The states vary with respect to the degree of district-level support
needed to initiate the process, ranging from as little as twenty percent,58
to as much as two-thirds,5 9 of property (or business) interests in the dis-
trict, with most states requiring the support of a majority.60 The most
common denominator for measuring support is property in the district
weighted according to assessed valuation 6 ' or to the assessment the
owner would pay.62 Some states, however, look to the number of owners,
56. See, e.g., Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 16 ("In most cases, state law requires
some form of vote by those affected, either before or after the city council passes an
enabling ordinance."); Simon Jenkins, What London Can Learn From New York, Evening
Standard, Sept. 6, 1996, at 9 ("Businesses within a defined neighbourhood have been
asked if they wish to vote for a committee with the power to surcharge their local rates to
improve local services."); Lueck, supra note 26, at Al (BIDs created by a vote of property
owners); Alan Pike, A Private Tax for Cleaner Streets, Fin. Times, Jan. 9, 1997, at 22
("[s] etting up a BID requires majority support in a vote of businesses in the district"). A
more sophisticated error is that a majority of district property owners must petition for a
BID. See Herbert Hadad, Business Groups Reclaiming Inner-City Districts, Times-
Picayune, Nov. 14, 1996, at A13. In some states, the requirement is well below a majority of
property owners, and in some states a petition is not required.
57. One case in which a vote is necessary is Baltimore, where the amendment to the
Baltimore City Charter adopted by the Maryland legislature conditions the effectiveness of
any Baltimore ordinance establishing the Downtown Commercial District Management
Authority on approval, in an election, by the owners of properties subject to BID charges.
58. Ind. Code Ann. § 36-9-38-8 (Michie 1998) (a petition filed by the owners of 20%
of the surface area of the real property of the proposed district is sufficient to trigger the
process provided the associations also include the owners of 15 separate parcels).
59. Ala. Code § 11-54B-5(a) (1975).
60. See, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36621(a) (West 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-
1205 (1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 36-43-5(1) (1993); Idaho Code § 50-2603 (1998); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 400, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1998); W. Va. Code § 8-13A-6 (1998).
61. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-54B-5(a) (1975).




the number of parcels, the land area, or to some combination of property
value and the number of parcels or owners. 63
Once petitions with the requisite number of signatures are filed, the
matter goes to city hall. The creation of a BID usually requires the enact-
ment of a local law or ordinance. That ordinance will typically track the
BID petition, and will address such basic questions as the BID's bounda-
ries, functions, budget, and financing formula.64 Typically, the munici-
pality can shrink, but not expand, the area within the BID, or reduce, but
not increase, the proposed assessments. The decision whether to create
the BID is a matter of city discretion: Even overwhelming private sector
support within the proposed district cannot force the municipality to es-
tablish the BID.65
In many states, city hall action is not the final step. Landowners (or
businesses if they are subject to assessment) may get an opportunity to
veto the municipality's approval of the proposed BID. District landown-
ers or businesses subject to assessment may block the BID if a significant
fraction of them file written protests within a specified period of time.66
As with the initiating petitions, the state protest provisions vary, with most
requiring a majority of the private sector interest subject to assessment,
measured by number of owners or assessed valuation, to sign protests in
order to block a municipally authorized BID.67 Although landowners (or
63. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 11-242-4 (1997) (owners of 51% of assessed valuation
and 25% of the number of individual properties); Iowa Code Ann. § 386.3 (West 1998)
(25% of owners and 25% of assessed valuation); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 400, § 3 (Law. Co-op.
1998) (51% of assessed valuation and 60% of owners); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 428A.08 (West
1998) (owners of 25% of land area and owners of 25% or more of net tax capacity of the
district); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-4026 (1997) (owners of 30% of assessable front footage or
users of 30% of space in business area); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-63-6 (Michie 1995) (majority of
the real property by assessed valuation and real property owners within the proposed
district); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-84-511 (1992) (majority of owners and two-thirds of assessed
valuation); Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 375.022 (West 1999) (majority of the real property
by assessed valuation or 50 owners of real property).
64. The failure of a city council to specifically set forth by ordinance the
improvements to be made by the BID and the estimated costs of those improvements led
the Nebraska Supreme Court to invalidate a BID in Foote Clinic, Inc. v. City of Hastings,
580 N.W.2d 81, 85-86 (Neb. 1998).
65. But .Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48-575(C) (West 1998) (municipality "shall" create a
BID proposed by a petition signed by all property owners in the district).
66. In some states, the protest period falls between two actions of the local legislature.
In these states, the local government passes a preliminary resolution outlining the
boundaries and financial plan of the proposed BID, and then must wait a period of time-
typically 30 to 60 days-in which protests may be filed. If the number of protests received
falls below the statutory threshold, then the municipality may proceed to final enactment
of the ordinance creating the BID. See Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36625 (West 1999). In
other states, the municipality may create the BID, but the district does not become
effective until after the period for filing written protests has elapsed. See Ala. Code § 11-
54B-7.
67. See, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36625 (West 1999); Idaho Code § 50-2606
(1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 7-12-1114 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-4027 (1997); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 3-63-8 (Michie 1995); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 35.87A.060 (West 1998). Some states
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firms) can veto a BID approved by the city, they cannot overturn a munic-
ipal decision to reject a BID that received sufficient district-level petition
support to qualify for municipal consideration.
Not all states offer this combination of private initiation, public ac-
tion, and opportunity for private protest. Some provide for initiation by
district petitions but not for district protests. 68 In other states, the city
government may take the initiative, without waiting for a petition, but
district owners (or businesses) can petition to block the BID.69 Where an
initiating petition is not required, district-level private sector input in BID
development may be formalized by a "district planning commission"70 or
"business improvement board"71 composed of firms or landowners from
the area considered for a BID. Its recommendations concerning district
boundaries, functions, and finances will frame the city government's
deliberations. 7 2
Not all states require both public and private action. In some states,
a BID may be created either by the city government alone, without a dis-
trict-level petition or an opportunity for district protests to block the
BID.73 These states may require the municipality to give special notice
and an opportunity for comment to property owners (or firms) in the
area in which it intends to create a BID,74 or direct the city to appoint an
advisory board composed of district-level business or property interests to
make recommendations concerning the BID's services and finances.7 5
enable protests by a smaller fraction of property or business interests to block a BID. See,
e.g., Ala. Code § 11-54B-7 (1994) (protests by owners of one-third of parcels); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 428A.09(2) (West 1999) (owners of 35% of the land area in the district subject to
assessment or owners of 35% of the net tax capacity of district property may block
formation of a special services district approved by local ordinance); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 66.608(2) (d) (West 1990) (owners of 40% of assessed valuation). Some require
significantly more than 50% to block the BID. See, e.g., Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann.
§ 372.010(c) (West 1988) (two-thirds of owners or owners of two-thirds of property).
68. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-25-1207 (West 1998); Ga. Code Ann. § 36-43-5
(1993); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91.754 (Michie 1996).
69. See, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36525 (West 1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-1789
(1991 & Supp. 1997); Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.117 (1993); S.D. Codified Law, § 9-55-10 (Michie
1995). In Pennsylvania, property owners may not block formation of a business district
authority, but written protests by the owners of one-third of the benefited properties in the
district, or by the owners of one-third of the valuation of the benefited properties, may
block the municipality from enacting the business district authority's plan, e.g., its budget
and proposed method of assessment. See Pennsylvania Downtown Center, Forming a
Business District Authority in Pennsylvania 8-10, 25 [hereinafter PDC] (updated manual
explaining the business district authority law and its application).
70. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-1785 (1991).
71. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-4021 (1997); S.D. Codified Laws § 9-55-5 (Michie
1995).
72. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 3-63-9 to -10 (Michie 1995).
73. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 1503 (1997); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:121
(1988 & Supp. 1996); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-66 (West 1992); Okla. Stat. §39-103.1 (1992).
74. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-71 (West 1992).
75. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:122 (1988 & Supp. 1996).
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However, special notice to, or input from, district interests is not always
required.76
The only state that makes no provision for local government involve-
ment in the creation of a BID, and also one of the very few states that
provides for district-level input by election rather than through petition,
is Mississippi. Under a law enacted in 1995,77 the process is triggered by a
petition signed by at least twenty percent of the property owners in an
area.78 They are then required to call a meeting of property owners
within the proposed district. The BID will go forward only if a majority of
the property owners in attendance agree on a plan of boundaries, im-
provements, assessments, and governance. 79 That plan, in turn, must be
submitted to a vote by the district's property owners. The BID is estab-
lished if approved by those who would pay seventy percent of the district's
assessments.80 The municipal role is limited to a public hearing before
the election to review the plan and receive public comments and, after
the election, to the mayor's review of the plan to determine whether it
complies with the statute's prescriptions.81
2. BID Formation in Practice. - The formal legal rules of BID forma-
tion tell only part of the story. Even in states that do not require a neigh-
borhood petition, some district-level property owner or business initiative
is usually necessary to start the process, and a private sector proposal gen-
erally shapes whatever district the city government ultimately adopts.8 2 A
study of thirteen BIDs in six states, including some that do not have a
petition provision, found that "the initiative comes from business lead-
ers," and BID boundaries, programs, finances, and governance structures
grow out of "business world intramural discussion."83
76. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. dit. 22, § 1503 (1997).
77. Mississippi Business Improvement District Act, 1995 Miss. Laws 442 (codified in
Miss. Code Ann. at §§ 21-43-101 to -133 (Supp. 1998)).
78. Id. at § 21-43-111.
79. Id. at § 21-43-113.
80. Id. at §§ 21-43-115 to -119. Although votes are weighted'according to assessments,
no single property owner's vote may exceed one-third of the total number of votes which
may be cast. Id. at § 21-43-115.
81. Id. at § 21-43-117(6). The Mississippi law appears to be onerous in practice. The
first BID proposed for the state, in downtown Jackson, failed in 1995 when it received
support from property owners representing 61%, but not the statutory 70% of square
footage. See Nita McCann, For SecondYear in a Row, Downtown Property Owners Debate
BID, 18 Miss. Bus. J. 1 5 (May 13, 1996) <http://www.msbusiness.com/mbj051396/
BID.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review). On a second try, with boundaries
reconfigured to exclude some opponents, the BID received 74% of the square footage
vote. See Will Pinkston, Vote Makes Business Improvement District a Reality in Jackson,
Clarion-Ledger, July 4, 1996, at 1A. City voters unsuccessfully challenged this procedure
under the federal Voting Rights Act. See Parker-Weaver v. Fordice (S.D. Miss. 1998)
(unpublished), affd mem., 119 S. Ct. 791 (1999).
82. See, e.g., PDC, supra note 69, at 12 ("the private sector should lead the
initiative").
83. Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 14-16.
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The impetus for a BID may come from one or a handful of leading
businesses or institutions;8 4 from a developer seeking enhanced munici-
pal services to make a new project more marketable to potential ten-
ants;85 from a not-for-profit community development corporation or
more loosely organized community groups;8 6 or, most commonly, from
an existing downtown association, chamber of commerce, merchants' as-
sociation, or public-private partnership.8 7 The downtown association may
push for the BID to promote downtown revitalization, or from the more
self-interested hope that it will be hired to manage the BID and, thus, be
able to rely on BID assessments for funding instead of having to struggle
to raise voluntary donations from merchants or realtors.88 The city gov-
ernment may also take a role in starting the process. City officials may
prod business figures to form a BID to finance services or improvements
in neighborhoods critical to the city's economy,8 9 and city officials may
be involved in the formulation of the BID's program. 90 In Los Angeles,
84. New York's 14th Street-Union Square BID-the first New York City BID created
pursuant to state general enabling legislation-was "the joint initiative of the heads of the
Consolidated Edison Company, the Guardian Life Insurance Company, and the New
School." Douglas Martin, Districts to Improve Business Proliferate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25,
1994, at B3. See also MacDonald, supra note 13, at 32 (describing the creation of the
Grand Central BID).
85. See, e.g., Edward T. Rogowsky et al., New York City's Outer Borough
Development Strategy: Case Studies in Urban Revitalization, in Urban Revitalization:
Policies and Programs 69 (Fritz W. Wagner et al. eds., 1995) (noting that Forest City
Enterprises, the developer of the multimillion dollar Metrotech office park in downtown
Brooklyn, "took the lead in organizing a Business Improvement District, including the
Metrotech development and a few surrounding institutions in order to provide a high level
of services and organizational support").
86. See, e.g., New York City Dep't of Bus. Services, Establishing and Operating a
Business Improvement District: A Step-By-Step Guide 1 (1996) [hereinafter DBS Guide)
("Regardless who initiates the BID, however, no BID effort will succeed without the active
support of a local sponsoring organization.... ."); John Holusha, Making A BID to Improve
a Bronx Neighborhood, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1996, at R7 (discussing evolution of
community anti-graffiti campaign into "a full-blown business improvement district").
87. See, e.g., PDC, supra note 69, at 12-13; Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 16;
Pike, supra note 56, at 22 (Baltimore BID grew out of Downtown Partnership); Profitable
Partnership: Downtown Group Did Much More Than Just Save Itself, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Jan. 22, 1997, at A10 (creation of Pittsburgh BID provided funding needed by
Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership).
88. See, e.g., Cliff Peale, Council is Last Hurdle for Downtown District, Cincinnati
Post, Aug. 7, 1997, at 6B (on the role of Downtown Cincinnati, Inc. in pressing for the
creation of the Downtown Cincinnati Improvement District); Leah Beth Ward, Downtown:
Property Owners Debate Need for Tax; "Privatized" District Could Attempt to Solve
Specific Problems, Cincinnati Enquirer, Aug. 25, 1996, atJ1 (same).
89. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 13, at 33 (NewYork City's mayor urged business
leaders to form what became the Grand Central BID); PDC, supra note 69, at 13
(describing the leading role of mayor of Mount Pleasant in forming that city's BID).
90. In New York City, for example, the Department of Business Services ("DBS")
insists on being "involved from the outset of the BID effort." DBS Guide, supra note 86, at




the city provides sponsors with seed money to assist in the development of
the BID plan and in its initial presentation to property owners.9 1
The creation of a BID usually requires proponents to invest consider-
able time, energy, and funds. New York City's Department of Business
Services ("DBS)-the agency responsible for overseeing the City's BID
program-notes that "no BID effort will succeed without the active sup-
port of a local sponsoring organization which is willing to undertake the
work."92 According to DBS's guide to BID formation, the sponsor ought
to select a project leader and a steering committee who will be responsi-
ble for proposing district boundaries; for assembling a detailed database
on the property owners, properties, and merchants within the proposed
BID; for determining the BID's services, budget, and assessments; and for
building support for the BID within the proposed district.93 The sponsor
will need to hire consultants to inventory the district's properties to deter-
mine uses, vacancies, and other factors relevant to the BID's finances; to
undertake studies to determine whether the area can sustain additional
assessments and whether the service program will benefit owners; and to
develop a strategy to win the support of those who would be subject to
BID taxation.9 4 DBS reviews the contents of the BID proposal, requires
the sponsor to develop a community outreach plan, and assesses the ade-
quacy of the sponsor's mailings, meetings, and use of media to notify
property owners in the proposed district.
In practice, local governments may press proponents to demonstrate
greater district-level private sector support for the BID than state or local
law requires. Although New York law requires the support ofjust a major-
ity of potential assessment payers as a condition for public approval of a
BID, New York City's DBS will not allow a BID proposal even to begin the
statutory public approval process unless the agency is provided with "doc-
umented support of a supermajority of property and business own-
ers" 9 5 -with "supermajority" typically meaning at least eighty percent.9 6
In other cities, too, "consensus"-that is, more support from property
91. See, e.g., Darrell Saltzman, Funds Allocated to Study Improvements, L.A Times,
July 25, 1996, at B3 (Los Angeles city council appropriates $225,000 to pay for consultants
to assist in planning BIDs for Chatsworth, Northridge, and Granada Hills).
92. DBS Guide, supra note 86, at 1.
93. See id. at 1-13. Similarly, according to a manual prepared by the New York City
Partnership, the first step in starting a BID is the formation of "[a]n initial core group of
property owners, business people, and commercial tenants" known as the "sponsor" to
prepare the district plan, build support for the proposal within the district, and move the
proposal through the statutory approval process. See New York City Partnership, The Bid
Manual: Establishing and Managing a Business Improvement District 2, 5 (1995)
[hereinafter The BID Manual].
94. See PPS, supra note 11, at 24-26.
95. Id. at 2, 13.
96. See The BID Manual, supra note 93, at 10. Even this may not be enough to assure
consensus. In 1996 and 1997, DBS submitted two BID proposals to the City Council which
drew sufficient property owner objections that the Council was required to disapprove the
BIDs. See Council of the City of New York, Managing the Micropolis: Proposals to
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owners or businesses in the district than the statutory minimum of a sim-
ple majority-may be required in practice before the city government will
approve a BID proposal.9 7
Such consensus usually takes time to achieve. According to one
manual on BID formation, "the door-to-door communication about the
district plan and program must be thorough and relentless." 98 A study of
BIDs in five large cities found the process took an average of sixteen
months.9 9 In New York City, it takes closer to three years, 100 with nine to
twelve months for the hearings, waiting periods, reviews, and opportuni-
ties for written protests that are mandated by law,10 and eighteen
months to two years consumed by the sponsor's development of the plan,
community outreach, revision of the plan in light of community re-
sponses, documenting of the necessary support, and review by DBS prior
to submission to the public approval process.' 0 2 The creation of
Philadelphia's Center City BID took five years. 10 3
BIDs are not always welcomed with open arms by district property
owners or merchants.' 0 4 The BID proposal may trigger an intense debate
over the quality of existing public services, the burdens to individual own-
ers of the proposed assessments, and the economic value of the proposed
services. Some business or property owners will oppose a BID. The own-
ers of large office buildings, who would often pay the largest assessments,
may already be providing the supplemental sanitation and security serv-
ices that the BID would offer.10 5 At the other end of the economic spec-
Strengthen BID Performance and Accountability 7-10 (1997) [hereinafter Managing the
Micropolis].
97. See, e.g., Oregon Downtown Development Association, Economic Improvement
Districts At Work in Oregon 8 (1988) [hereinafter ODDA]; Mike Dries, Map to the Future,
Bus.J. 1, Dec. 21, 1996, at 8, 10 (discussing requirements for BID proposals in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin).
98. PDC, supra note 69, at 23.
99. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 18. In a later article, Houstoun reported
that a year and a half is the typical amount of time it takes to form a BID, with some BIDs
requiring two years or more to establish. See Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 9.
100. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 18.
101. See DBS Guide, supra note 86, at 13-14; The BID Manual, supra note 93, at
exh.6.
102. See DBS Guide, supra note 86, at 12; The BID Manual, supra note 93, at 23.
103. See PDC, supra note 69, at 24.
104. See id. at 10 ("In every city, some property owners opposed the EID [economic
improvement district-Oregon's term for a BID].").
105. See, e.g., ODDA, supra note 97, at 6 ("The most dangerous group is comprised
of large, property-owner occupied businesses."); McCann, supra note 81, 1 2 ("Major
property owners whose buildings were already sparkling clean and full of tenants and who
provide their own security did not see the point of paying an annual 9-cent-per-square-foot
fee to provide services for the whole of downtown Jackson."); Clifford Carlsen, Brighter
Economy Dims Outlook For Downtown Clean-Up Tax, S.F. Bus. Times, July 19, 1996, at 5
(lack of support from large hotels, which would have been subject to largest assessments,
contributed to defeat of proposed Center City District BID in San Francisco); Claudia H.
Deutsch, Tug-of-War Over A Business Improvement District, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1995, § 9,
at 9 (quoting the vice president of one large office tower, "We steam-clean our sidewalks,
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trum, small merchants, 10 6 parking lot owners, 10 7 and the "owners of tiny
lots and rundown vacant buildings" are reluctant to pay assessments "on
top of taxes they already claim are too burdensome." 0 8 Owners of facto-
ries and industrial properties, who have few walk-in customers, may be-
lieve they will receive little benefit from the additional trash pick-up,
street cleaning, and graffiti removal that the BID is intended to pro-
vide.10 9 Many owners are concerned about subjecting themselves to new
taxation and resent having to make an additional payment to finance
services they think should be paid for out of their existing' tax dollars." 0
Some, particularly the owners of residential property, may be unable to
pass on the BID's costs to tenants or customers."' Even when owners
agree about the value of a BID in principle, they may clash over the level
of taxation, the assessment formula, or the BID's programmatic
priorities.
As the proposal moves forward, the BID's boundaries may have to be
redrawn," 2 its service plan and budget cut back,"13 and its assessment
mechanism revised to ease the burden on objectors." 4 Consensus may
we patrol our streets, the city police and sanitation people work the area. We do not feel a
BID is needed here."). At the end of 1998, San Francisco appears to be on the verge of
reversing the 1996 rejection, and approving a BID for the Union Square, effective early
1999. See Edward Epstein, Improvement District Tax Plan Endorsed, S.F. Chron., Dec. 3,
1998, at A29.
106. See Kara Swisher & Rene Sanchez, "BIDs" Backed as Solution to Downtown
Blight: Business Improvement Districts Gain as Private-Sector Way to Revitalize City's
Core, Wash. Post, Apr. 14, 1992, at D1 (quoting owner of a shoe store, "We have our own
problems paying bills and taxes and other fixed costs we now have.").
107. See, e.g., Dan Monk, Critics Claim Taxing District Lacks Support, Cincinnati Bus.
Courier, Aug. 1, 1997, at 3 (noting that parking companies opted not to sign Downtown
Cincinnati Improvement District Petitions because the financing scheme, which collected
25% of the assessment from front footage, imposed a big hit on surface lots).
108. McCann, supra note 81, 1 3.
109. See, e.g., Lois Weiss, BID Fever Not Spreading in Long Island City, Real Estate
Wkiy., July 7, 1993, at 1.
110. See ODDA, supra note 97, at 7; Ward, supra note 88, atJl.
111. Many states limit BIDs to commercial or business districts, but the separation of
business and residence is rarely total, and residential parcels may be found in commercial
areas. Some states exempt residential parcels from assessment or limit their assessments to
nominal amounts. Owners of exempt parcels may not be given a voice in the BID
formation process. But where residential owners are subject to assessment their consent
must also be sought.
112. See, e.g., Mound Hardware v. City of Spokane, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 1940 (Ct.
App. Wash., Div. 3, 1997) at *4; ODDA, supra note 97, at 5 (advising BID proponents to
"be realistic about potential opponents and develop boundaries accordingly"); Henry,
supra note 20, at 27 ("The zig-zag boundaries on the 34th Street map illustrate the cajoling
of property owners that goes into establishing a district. ... Organizers have been willing to
exclude properties on the fringes to avoid a fight.").
113. See, e.g., Mound Hardware, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS at 5; Dan LeRoy, Revised
Urban Plan Gets More Support, Charleston Daily Mail, Sept. 2, 1997, at 1A.
114. See ODDA, supra note 97, at 6 (use of graduated assessment levels to reduce
opposition); Henry, supra note 20, at 27 (major retailers assessed at two-thirds rate of
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not be reached, and the BID may be aborted.1 15 Even if the city autho-
rizes the BID, property owner opponents may continue the fight by mus-
tering written protests"16 or taking the matter to court." 7
City governments are generally inclined to approve BDs that enjoy
district-level business backing," 8 but city officials may lower the proposed
assessment, n 9 redraw the boundaries to reduce the number of property
owners subject to assessment,12 0 or even reject a BID that satisfies the
formal statutory requirements.' 2 ' This is most likely to occur where state
law measures business support in terms of the assessed valuation of the
property at stake, rather than the number of owners. A relatively small
number of major landowners may control the share of property legally
required for district approval when property is calculated in terms of as-
sessed value. But as a political matter, elected city officials may be reluc-
tant to act unless there is support from a substantial fraction of all prop-
erty owners, large and small. 122
office buildings). Many states permit a variety of assessment mechanisms, so sponsors may
be able to choose a method less burdensome to a particular type of property owner.
115. See, e.g., ODDA, supra note 97, at 10 (failed BID proposals in Oregon);
Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 9 (six New Jersey BIDs "abandoned in the planning
stage"); Edward Epstein, Patrol Sweeps Up Downtown S.F., S.F. Chron., Oct. 23, 1996, at
A13 (discussing a "misfired attempt" to create a BID in downtown San Francisco); Dan
LeRoy, Retailer Says Plan for District is Dead But Councilman Says Opposition is Not
Reason It's OffAgenda, Charleston Daily Mail, Sept. 12, 1997, at 4B ("outcry from property
owners" led to halving of BID program, but reduced proposal still failed due to lack of
property owner support).
116. See, e.g., Easley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 130, 135 (Neb. 1983) (finding
that trial court erred in calculating percentage of landowners who protested); North Star
Lodge No. 227 v. City of Lincoln, 322 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Neb. 1982) ("[H]ad the statute
been properly interpreted and followed" the contested proceedings would have
terminated "due to the filing of written protests by more than the statutorily required 50
percent of assessable unit owners.").
117. See, e.g., Nesterak, supra note 2, at AA1 (lawsuit by commercial property owners
in Freehold, N.J. who did not believe that theywould benefit from BID as much as district
retailers).
118. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 16.
119. See, e.g., Rob Moritz, Proposed CBID Tax Could Hit Dead End, Nashville
Banner, Sept. 10, 1997, at B1 (Nashville City Council considering reduction in assessment
for proposed Central Business Improvement District from the level supported by the 58%
of downtown property owners who signed petition calling for creation of the CBID).
120. See, e.g., Larry Compton & Sally Compton, Anchorage Assembly Erred on BID
Borders, Anchorage Daily News, Sept. 4, 1997, at 7B (criticizing Anchorage city
government for reducing area of Downtown Business Improvement District despite
approval of larger boundaries by a majority of property owners within the proposed BID).
121. See Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 7-10 (noting that although 25
objections to the Noho BID came after the statutory deadline and were insufficient as a
matter of law to block the BID, the City Council persuaded the sponsor to cut the cost of
the program by 35% and to change the composition of the BID governing board to give
greater representation to commercial property owners).
122. See Guy Boulton & Perry Brothers, Council Panel OKs Downtown District,
Cincinnati Enquirer, Sept. 4, 1997, at B16 (Cincinnati Council finance committee
approved creation of Downtown Cincinnati Improvement District on petition signed by
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Ordinary residents-and even commercial tenants in a BID that
would be financed by property taxes-have little formal role in the pro-
cess. Their signatures have no legal weight in petitions for a BID or in
written protests to block one. BID-sponsor outreach efforts are focused
on property, although merchants, noncommercial neighborhood associa-
tions, not-for-profit development corporations, and community planning
boards may be contacted during the BID formation process. Residents
are heard, if at all, at the public hearings that most states require city
councils or other municipal bodies to conduct as part of the public pro-
cess of BID formation. 123 Even then, in many jurisdictions statutory no-
tice requirements are focused on reaching the property owners or busi-
nesses who would be subject to BID assessments rather than district
residents generally.
Still, although the process of BID formation tends to be dominated
by landowners or business interests-and significant private opposition
will usually block a BID-the ultimate decision in nearly all states is a
public one. Private interests can propose a BID, but for the most part
only a municipal government can create one.
3. Termination. - The provisions governing the termination of the
BID underscore the extent to which BIDs require the ongoing support of
both district business or property interests and city hall. However, in con-
trast to BID formation, which is likely to require both public and private
action, many states permit the termination of districts by either the city
government or the district private sector acting independently.
In a number of states, a BID is established for a limited period. Typi-
cally, the term is five years, 124 although in some states it is ten years,
125
and Delaware permits its municipalities to create BIDs with up to thirty-
year terms.' 26 Many states also provide for renewal or reauthorization of
the BID when the initial term expires. This may entail compliance with
the standards and procedures-including the property owner petition
owners who would pay 70% of proposed district assessment, even though Ohio law
required support from just 60%. The successful petition, representing owners of 70% of
assessable property, also represented 47% of property owners. An earlier petition, bearing
the signatures of property owners accounting for 61% of assessed valuation, had been
criticized because only 34% of all owners had signed the petition, with the 5 largest
property owners in downtown Cincinnati accounting for half the assessed valuation.) See
Dan Monk, Critics Claim Taxing District Lacks Support, Cincinnati Bus. Courier, Aug. 1,
1997, at 3.
123. In New York City, for example, community planning boards are given the
opportunity to conduct public hearings and submit written recommendations to the city
planning commission on BID proposals before the City Council can act. See N.Y. Gen.
Mun. Law § 980-d (McKinney Supp. 1999).
124. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-541-19 (1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2288 (Supp. 1998);
Ga. Code Ann. § 36-43-9 (1993 & Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 2143-131 (Supp. 1998);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-63-15 (Michie 1995).
125. See Mont. Code Ann. § 7-12-1141 (1997); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 39-103.1(D)
(West & Supp. 1999); W. Va. Code § 8-13A-15(b) (1998).
126. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 1503 (1997).
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and opportunity for protest-applicable to BID formation.' 27 Somejuris-
dictions employ looser criteria for renewal than for original creation.' 28
In other states, the BID enabling legislation does not limit the district's
life but, instead, restricts the period of the BID assessment to one year,' 2 9
four years,' 30 or five years. 13' Subsequent assessment would require new
municipal action.
Most of the states that do not limit the duration of their BIDs author-
ize either the assessment payers or the municipal government, or both, to
dissolve the BID. Some substantial fraction-usually a majority or
supermajority-of district property owners or businesses, measured in
terms of assessed valuation, area, or number of owners, can petition for
the dissolution of the BID.' 3 2 Unlike the formation process, the city typi-
cally has little discretion in the matter if the number of signatures on the
dissolution petition crosses the statutory threshold. Similarly, a number
of states expressly authorize the city government to dissolve the BID even
in the absence of property owner or business petitions, and without hav-
ing to obtain the approval of the property owners or businesses in the
BID.' 3 3 The municipal power to disband a BID can be limited if the BID
has issued long-term debt;' 34 however, many states do not authorize BIDs
to issue debt, and even in states that permit it, the city may have discre-
tion to determine in the ordinance creating the BID whether a particular
BID has power to incur debt.
There is less experience with BID termination than formation. Most
BIDs are relatively young and few have been terminated at the end of
127. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 36-43-9 (Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 21-43-131(Supp. 1998); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 39-103.1(d) (West Supp. 1999); W. Va. Code § 8-
13A-15(b) (1998).
128. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2288 (Supp. 1998).
129. See Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36534(a) (West Supp. 1999); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 40:56-81, 40:56-84 (West 1992).
130. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1710.02(F) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
131. See, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36622 (West Supp. 1998); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 91.754(1) (Michie Supp. 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.117(1)(d) (1997).
132. See Ala. Code § 11-54B-19 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-184-130 (Michie 1998);
Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36650 (West Supp. 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-25-1225(West Supp. 1998); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2288(b) (Supp. 1998); Idaho Code § 50-2618(1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 12-1789 (1991); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 91.762(2)-(3) (Michie
Supp. 1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 400, § 10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); Miss. Code Ann.§ 21-43-133 (Supp. 1998); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-n (McKinney Supp. 1998); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1710.13 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-84-529 (1998); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 66.608(4m) (West 1990).
133. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7-339s (West 1989); Idaho Code § 50-2618(1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-4035 (1997); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-n (McKinney Supp.
1998); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 39-103.1 (d) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999); S.D. Codified Laws§ 9-55-19 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-413 (1991); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 35.87A.180(West 1990); W. Va. Code § 8-13A-15(a) (1998). A number of these statutes provide that
the municipality may act only after notice and a hearing.
134. If a BID issues debt, the only way the municipality could terminate the BID while
the debt is outstanding is to assume the debt itself.
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their statutory period or otherwise dissolved.' 3 5 The limited record sug-
gests that BIDs may be terminated because of district-level opposition to
BID assessments or as a result of dissatisfaction at city hall, 13 6 but there
are too few reported discussions of BID terminations to permit any confi-
dent generalization.
B. Finances
BIDs are financed primarily by assessments or charges imposed on
property or businesses in the district. 137 These charges are in addition to
normally applicable state and local taxes. The BID, thus, differs from
other sublocal urban development structures, like the enterprise zone,
empowerment zone, or tax increment finance district, which rely on tax
breaks in the district, the infusion of other government money into the
district, or the reservation of revenues produced by existing taxes for fi-
nancing programs in a district.138 Frequently, but not always, only com-
mercial and industrial property is assessed.'3 9 The rules, however, vary
considerably from state to state, and some states authorize assessments
135. The most prominent instance involves the dissolution of the Lincoln Road BID
in Miami Beach, Florida, see Houstoun, ULI, supra note 3, at 174. In addition, in 1998,
New York City terminated the Grand Central Partnership's contract to manage the Grand
Central BID, see Thomas J. Lueck, Business Improvement District at Grand Central Is
Dissolved, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1998, at BI.
136. City Hall may promote district-level opposition by promising property owners it
can provide the additional services out of ordinary taxes without need of a BID assessment.
See Houstoun, ULI, supra note 3, at 174.
137. In most states, the additional taxes are special assessments against property in the
district, which are paid by the property's owner. These assessments may be based on
valuation, front footage, square footage, property tax payment, precise location within the
district, the use to which the property is put, or a combination of methods. See, e.g., Ala.
Code § 11-54B-8 (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-184-118 (Michie 1998); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 31-25-1219 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-72 (West 1992); N.Y. Gen.
Mun. Law § 980-j (McKinney Supp. 1998). Due to a special provision of the Illinois
Constitution, Illinois Special Service Areas may be financed by increases in the property tax
rather than special assessments. See Illinois Dep't of Commerce and Community Affairs,
Office of Urban Assistance, Special Service Area Financing 2, 6 (1988).
Several states provide for BIDs that are financed out of surcharges on business taxes,
such as the business license fee, or occupation tax. Some states offer the option of both
property tax and business tax BIDs. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 36-43-6 (1993); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 19-4018 (1997); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-85 (West 1992); S.D. Codified Laws § 9-55-2
(Michie 1995).
138. See Briffault, Sublocal Structures, supra note 53, at 509-11 (enterprise and
empowerment zones), 512-14 (tax increment finance districts).
139. See, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36634(b) (West Supp. 1999) (exempting
agricultural and residential property); Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.114(2) (c) (1997) (same); Wis.
Stat. § 66.608(5) (a) (West 1990) (exempting residential property). Some states exempt
only single-family owner-occupied housing, or only property zoned residential, thus
permitting assessments of property zoned commercial that is in residential use. Others do
not mandate exemptions but permit municipalities to exempt residential or other
noncommercial property. See, e.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-66b (West 1992); Tex. Loc.




against residential or other types of noncommercial property, although
usually at rates lower than that applied to commercial property. 40 Due
to its reliance on district charges, a BID is generally viewed as "self-sup-
ported"' 41 or "self-financing,"142 and as avoiding "further demand on the
strained public treasury."143
BID assessments are generally small compared to property taxes. As-
sessments appear to run under-often well under-ten percent of local
property taxes, or under one percent of assessed valuation. In some
states the level of assessment is capped by the BID enabling law;' 44 in
most states assessments are effectively capped by the need to win the sup-
port of those who have to pay the assessments in order to get the BID
created in the first place. Thus, although New York law permits a BID's
assessment to run as high as twenty percent of the city property taxes
collected in the district,145 assessments in two of the city's largest BIDs
amount to about two percent of property tax payments. Assessments in
Philadelphia's Center City District-one of the largest BIDs in the coun-
try-are six percent of property taxes. 146 A 1990 study of six NewJersey
BIDs found that their surcharges ranged between 2% and 8.7% of ex-
isting taxes. 147 The assessment in Pittsburgh's downtown BID is 4.25% of
local property taxes. 148 According to a 1995 study, the assessment in
Dallas's downtown BID was 1.7% of total property taxes paid in 1992, and
was projected to rise to 3.0% in 1996.149 The highest assessment rate for
the downtown Denver BID was fifty-seven cents per one hundred dollars
of assessed valuation; in Portland, Oregon, the rate was thirty-four cents
per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation.1 50 A survey of twenty-
three BIDs across the country, conducted by the Pittsburgh Downtown
Partnership in 1995, found that assessments generally ranged from six to
140. In New York City, the Department of Business Services recommends that fully
residential properties be assessed at the nominal rate of one dollar per year. See DBS
Guide, supra note 86, at 11.
141. Iowa Code Ann. § 386.1 (West 1976 & Supp. 1998).
142. E.g., NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-65 (West 1992).
143. Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 1501(4) (1997).
144. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 50-1703A(6) (1994) (no parcel may be assessed more
than 20% of its market value); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 400, § 7 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1998)(total assessments may not exceed one-half of one percent of the assessed valuation of
property owned by participating members in the district); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 71.800 (West
1998); Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.114(2) (a) (1997) (assessments capped at one percent of real
market value of real property in district).
145. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-k(b) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
146. See Center City District Philadelphia's Business Improvement District (last
modified Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.centercityphila.org./ccdinfo.html> [hereinafter
Center City BID] (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
147. See IDA, supra note 10, at 24.
148. See Kari Hudson, Special District Governments: Examining the Questions of
Control, Am. City & County, Sept. 1996, at 66.
149. See Downtown Improvement District, supra note 2, at 14.
150. See IDA, supra note 10, at 42.
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eight cents per square foot-15 1 Another recent study found that BID as-
sessments were typically ten to twelve cents per square foot.
152
With property ownership in some downtowns concentrated in rela-
tively few hands, a small number of big landowners may pay a significant
fraction of a BID's bills. 15 3 The Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership found
that, in the twenty-three BIDs surveyed, the ten largest properties in a
district on average accounted for forty-two percent of the district's assess-
ments. 15 4 Another study found that in Philadelphia, fifteen properties-
out of more than two thousand subject to assessment-accounted for
thirty-seven percent of the Center City District's assessments, and the top
two hundred properties paid eighty-seven percent of the assessments.
15 5
Conversely, owners of smaller, or lower valued properties, pay much
smaller assessments. In 1994, the average annual assessment of the six-
teen BIDs that responded to this question in the Pittsburgh Downtown
Partnership survey was $4,729156-and the Pittsburgh survey focused on
relatively large BIDs. In other BIDs, annual assessments, particularly
those paid by smaller landowners, are likely to be just a few hundred
dollars.' 57
District assessments are the primary, but not the sole, source of BID
funds. One analyst, writing in 1992, determined that assessments ac-
counted for about seventy percent of BID revenues.' 58 The Pittsburgh
survey determined that property owner assessments provided eighty-four
percent of the budget for the responding BIDs; for eight BIDs, assess-
ments were the sole source of funds, and five other BIDs received more
than ninety percent of funds from assessments. 159 Many districts are
151. See Hudson, supra note 148, at 66.
152. See Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 8.
153. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 16.
154. See Hudson, supra note 148, at 71.
155. See Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 8. The largest assessment paid in
Philadelphia was over $300,000. See id. Perhaps the largest single assessment paid by any
property owned is the half million dollar charge imposed on the Empire State Building,
located in New York's 34th Street BID. See MacDonald, supra note 13, at 40.
156. Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership, Survey of Business Improvement Districts 5
(1995). The median assessment in the nine BIDs that responded to this question was
$16,234. See id.
157. The Project for Public Spaces study conducted for the International Downtown
Association in 1991 estimated that "a dollar a day is a reasonable amount for small retailers
to pay during the initial start up." PPS, supra note 11, at 27.
158. See Pack, supra note 5, at 20.
159. See Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership, supra note 156, at 4. See also NY COM,
supra note 2, at 6, 12, 16-20 (special assessments sole source of revenues for BIDs in
Downtown Elmira, Downtown Albany, Cedarhurst, Great Neck, Patchogue, Peekskill, and
Greater Port Washington). The PDP survey almost surely undercounts the percentage of
BID revenues that come from assessments since it states that New York's Grand Central
BID had a 1994 budget of $130 million, with assessments providing $8 million. The $130
million is far greater than all other accounts of the Grand Central budget, which place the
figure at about $14 million. See Bureau of Management Audit, The City of New York
Office of the Comptroller, Audit Report on the Internal Controls and Operating Practices
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funded entirely by assessments, but others receive funds from other
sources, including voluntary payments from tax-exempt property owners,
proceeds of bonds backed by district revenues, interest income, and
funds generated by charges for district operations, such as the manage-
ment of district-owned facilities160 or the sale of district services. 16 1 BIDs
may also receive public funds, including federal or state economic devel-
opment grants, 162 payments from governments owning property in the
district, 163 revenues generated from managing publicly owned facili-
ties, 164 or appropriations from city or county treasuries. 16 5 Overall, prob-
ably less than ten percent of BID revenues comes from general govern-
ment funds,' 66 but for some BIDs the percentage may be far greater.' 67
In addition to occasionally providing municipal treasury funds, city
governments play three important roles in financing BIDs. First, most
BIDs rely on the municipal tax collection system to obtain their assess-
of the Grand Central Partnership Business Improvement District ES-2 (1997) [hereinafter
Comptroller's Audit]. The PDP study may incorporate Grand Central's debt-based capital
program, although that is far less than $130 million. Aside from Grand Central,
assessments amounted to more than 80% of BID budgets in 16 cases out of 22
observations, and between 50% and 79% in three more cases.
160. See NY COM, supra note 2, at 6 (more than one-third of the revenues of the
Coming Intown BID in Coming, New York comes from the management of a parking
garage).
161. This may include sales of services to firms or property owners outside the BID.
See, e.g., Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 5-6.
162. See Idaho Falls Post-Register, Dec. 11, 1996 (Idaho BIDs created to receive
CDBG and TIF funds).
163. See General Services Administration News Release, GSA Creates Good Neighbor
Program: A New Partnership with America's Cities, Sept. 30, 1996, at I [hereinafter GSA]
(GSA to contract for security, maintenance, cleaning and other services from BIDs); Jean
Van Valkenburgh, Feds to Help Mall Maintenance, Memphis Com. Appeal, Dec. 18, 1996,
at 8B (GSA to contribute $21,000 to Center City Commission for maintenance of Main
Street Mall in Memphis's Central Business Improvement District).
164. See IDA, supra note 10, at 42 (approximately 40% of the revenue of the
Portland, Oregon downtown BID comes from the management of seven city garages).
165. See, e.g., Elliott v. Morgan, 571 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Wis. 1997) (Milwaukee BID
received $8.5 million from the city in addition to $1.945 million in special assessments);
Jody Callahan, Yet Another Plan Offered for Central Business Area, Memphis Com.
Appeal, Nov. 28, 1996, at 1OEC (Memphis BID receives $250,000 apiece from city and
county); Ernst-Ulrich Franzen, Opel OK'd Loan to Cover BID Deficit; Officials Disagree
Over Whether District Knew of Revenue Shortfall, MilwaukeeJ.-Sentinel, Dec. 11, 1996, at
1 (city provided $26,000 out of BID's $137,000 in revenues and then provided additional
$15,000 to cover budget deficit); Mark Glover, Businesses on Fulton Rev Up for Self-Help,
Sacramento Bee, Apr. 1, 1998, at Cl (Sacramento county funds will match BID assessment
funds).
166. See Pack, supra note 5, at 20.
167. See, e.g., Elliot 571 N.W.2d at 867 (large city grant to a BID to fund Riverwalk
construction project); Glover, supra note 165, at Cl. As previously noted, governments
may provide BID sponsors with "seed money" during the BID formation process, although
this may have to be repaid from assessments once the BID is established.
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ments. The municipality, not the BID, typically bills the owners or busi-
nesses subject to assessment and gathers the payments.168
Second, municipalities usually have some formal control over BID
finances. Generally, the assessment mechanism, including the formula
applied to particular parcels or firms, must be approved by the municipal
government when a BID is created. Subsequent changes in the formula
or increases in the rate require municipal approval as well. Municipali-
ties may have considerable authority over whether the BID may issue
bonds. Many states permit BIDs to issue bonded debt; some prohibit it.
But, as with assessments, a particular BID's authority to issue debt can be
restricted by the city ordinance creating the BID. It is not clear how
closely cities review BID requests to increase assessments169 or issue
bonds, but, as the decision by New York City's Mayor to bar the further
issuance of bonded debt by the city's BIDs demonstrates,170 when a city
blocks new debt or refuses approval of an assessment increase, a BID has
little legal recourse but to accept the municipal decision.
7 1
Third, BID assessments and charges are, for many legal purposes,
treated like taxes. Failure to pay a BID assessment may subject a property
owner to the same penalties, including fines, the filing of a lien, and de-
linquency sale, as apply to nonpayment of property taxes.1
7 2
More generally, despite the rhetoric of BIDs as voluntary associa-
tions, BID assessments are like taxes in that, in nearly every state,' 73 they
168. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 15.1-18.2-6 (Michie 1997) (authorizing city to "levy
and collect an annual tax upon any property in [a special] service district subject to local
taxation"; "the proceeds from such annual tax shall be so segregated as to enable the same
to be expended in the district in which raised"). Some states require BIDs to do their own
assessing and collecting. This can put a financial burden on smaller BIDs. See Houstoun,
ULI, supra note 3, at 36-37. Philadelphia's Center City BID is the principal large BID with
the power to collect its own assessments.
169. A BID may reduce municipal oversight by relying on an assessment formula, such
as one based on assessed valuation, that yields increased payments as property values rise.
170. See Clifford J. Levy, City Prohibits Borrowing by Improvement Districts, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 14, 1996, at B22.
171. See Philip Lentz, Giuliani's Tentacles Pinch BID, Crain's N.Y. Bus., Apr. 27,
1998, at 1 (reporting that New York City's Mayor is refusing to approve a requested 3.9%
budget increase for the Grand Central BID).
172. See, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36632 (West 1969 & Supp. 1999); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 91.758(5) (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1996); ODDA, supra note 97, at 17. NewYork goes even
further and treats BID assessments as taxes for purposes of state constitutional tax
limitations-although in most states BID assessments, like special assessments generally,
are not taxes subject to state constitutional ceilings. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-k(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1999).
173. Massachusetts is the only state that enables property owners in a BID to opt out
of the duty to pay assessments. See Mass. Ann. Law ch. 400., § 4 (Law Co-op. 1998). This
has proven a significant obstacle to the creation of BIDs in the state. See Richard
Kindleberger, Focus Downtown: Property Owners, City Study Taxing Businesses to Make
Downtown Boston Safer and Cleaner, Boston Globe, Apr. 6, 1997, at Fl. In the summer of
1998, Springfield became the first city to create a BID with an opt-out provision. See Greg
Gatlin, Springfield Makes First Bid, Boston Herald, Aug. 26, 1998, at 39. According to one
report, owners of 94% of the district's 272 properties agreed to participate in the BID. See
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are compulsory for all property owners or businesses in the district who
are subject to assessment-even for those who filed a written protest
against the creation of the BID. The compulsory nature of BID assess-
ments is what attracts downtown commercial associations, chambers of
commerce, and other organized business interests to the BID device.
The BID assessment frees them of the "ongoing, arduous, complex and
often times very personal"174 burden of securing contributions, provides
a stable and secure funding base for downtown programs, 175 and elimi-
nates the ability of nonpaying businesses to free-ride on the contributions
of others. 176 The coercive assessment is essential to the BID.
C. Functions
BID activities may be grouped into four broad categories, recogniz-
ing that some activities may fall into more than one category, while others
may not easily fit into any category. These categories are: physical im-
provements, traditional municipal services, social services, and business-
oriented programs. 177
1. Physical Improvements. - Many BIDs repair or renovate streets,
sidewalks and public places, and provide new public amenities. They pay
for repaving, relighting, new signage, landscaping, planters, flowers,
trees, informational kiosks, bus shelters, benches, lamp stanchions, hy-
drants, and other so-called street furniture. New York's Bryant Park BID
became famous for its successful reconstruction of that once troubled
park. New York's 34th Street BID has committed $2 million to transform
Davis Bushnell, Springfield Strengthens its Business District, Boston Globe, Nov. 21, 1998,
at G1. Boston is currently attempting to create a BID for its Downtown Crossing shopping
area, but that proposal involves an effort to outflank the opt-out law through the
enactment of special state legislation for the Downtown Crossing BID. Under Mayor
Menino's proposal, the BID would also require the approvals of property owners
representing 51% of total district valuation and of 75% of property owners. See Gatlin,
supra. The Boston City Council approved the proposal in December 1998. See Anthony
Flint, Downtown Crossing Plan Ok'd by Council, Boston Globe, Dec. 10, 1998, at A48.
174. PPS, supra note 11, at 7.
175. See, e.g., NewJersey Dep't of Community Affairs, Business Improvement Districts
Information Guide 3 (1996); ODDA, supra note 97, at 2.
176. See, e.g., PDC, supra note 69, at 13 ("This option [Business District Authorities]
was chosen . .. on the basis that a BDA would guarantee revenue and eliminate 'free-
riders.'"); Dale Bryant, Downtown Association Board Votes to Continue, Los Gatos Wkly.-
Times, Feb. 21, 1996, at 7 (BID sought in order to compel fast food businesses to
contribute to downtown association's street cleaning program: "The only way we'll get
them to do their part in keeping the sidewalks clean is to assess them."); Hannes Zacharias,
Help Yourself With Downtown District, 7 Kans. Bus. News 39 (April 1986) ("Volunteer
merchants associations . . . provide opportunity for freeloaders to reap the benefits of
organized promotions and professional management").
177. The principal activities that do not fit easily within this typology relate to
transportation. BIDs manage parking facilities, operate shuttle buses to move people in
and through pedestrian malls, and engage in transportation planning. See, e.g., NY COM,
supra note 2, at 2, 37; Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership, supra note 156, at 6; Bradley,
supra note 1, at 12; Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 14.
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two traffic islands into parks. 178 BIDs in other cities have devoted funds
to parking garages, pedestrian malls, and physical improvements to ease
transportation access to older downtowns.
179
Two themes run through many BID capital improvement programs.
First, by repairing or replacing rutted streets, crumbling pavements, dy-
ing trees, and vandalized lampposts and benches, BIDs eliminate dangers
and eyesores and improve the appearance, safety, and convenience of
downtown areas for businesses, residents, and visitors alike. Second, BIDs
may seek to place a distinctive stamp on the appearance of the public
spaces, facilities, and properties in the district. This may involve the re-
peated use of certain materials-such as the "red granite signature cor-
ners" planned in Grand Central's capital program-or of design ele-
ments in lighting, benches, banners, and informational kiosks, and the
placement of the BID logo on street lamps, street signs, newsstands, and
street furniture. The goal is the creation of a distinctive district image
that will help market the district to the outside world-as well as demon-
strate the accomplishments of the BID to assessment payers within the
district.
Many BIDs spend substantial sums on capital programs.
Philadelphia's Center City District has undertaken a $21 million bond-
financed plan of "streetscape improvements." New York's Grand Central
BID issued $32 million in bonds, and the affiliated 34th Street BID an-
other $24 million in bonds, to finance comparable programs. Overall,
however, physical improvements are a relatively small part of most BIDs'
activities. A 1994 study of five major BIDs outside New York City deter-
mined that only twelve percent of their expenses went for capital projects
and streetscape improvements; a 1993 survey of New York City's eight
largest BIDs found that just sixteen percent of their budgets went for
these purposes. °8 0 Special purpose districts and special assessment dis-
tricts tend to focus on capital improvements, but the distinctive character-
istic of the BID is its extensive involvement in municipal operating activi-
ties rather than capital projects-in providing services rather than
undertaking new construction.
2. Traditional Municipal Services. - The central purpose of most BIDs
is the supplementation of municipal sanitation, public security, and street
maintenance. A New York City Council survey of the thirty-three BIDs
178. See Douglas Martin, The Greening of Herald and Greeley Squares (They'll
Become Parks), N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1996, at B31.
179. Indeed, in a number of states, a BID may be formally named a "parking and
business improvement" district, see, e.g., Cal. Sts. & High. Code §§ 36500-36551 (West
1999), Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 35.87A (West 1999) ("parking and business improvement
areas"), or may be created pursuant to legislation initially intended to promote pedestrian
malls, see NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-65 (West 1992).
180. Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 13 fig.1. The new Washington, D.C.
downtown BID will spend 15% of its $7.7 million annual budget on physical improvements.
See Stephen C. Fehr, Property Owners Commit to Revive D.C.: In Heart of District, A
$38.5 Million Push for Safety, Cleanliness, Wash. Post, July 27, 1997, at Al.
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operating in the city in 1995 determined that ninety-four percent pro-
vided sanitation service, seventy-nine percent engaged in street mainte-
nance, and seventy-six percent provided some form of public security.'8 '
Sanitation accounted for twenty percent, and security twenty-five percent,
of BID spending.'8 2 An earlier study of the city's eight largest BIDs found
that fifty percent of expenditures went for traditional municipal services;
a study of five other big city BIDs also found that half of BID funds were
spent on sanitation, street maintenance, and security. 183
BIDs sweep and wash sidewalks and curbs, clear snow,18 4 pick up lit-
ter, empty trash receptacles, and remove graffiti. In Philadelphia, where,
in the late 1980s, "[u]biquitous litter became a public obsession" 85 and
"a daily assault on the city's spirit,"1 8 6 the Center City District deployed
cleaners to vacuum and sweep sidewalks three times a day, power wash
them once a month, and remove graffiti five days a week.' 87 New York
City's Madison Avenue BID's "gleam team" cleans and paints lampposts,
fire hydrants, and mail boxes and removes graffiti and stickers from street
furniture.
In some BIDs, sanitation and maintenance efforts are tied to district
promotion, with street cleaning crews dressed in distinctive uniforms that
showcase the BID's efforts. New York's Grand Central BID refers to the
"60 white-suited sanitation workers" who sweep district streets and empty
litter baskets as the "BID's most prominent ambassadors."' 88 The Times
Square BID makes the point of dressing its fifty-person sanitation crew in
"bright cherry-red jumpsuits" and equipping them with red barrels and
purple trashbags. BID critics generally acknowledge that BIDs have sig-
181. See Council of the City of New York, Staff Report to the Fin. Comm., Cities
Within Cities: Business Improvement Districts and the Emergence of the Micropolis 77-78
(1995) [hereinafter Cities Within Cities].
182. See id. at 78, 81.
183. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 13 fig.l. The Pittsburgh Downtown
Partnership collected spending data from 23 BIDs. In 1994, 18 BIDs reported spending
$10.1 million-about one-third of the $31 million in assessments collected-on cleaning
activities. A slightly different set of 17 BIDs reported spending $7.7 million on security.
That accounted for more than a quarter of the $29.2 million in assessments collected by
these BIDs. See Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership, supra note 156, at 5. More recently,
the new Washington, D.C. downtown BID has announced that it will devote 48.5% of its
budget to such traditional municipal services as public safety, street cleaning, and street
maintenance. See Fehr, supra note 180, at Al. At a talk at the annual meeting of the
International Downtown Association in New York City in September 1997, Paul Levy, the
executive director of Philadelphia's Center City District, stated that 68% of his BID's
budget was spent on cleaning and public safety.
184. In many jurisdictions, sweeping sidewalks and clearing snow are the
responsibilities of the adjacent property owners, so that BIDs performing these functions
are technically not providing a municipal function.
185. Dale Russakoff, Businesses Take On City Hall's Dirty Work: Private Interests Pick
Up Slack as Public Services Dwindle, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1991, at Al.
186. Id. (quoting an unidentified 1989 Philadelphia Inquirer editorial).
187. Center City District, supra note 2, at 15.
188. NY COM, supra note 2, at 40.
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nificantly improved the cleanliness of the streets in the areas in which
they operate; 189 the distinctive uniforms and equipment ensure that the
BIDs get the credit.
BID security efforts are more varied and more controversial. 9 0
Some provide funds to city governments to pay for additional police of-
ficers, longer working hours, new equipment, and special police facili-
ties. 19 1 Philadelphia's Center City District, for example, financed a new
police substation for the downtown area. New York's Downtown-Lower
Manhattan BID recently concluded an arrangement with the New York
Police Department in which the BID would finance the $5 million cost of
a new substation for the Wall Street area if the New York Police
Department would relocate to the new facility some police officers as-
signed to the precinct that covers Wall Street but stationed in a facility
outside the financial district.192 The downtown Baltimore BID substan-
tially financed the installation of video surveillance cameras in a sixteen-
square-block area.'9 3 The Dallas Downtown Improvement District pro-
vided the police department with a paddy wagon, an auxiliary vehicle,
reflective tack for the mounted patrol, collar/radio microphones, and a
mobile command unit.194 Some BIDs work to get police departments to
give more attention to the kinds of low-level criminality-vandalism, graf-
fiti, purse snatching, pickpocketing, illegal peddling, ticket scalping and
three-card pocketing-that are typically the most serious crime problems
in business districts. Some improve area lighting, establish alarm systems,
and work with merchants on crime prevention and personal security
techniques. 95
189. See Feldmann, supra note 14, at 18.
190. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 9, at 404-06 (describing "outreach teams" employed
by New York's Grand Central Partnership whose use of intimidation and/or physical
violence in removing homeless people from the BID earned them the nickname "goon
squads").
191. See, e.g., Downtown Denver Business Improvement District (undated brochure
published by Downtown Denver BID listing 1995 BID board of directors, on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (BID contributes to the city's Mounted Patrol and provides
motorcycles, a police car, and other equipment).
192. See Michael Cooper, Mayor Defends Payment for a Police Base, N.Y. Times, Feb.
18, 1998, at B3. In addition to housing 40 police officers from the First Precinct, who
patrol the Wall Street area, the new substation would also house 75 officers from the
citywide Homeless Outreach Unit, who would be relocated from a facility in Brooklyn, and
25 officers from the citywide movie and television unit, who would be relocated from
midtown. See id.
193. See Christian Parenti, Robocop's Dream: The New Policing: From the Military
to Your Streets, Omniscient Surveillance, The Nation, Feb. 3, 1997, at 22, 23-24.
194. See Downtown Improvement District, supra note 2, at 2-3. See also Diane
Kittower, Good Business Neighborhoods Get Better, Wash. Bus.J. 21,June 13, 1997, at 21
(Bethesda, Maryland BID donated bicycles to local police department).
195. See, e.g., NY COM, supra note 2, at 30, 35. BIDs' focus on petty criminality is, of
course, entirely consistent with the concern with "quality of life" offenses and the attention
to "fixing broken windows" that has come to loom so large in contemporary urban
policing. There may be little disagreement between BIDs and big city police departments
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Many BIDs provide their own security. During 1995, twenty-one New
York City BIDs collectively fielded 363 private security officers.' 9 6 BID
security officers are typically uniformed but unarmed. They carry cellular
phones, two-way radios, or walkie-talkies; patrol their districts' streets; and
serve as the "eyes and ears" of the police. 19 7 They generally do not make
arrests, but they may assist the police in making arrests, 198 as well as assist
victims, take witness statements, and make court appearances.
Some BIDs seek to meld their security efforts with the municipal po-
lice. In Times Square, the BID's forty officers are equipped with radios
and linked to the police by dispatchers in the BID office. In
Philadelphia, the downtown police and the BID's force hold joint roll
calls each day in the BID-financed substation and coordinate deployment
strategies. 199 The Grand Central BID brought together in one storefront
the security forces of the BID, the city police, the commuter rail station's
police, and private security forces employed by an adjacent office build-
ing.200 In Baltimore, BID patrols now handle a significant fraction of
non-priority calls that formerly went to the police, freeing up the police
for serious activities.20 1 Other BIDs work with police in getting out infor-
mation concerning breaking crimes, analyzing crime statistics, and de-
tecting patterns of criminal activity in their districts. 20 2
Like the cleaning crew, the security force may have a role in market-
ing the district. Many districts refer to their security staffs as "community
service representatives,"20 3 public safety guides, hospitality officers or
goodwill "ambassadors."20 4 Their uniforms are likely to favor wind-
breakers or blazers, in tourist-friendly colors, rather than the paramilitary
wear of private security forces.20 5 The Los Angeles Fashion District BID,
for example, outfits "brightly dressed" foot and bicycle patrols and "pur-
concerning the importance of maintaining public order and going after petty offenders.
Indeed, in their leading study, Kelling and Coles bracketed BID initiatives with police
department and law enforcement actions as successful instances of "taking back the
streets" and drew no distinctions between BID security programs and municipal order
maintenance initiatives. See Kelling & Coles, supra note 35, at 194-235 (1996).
196. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 81.
197. See Maryann Haggerty, In Philadelphia, Signs of Success: Center City Is Cleaner,
Safer-and Tax District Program Has Won Converts, Wash. Post, July 27, 1997, at A20.
198. See, e.g., NY COM, supra note 2, at 44, 45 (34th Street BID, Times Square BID).
According to Daniel Biederman, the manager of the Grand Central, 34th Street, and
Bryant Park BIDs, "we allow the police to actually make the arrest, although we may hold
someone for an arrest." Donna Greene, Westchester Q&A. Daniel A. Biederman: The
Greening of Downtown Districts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1997, § 13 (Westchester ed.), at 3.
199. See Center City BID, supra note 146.
200. See NY COM, supra note 2, at 40.
201. See Pike, supra note 56, at 22.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Center City District, supra note 2, at 17. See also Downtown
Improvement District, supra note 2, at 2 ("Dallas Ambassadors").
204. Id.




ple-clad customer service ambassadors" who circulate through the dis-
trict. In Atlanta, the "ambassadors" are outfitted in white pith helmets,
starched white shirts, blue pants and teal-colored jackets. 20 6 These uni-
formed street personnel are trained to provide shoppers and tourists with
directions, assistance and information concerning special events in the
district, and to notice conditions in need of repair as well as to report
crimes and discourage disorder. Consistent with the general focus of BID
security efforts on maintaining order and deterring low-level crime, the
goal of the uniformed BID patrols is to provide "visitors, residents, and
workers with a heightened sense of security."20 7 The sense of security may
contribute directly to real security if it leads to an increase in the number
of visitors, residents, or workers in the area.
The traditional municipal services of cleaning, maintaining and pa-
trolling city streets are the most important functions of most BIDs, in
terms of budget, impact, and the public attention given to BIDs.
Through the daily deployment of distinctively clad street cleaners and
hospitality/security personnel, BIDs have become a part of the fabric of
daily life in the neighborhoods in which they operate. Their apparent
success in delivering traditional municipal services forms the basis of
much of the praise BIDs have garnered.
20 8
206. See Tom Barnes, User-Friendly Downtown Promoted: Golden Triangle Realty
Levy Would Fund Patrolling Aides, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 3, 1996, at Al (a survey of
downtown office workers in Atlanta found that teal was perceived as the "friendliest"
color). See also Tom Barnes, Downtown Partnership Gets New Chief, Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Aug. 7, 1997, at D4 (Pittsburgh's "ambassadors" wear gold shirts and black pants);
Haggerty, supra note 197, atA20 ("teal shirts" on Philadelphia Center City District sidewalk
sweepers).
207. NY COM, supra note 2, at 37 (emphasis added) (Downtown-Lower Manhattan
BID).
208. There are few, if any, rigorous and independent reviews of BID services, or their
impact on security, sanitation, and street maintenance in the districts in which these are
provided. The commentary consists overwhelmingly of either anecdotal observations or
studies undertaken by or for the BIDs themselves-often in conjunction with efforts to
persuade a city council to continue a BID's existence, sell a proposed BID to landowners
and firms, or showcase a district as a site for new investment. The BIDs eagerly tally the
number of bags of trash they have collected, the number of "contacts" between their street
"ambassadors" and tourists, and cite drops in local crime rates. See Downtown
Improvement District, supra note 2, at 2. As one BID proponent has noted, "there is an
inherent conflict between their roles as cheerleaders and their roles as measurers of
economic and social conditions." Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 9.
A rare independent review, undertaken by the staff of the Finance Committee of the
New York City Council, focused not on the quality of BID services but on the satisfaction of
property owners within districts, as determined by a telephone survey. The Council
Report, however, is marred by its tendency to lump "don't know's" with "dissatisfied's" in
reporting whether respondents were satisfied or dissatisfied with their BIDs, so that data
indicating that 23% of respondents were dissatisfied with BID services is reported as 37%
who were dissatisfied or unsure about the quality of BID services. See Cities Within Cities,
supra note 181, at xv, 75. Still, the study found that 81% of respondents reported their
districts were cleaner, see id. at 78, and more than 55% said they were safer, see id. at 81.
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But BIDs' performance of traditional municipal functions, especially
policing, has also been the source of many of the concerns about BIDs.
BID security forces are seen as unaccountable and independent of the
legal and political structures that serve to constrain the discretion of the
public police.20 9 Similarly, BID-financed supplemental municipal serv-
ices lead to charges that BIDs promote intralocal inequality. These
charges are most heated when BID funds go toward enhancing the serv-
ices provided by the municipality itself in the BID. The Wall Street police
substation deal, which involved not the hiring of a BID security force but
the redeployment of the city's police, provoked a public uproar, with
mainstream critics alleging that the arrangement "sends the troubling
message that wealthier communities can buy more police attention,"210
and others asserting that the "cash-for-cops deal" was tantamount to a
bribe.2 11 On the other hand, a similar arrangement in Philadelphia
seems to have caused little controversy.2 12
BID services are intended to "supplement and not supplant the mu-
nicipal services of the municipality."213 In many states, the process of BID
formation involves a determination of existing levels of municipal services
provided within a district and a commitment by the municipality to main-
tain that baseline service level after the BID begins operations.2 1 4 In
practice, it may be difficult to determine whether BID services affect the
level of other municipal services even if a baseline services agreement is
in place.2 15 Actual levels of services often depart from formal standards
209. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 9, at 404-06. The relative autonomy of BID security
forces may exacerbate the discretion problem endemic to so-called "quality of life"
policing. For a comprehensive analysis of the discretion issues raised by the current order-
maintenance strategies of municipal police forces, see generally Debra Livingston, Police
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities and the New
Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997).
210. Editorial, More Police on Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1998, at A18.
211. Jim Dwyer, Your Cop$ on Wall Street, Daily News (N.Y.), Mar. 1, 1998, at 8.
212. Philadelphia's principal BID, the Center City District, financed the Center City
District Operations Center. The Center serves both as the BID's headquarters and as a
police substation for the officers and 70 foot-patrol officers assigned to the Center City.
The BID's community service representatives-the BID's security force--"stand roll call
and hold inspections alongside the police in the same room." Houstoun, ULI, supra note
3, at 138.
213. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 375.001(c) (West Supp. 1999) (municipal
management districts). In New York, "[s]ervices for which district property owners are
charged pursuant to the plan must be in addition to or an enhancement of those provided
by the municipality prior to the establishment of the district." N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-
j(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999). Accord Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1710.08 (West Supp. 1998).
214. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-54B-4(g) (1994); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2290 (Supp.
1998); Mont. Code Ann. § 7-12-1142 (1997); W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-13A-9(b) (1998).
215. In New York, some BID administrators claim that city sanitation services in their
districts have been reduced because of BID services. The Council Report found that
sanitation services had been reduced citywide but "it was impossible ... to determine if




and criteria or reflect low-level decisions, and a municipal sanitation de-
partment may be able to stretch scarce resources by quietly cutting back
on trash pickups or street cleaning in an area if it knows that a BID exists
to pick up the slack.
On the other hand, some BID activities lead to additional municipal
services beyond those actually paid for by the BID. Financing a new po-
lice substation in the district, providing the police with equipment for use
in the district, or lobbying for greater law enforcement attention to dis-
trict problems can result in the increased deployment of police personnel
in the district above the level of additional security actually financed by
the BID. This flypaper effect compounds the concern that BIDs cause
wealth-based inequalities in service delivery.
2 16
3. Social Services. - Few BIDs provide social services, and, for those
that do, such services are usually a relatively small part of their programs.
Some states authorize their BIDs to provide child care or employee train-
ing.2 17 Philadelphia's Center City BID, for example, provides an employ-
ment and training program for welfare recipients. The District has hired
welfare recipients to work on a number of their physical improvement
and street maintenance programs. Under a state welfare-to-work pro-
gram, welfare grants are transferred to the BID, where they are matched
by assessment funds, and used to pay welfare recipients' salaries. Some
participants in the BID work program have ultimately been placed in full-
time jobs with the BID.2 1 8
The leading BID social service activity-in terms of both dollars and
public controversy-involves the homeless. A number of BIDs in the
downtown areas of larger cities have programs aimed at the homeless
people who may be found in the streets, plazas, malls, bus and train ter-
minals, and ATM vestibules in their districts. In New York, thirty percent
of BIDs provide some social services, and five provide direct outreach
services to the homeless.2 19 In 1993, social services amounted to twelve
percent of the budgets of the larger New York BIDs.
22 0
216. See Stark, supra note 22, at 75-76.
217. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 14-184-115(7) (Michie 1998) (child care); Miss. Code
Ann. § 2143-105 (d) (ix) (Supp. 1998) (training programs for employees); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 7-84-520(10) (1998) (child care).
218. Paul Levy, executive director of the Center City District BID, explained the BID's
employment and training program at a presentation at the Annual Meeting of the
International Downtown Association in New York City, on September 21, 1997. The
Center City District program pays the welfare recipients it hires minimum wage salaries. By
contrast, ajob training program for homeless individuals operated on behalf of New York
City's Grand Central and 34th Street BIDs ran afoul of the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act and New York State's minimum wage law when the BIDs paid the homeless workers
only a subminimum training stipend rather than the minimum wage. See Archie v. Grand
Cent. Partnership, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 524-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
219. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 85.
220. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 13 fig.1. The Washington, D.C. BID
intends to devote 4.5% of its budget to homeless services. See Fehr, supra note 180, at Al.
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These programs may provide temporary shelter, food, employment,
training, drop-in centers, or referrals to social service agencies.22' For
many districts, however, programs dealing with the homeless grow out of
the BID's goal of maintaining public order rather than a desire to pro-
vide social services per se.222 They aim to prevent panhandling and the
sense of "social disturbance" attributable to the presence of the home-
less.2 23 The Portland BID "sends out its security guards to give morning
'wake-up calls' to the homeless-in other words, to roust them from the
doorways of businesses." 224 Baltimore's "guides" press panhandlers to
move along; "[i]f a panhandler refuses, the guides station themselves on
either side of him and discourage pedestrians from giving money."225
With slightly more finesse, Philadelphia's Center City District sponsored a
program to discourage pedestrians from giving money to panhandlers;
potential donors were urged to give beggars cards referring them to so-
cial service agencies instead of loose change. 226
Even where BID programs emphasize the provision of services to the
homeless and outreach efforts to connect the homeless with social service
programs, critics have alleged that homeless assistance can turn into
homeless removal. New York's Grand Central BID became embroiled in
a major public controversy in 1995, which ultimately resulted in the loss
of a half-million-dollar federal grant and a restructuring of its social ser-
vice programs, when several outreach workers employed by the BID
claimed they operated as "goon squads" assaulting homeless individuals
in order to remove them from ATM vestibules and other private areas.22 7
An independent investigation by Robert Hayes, a leading advocate for the
homeless, found "no credible evidence" to support the claims that BID
officials "purposely encouraged or condoned brutal or bullying conduct
by outreach workers" and dismissed the "image of organized, roving
'goon squads' . . . beating and intimidating homeless people [as] fanci-
ful."228 Indeed, Hayes praised the Grand Central BID for operating a
facility that provided a "remarkably safe and secure haven for homeless
221. See, e.g., Downtown Improvement District, supra note 2, at 3 (homeless
assistance grants to social services agencies); PDC, supra note 69, at 20; Fehr, supra note
180, at Al.
222. See, e.g., Downtown Improvement District, supra note 2, at 3 (reporting
homeless assistance programs under the rubric of "[slafety").
223. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 11-12.
224. MacDonald, supra note 13, at 40.
225. Id.
226. See Vernon Loeb, Giving Panhandlers a Different Handout, Phila. Inquirer, Dec.
10, 1993, at BI.
227. The homeless outreach services were technically provided by the Grand Central
Social Services Corporation ("GCSSC'), rather than the BID itself. The GCSSC was an
affiliate of the BID, and its board consisted entirely of members of the Grand Central BID's
senior staff. See Robert M. Hayes, Report to the Board of Directors, Grand Central
Partnership, on the Grand Central Partnership Social Services Corporation 14 (1995)
[hereinafter Hayes Report].
228. Id. at 47.
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men and women" that was "safer and more humane" than municipally-
operated shelters. 229 Nevertheless, Hayes found that the BID had failed
to provide its outreach workers-who were formerly homeless individuals
themselves-with proper levels of screening, training, and supervision,
and he determined that, in combining the "separate missions of outreach
and security," the BID's homeless outreach program was "flawed in its
design."230
Although the "goon squad" uproar was disconnected from the
proven facts, the issue demonstrates, as the Hayes Report points out, the
tension inherent in BID programs that seek to combine the traditional
social service goals of homeless outreach with the security and business
development goal of homeless removal. Given the business orientation
of BID programs, and the private sector domination of BID managing
boards, the goal of increasing the sense of security and order-including
the elimination of the sense of danger and disorder that the presence of
the homeless often creates-is likely to dominate the more charitable
goals of providing material assistance, counseling, and appropriate refer-
rals to social service agencies.
Yet, some BIDs do undertake programs that offer the homeless food,
clothing, shelter, psychiatric and medical services, and substance abuse
counseling.2 31 By separating the social service and security components
of their programs, and by contracting with independent social service
agencies rather than engaging directly in homeless outreach, the Times
Square and Downtown-Lower Manhattan BIDs manage to provide home-
less assistance-and also reduce the public presence of the homeless in
their districts-without coercion or violence. Indeed, apart from its con-
troversial outreach program, the Grand Central BID operated a multi-
service drop-in center which, over a seven-year period, found full-time
jobs for almost four hundred formerly homeless people, and permanent
homes for almost six hundred. The New York City Council, which gave
extensive attention to the Grand Central incident in its highly critical
1995 report on the City's BIDs, was "not prepared to recommend that
BIDs discontinue providing such services" "[i] n view of the increasing
budget cuts in homeless services at the Federal, State, and local
229. Id. at 52, 54.
230. Id. at 4. The publicity over the "goon squad" allegations led to investigations of
Grand Central's social services which revealed there had been prior claims, resulting in
lawsuits, of violence by BID outreach workers. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at
86-93. The Grand Central BID's homeless program also drew sharp criticism for
employing the homeless, rather than social service professionals, as outreach workers, and
for paying them only a minimal "training stipend," rather than a wage. See David Stout,
For Troubled Partnership, A History of Problems, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1995, at B6. The
failure to pay the minimum wage to the homeless people working in the BID's Pathway to
Employment program was subsequently held to violate the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act and NewYork State's minimum wage law. See Archie v. Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc.,
997 F. Supp. 504, 524-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
231. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 91-93.
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levels .... -"232 Although BIDs may not be the ideal providers of homeless
services, the real problem may be, as the New York City Council acknowl-
edged, that there are so few publicly-financed alternatives. Homeless ad-
vocate Hayes found that "the resources of BIDs and business associated
with BIDs are vitally important to meet the needs of... [the] homeless
poor," and he concluded "there is absolutely no question that BIDs
should remain involved in the provision of social services."233
4. Business-Oriented Services. - In a sense, all BID services are busi-
ness-oriented. The rehabilitation of public places, the enhanced clean-
ing and patrolling of streets and sidewalks, and the removal of the home-
less by persuasion or coercion are all intended to improve the business
environment, even if they also benefit the many people who live in or visit
the district. Many BIDs go further and provide direct assistance to busi-
nesses, rather than simply making neighborhoods more attractive places
for doing business. Increasingly, BID programs are focused on such "soft
services"2 3 4a-promoting the districts, marketing the products of district
businesses, recruiting and retaining businesses, attracting tourists and
consumers, and working with individual firms and local industries.
In New York City, ninety-four percent of BIDs offer some promotion
and marketing services. 235 In 1993, the City's eight largest BIDs allocated
ten percent of their budgets to business-oriented services; in 1994, five
major downtown BIDs in other cities spent fifteen percent of their funds
on such services. 236 Many of these business-oriented services resemble
those offered by chambers of commerce, merchants' associations, and
other downtown development organizations. BIDs may sponsor direct
mail advertising, flyers, circulars, coupons, calendars of events, newslet-
ters, cooperative promotion campaigns, discounts, and shopping guides
that feature district stores; 237 a directory of downtown stores; an in-
fomercial promoting the district;238 billboards and kiosks that feature dis-
trict events; downtown parking discounts; and a variety of special events
and entertainment-such as lunchtime concerts, holiday lighting, sum-
mer evening shows, 239 food festivals, and the Times Square BID's
232. Id. at 85.
233. Hayes Report, supra note 227, at 2.
234. See Ward, supra note 88, at Jl.
235. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 83.
236. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 13 (expenditures for public relations/
marketing, special events, retail promotions, facade and sign improvements, seasonal
lighting, business attraction, and business retention). The Pittsburgh Downtown
Partnership found that in 1994, 17 representative BIDs spent $3.2 million, or about 13% of
the $24.4 million in assessments raised by these BDs. See Pittsburgh Downtown
Partnership, supra note 156, at 8-11.
237. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 83.
238. See Newport City Council Report, Orange County Register, Dec. 12, 1996,
Newport Beach Ed., at 17.
239. See Marianne Flagg, Mixer Helps Restaurants Thrive After 5, Idaho Statesman,
Sept. 7, 1996, at ID.
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"Broadway on Broadway" and "First Night" programs on New Year's
Eve.2 40
Some BID programs focus directly on particular businesses. New
York's MetroTech Area BID launched an express bus service linking the
BID in downtown Brooklyn to Staten Island-the home of two thousand
of the sixteen thousand workers in the MetroTech Center which is the
heart of the BID.24 1 New York's Fashion Center BID created an interac-
tive kiosk, a website, and a central information resource center with com-
puterized lists of the district's apparel industry resources, a calendar of
events, and facilities for making showroom reservations, all "housed in an
eye-catching octagonal structure adorned with the world's largest button
appended to the structure's roof, held aloft by a 31-foot-long steel nee-
dle."2 42 New York's 34th Street BID provides management consulting
services to the district's small retailers.
243
Increasingly, BIDs engage in strategic planning for their districts.
They will attempt to identify a distinctive niche or marketing theme, and
tie special events, promotions or design improvements to that theme.
24 4
Some BIDs may identify particular types of stores or categories of activi-
ties as targets for development. This may entail efforts "to recruit new
businesses ... to balance the business mix of the district."
245 BIDs may
provide office building owners with leasing assistance,24 6 work with own-
ers of vacant buildings to find a buyer,24 7 or develop an appropriate fi-
nancial package to attract an operator for a restaurant in an important
location in the district. 248 A few BIDs provide grants to businesses;
24 9 the
one in Milburn, New Jersey established a bank community development
corporation to provide loans to district businesses. 25 0 Strategic planning
may even involve efforts to change the character of a district, such as the
240. See NY COM, supra note 2, at 40, 45.
241. See Bill Farrell, S.I. to Metrotech Express, Daily News (N.Y.), Sept. 3, 1997,
(suburban ed.), at 1.
242. Sun Microsystems Unveils Multimedia Technology Center in New York City's
Fashion District, Bus. Wire, Sept. 10, 1996.
243. See David M. Halbfinger, Free Retailing Advice, Indirectly From Macy's, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 22, 1997, at B6.
244. See, e.g., Nesterak, supra note 2, at AA1 (New Jersey's BIDs are "searching for
something unique" in their town's "history, geography or population to define its
character and spark its renaissance"); Kittower, supra note 194, at 21 (signs established by
Bethesda, Maryland BID "distinguish Bethesda from its surroundings, so you 'feel like
you're in a special place'") (quoting Dee Metz, executive director of the Bethesda Urban
Partnership).
245. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-83.b(14) (West 1992).
246. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 11.
247. See, e.g., Great Falls, Montana Business Improvement District, Goals 1995/1996
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
248. See Mervyn Rothstein, Commercial Real Estate: Restaurant to Fill Niche Under
Park Ave. Viaduct, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1997, at B6.
249. See Jerry Dean, Neighborhoods Focus of CBID's Interest, Knoxville News-
Sentinel, Jan. 23, 1997, at C6.
250. See Bradley, supra note 1, at 11.
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efforts by a number of commercial or industrial downtowns to promote
more residential uses.251
BID strategic planning often focuses on issues of appearance and
design. In the belief that greater uniformity of design enhances the dis-
trict's overall marketability, some districts attempt to promulgate design
standards for private storefronts and buildings, and encourage local busi-
nesses and property owners to abide by the BID's architectural and aes-
thetic themes.25 2 A BID may attempt to persuade a store to tone down a
too-garish sign, reduce the size of one that is out of scale with its neigh-
bors,25 3 or urge another to replace solid metal grates with those in a less
forbidding open-grille style. 254 Several BIDs provide grants or loans for
facade renovations; Philadelphia's Center City District, in cooperation
with a local bank, introduced a special below-market rate loan to enable
downtown firms to make storefront improvements, including gate
replacements and treatments of store entrances, signage, display win-
dows, and architectural detailing consistent with BID criteria. 255
BID economic development strategy and design efforts need not in-
volve the promotion of all business activity. Some districts may seek to
discourage activity inconsistent with the plan or the image the BID is try-
ing to develop. This can involve lobbying state and city governments for
new laws or the enforcement of existing laws against street peddling or
shops that sell pornography. 256 New York's 34th Street BID trumpets the
work of its "sign police" in successfully encouraging the city government
to crack down on oversized signs that violate city laws and the BID's own
251. See Bob Brooke, Center City District Sees New Uses for Office Buildings, Phila.
Bus. J., July 12, 1996, at 17 (describing program for converting upper floors of office
buildings into apartments); Vild Reath, "A Small Price to Pay"; City Businesses Happy to
Fund Extra Services, Wash. Times, April 3, 1997, at B8 (describing efforts of New York's
Downtown-Lower Manhattan BID to develop tax abatements and incentives to "attract
companies and developers wanting to convert older office buildings to residences").
252. See, e.g., AndrewJacobs, From Kerouac to Kmart, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1996,
§ 13, at 4.
253. See, e.g., Janet Allon, Union Square: Superstore Asked to Make Its Sign a Bit
Less Super, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1997, § 13, at 6.
254. See Mark Francis Cohen, Security Without the Scare: Mesh Gates Get Respect,
Cramin's N.Y. Bus., Sept. 22, 1997, at 28 (Brooklyn's MetroTech BID is offering to pay half
the costs of business owners who replace solid gates with see-through mesh; according to
BID director, mesh gates reduce the "impression of a siege mentality").
255. SeeJessica Davis, Special Loan Rate Available for Downtown Retailers, Phila. Bus.
J., Apr. 15, 1994, at 5; ThomasJ. Walsh, Center City District Offers Facade Improvement
Aid, Phila. Bus. J., June 6, 1997, at 6.
256. See Zukin, supra note 23, at 67, 275; Douglas Martin, Veterans Fighting for Right
to Peddle in Midtown Once Again, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1995, at B3 (Fifth Avenue BID
seeking to eliminate exemption for disabled war veterans from ban on peddling); Mark
Schoofs, Beat It: The City's Moral Fixation: Pushing Porn Out Of Town, Village Voice,




standards of visual propriety.2 57 Other BIDs may attempt to influence
landlords not to renew the leases of undesirable firms. 2
58
Disagreements over economic strategy and district image have been
the cause of conflict among businesses or land owners within BIDs.
2 59
Where BID leaders see "visual anarchy,"260 congestion, unfair competi-
ion, filth, and noise,261 some firms may see a "carnival atmosphere"
262
attractive to their customers. More than a matter of mere aesthetics,
these disputes concern which commercial activities, businesses, and cus-
tomers ought to be attracted to, or discouraged from, the district, and
thus can determine many of the social and economic factors that influ-
ence the character of the district. BIDs have little direct power over the
business activities that go on within a district. But working with other city
or state agencies and with private developers, BIDs can be part of broader
efforts to recast the image and economic organization of a particular dis-
trict, as exemplified by the remarkable transformation of Times Square
from a so-called adult entertainment red light district to a combination
family entertainment and office building center. Should BID efforts to
shape the character of their districts expand, the level of conflict over
BID development policies may grow as well.
BID efforts to shape the development of their districts rely on moral
suasion; the provision of financial inducements, such as grants and loans;
lobbying city hall; 263 or joining in lawsuits to enforce regulations or de-
fend municipal ordinances that advance BID-initiated policies.264 BIDs
257. See Shop Talk: A Newsletter of the 34th Street Partnership, Inc., Spring 1997
(on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Fehr, supra note 180, at Al (Washington,
D.C. downtown BID to seek greater enforcement of regulations governing poorly
maintained buildings); Hollywood: City Ordinance to Target Stores' Signs, Banners, L.A.
Times, July 1, 1997, at B4 [hereinafter Hollywood BID] (Hollywood Entertainment District
BID working with city to enforce new ordinance regulating signs).
258. See Lawrence Sussman, Downtown Falls BID Could Be Model, Milwaukee J.-
Sentinel, Nov. 8, 1996, at 1 (BID persuaded a realtor to close down a Kentucky Fried
Chicken franchise and replace it with a store more consonant with the district's plan).
259. See, e.g., Zukin, supra note 23, at 229 ("The conflicted identity of Fulton Street is
fought out in the quality of goods in the shops, in the politics of the BID, and on the street
itself.").
260. See Jacobs, supra note 252, at 4; see also Hollywood BID, supra note 257
(discussing BID enforcement of Hollywood ordinance against "visual clutter").
261. See Janet Allon, Navigating 125th Street, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1996, § 13, at 4 (a
principal goal of merchants in 125th Street BID is to get street vendors removed from the
sidewalks).
262. Zukin, supra note 23, at 67.
263. See, e.g., Stringfellow's of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 653 N.Y.S.2d 801,
803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (Times Square BID allowed to intervene to defend city ordinance,
which the BID had lobbied for, dispersing the concentration of so-called adult
establishments). See also 34th Street BID Sues over Newstand, Real Est. Wdy., Feb. 24,
1993, at 5B (BID sues city to compel enforcement of municipal regulations against
oversized, unlicensed newsstand).
264. See, e.g., Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1996) (five BIDs
filed amicus briefs in support of municipal ordinance prohibiting unlicensed street
vending). See also City of New York v. State, 640 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (BIDs
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are rarely, if ever, authorized to regulate the activities of district landown-
ers, merchants, or residents directly. A few states, however, do contem-
plate a special role for BIDs in developing economic or building regula-
tions for areas designated as BIDs. Georgia, for example, provides that,
upon the creation of a BID, the governing authority of the municipality
"may mandate design and rehabilitation standards for buildings within"
such districts. 265 In New Jersey, the ordinance authorizing the creation
of a BID may require that construction or alteration of building and
structure facades be subject to design criteria enforced by the body that
manages the BID.266 NewJersey also authorizes special limitations on the
activities of peddlers, pushcarts, and street vendors operating within
BIDs. 267
The rise of marketing, promotion, strategic planning, and direct
assistance to businesses as central BID activities complicates the effort to
situate BIDs along a public-private continuum. BID business-oriented
services appear to present less of an issue of private encroachment on the
public sector than does BID policing. Business-oriented services more
closely resemble the activities of a chamber of commerce or trade associa-
tion than those of a city government. The more BIDs shift their focus to
business-oriented services, the less they present a threat of privatization.
But BID strategic planning can significantly affect a district's economic
activity and built environment. Moreover, in using assessment-provided
funds to support efforts to shape the physical appearance, land uses, and
path of development of their districts, BIDs are exercising the traditional
public functions of planning, regulation, and spending tax dollars, even if
these activities do not represent traditional public services, and even if
BIDs lack the formal powers to unilaterally impose their plans.
BID-provided traditional municipal services tend to benefit the dis-
trict as a whole-they are "public" within the boundaries of a district.
BID business-oriented services are more likely to benefit discrete land-
owners or firms within the districts. They are more "private" in that they
may provide varying degrees of benefit to different businesses or land
owners. As a result, they raise a greater possibility of redistribution
among the landowners or businesses who pay BID assessments. Retailers
who depend on walk-in trade, and office building owners, who need to
demonstrate to potential tenants that their facilities are located in a clean
and safe area, may receive more benefits than wholesalers or industrial
producers. If BID-provided policing and social services present serious
questions of BID accountability to the city and to the norms applicable to
join New York City in lawsuit concerning enforcement of violations of city's administrative
code).
265. Ga. Code Ann. § 36-43-8 (1993).
266. See NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:56-71 (West 1992).
267. See id. at § 40:56-77(b)(2). See also Fanelli v. City of Trenton, 641 A.2d 541,
543-49 (NJ. 1994) (upholding Trenton ordinance adopted pursuant to state BID
enabling legislation banning hawking, peddling, and street vending within a BID).
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the public sector, BID business services raise questions concerning BID
accountability to a BID's own private sector constituents.
D. Governance
Like formation, BID governance typically combines formal roles for
both city hall and district landowners or firms. In a few places, BIDs may
be governed by formally independent public authorities-although even
then, important decisions may require the consent of the municipality.
268
More commonly, state laws provide that the governing body of the munic-
ipality shall be the governing authority of the BID, but then require the
creation of advisory boards or managing bodies dominated by representa-
tives of property owners or businesses. Municipalities may establish these
entities even when they are not required to do so by state law. Although
technically not governing bodies, they exercise considerable control over
BID operations. Indeed, the board of directors of the BID advisory board
or administrative body is commonly referred to as "the BID" in much the
same way as the municipal government is called "the city."
Where labeled "advisory," the BID board is directed to make recom-
mendations concerning the BID's program and finances to the city gov-
ernment, which is free to adopt, modify, or reject the board's recommen-
dations.269 In a few states, the special boards created to advise the
municipal government on the initial service plan for the BID may be
asked to administer the district once it is established.2 70 In other states,
the district-level boards are officially administrative rather than advisory
entities.
In several states, the BID enabling legislation requires, or expressly
authorizes, the municipality to contract with a not-for-profit corporation,
a business association, or other independent entity for the day-to-day
management of the BID.2 71 These entities, known as "district manage-
ment corporations '272 or "district management associations," may pre-
date the formation of the BID. A local development corporation or a
268. In Pennsylvania, for example, BIDs are created under a 1980 amendment to a
1945 law that provides for the creation of autonomous financing authorities. As a
"business district authority," a Pennsylvania BID is legally independent of the municipality
that created it. See PDC, supra note 69, at 3, 8. Nevertheless, even in Pennsylvania the
municipality has a role in the governance of the BID, including the power to appoint the
members of the BID board of directors, and power to veto changes in the service plan or
method of assessment. See id. at 17, 26.
269. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 428A.07 (West Supp. 1999) (before municipality may
create special services district, a special appointed advisory board must be given
opportunity to review and comment).
270. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 19-4021 (1997).
271. See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 11-54B-1(a), 11-54B-11 (1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 22,
§ 1504 (1997); Idaho Code § 50-2611 (1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-63-11 (Michie 1995);
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 7-84-502(1), 7-84-519 (1998); PPS, supra note 11, at 28.
272. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 40:56-66(c), 40:56-83, 40:56-84 (West 1992).
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chamber of commerce may be given the contract to manage a BID.273
Alternatively, the managing body may be established by the municipal-
ity2 74 or by the BID's sponsors.275 In New York, for example, incorpora-
tion of a not-for-profit district management association ("DMA") is an
integral part of the process of the creation of a BID: BID assessments are
collected by the city's tax department and remitted to the BID only pursu-
ant to a contract between the city government and the DMA. 2 76
Although a "management" entity and not a governing authority,277
the DMA, in the view of those who work with BIDs, is "responsible for the
policy and fiduciary functions of the BID."2 78 It sets the budget, hires
staff, evaluates programs and staff performance, and makes recommenda-
tions to the city council for changes in the assessment rate and in the
BID's program.279 The city government is likely to leave the BID's day-to-
day operations to the DMA. The city will get involved in BID programs or
finances only when the district advisory or management body seeks to
make a basic change in the district's structure-to increase the assess-
ment level, revise the assessment formula, issue bonds, or alter signifi-
cantly the plan of services and improvements.
These bodies tend to view themselves as private agencies rather than
arms of the city government.280 In a technical sense they may be right.
273. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 50-2611 (1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 21-43-105(a) (1990);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 35.87A.110 (West 1990). See also Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.119 (1993)
("An existing association of property owners or tenants may enter into an agreement with
the city to provide the proposed economic improvement.").
274. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 22, § 1504 (1997) (outlining the procedures
governing the "creation and powers of the authority or management company").
275. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-84-519(a) (1998) (municipal governing body may
either create a board or appoint an existing organization to act as an "advisory board...
for the purpose of administering activities within and for the district"). In Mississippi,
district property owners designate the district management group. The group proposed to
manage the district is identified in the plan voted upon by district property owners. See
Miss. Code Ann. § 21-43-121 (1990). The district management group can be a department
of local government, a non-profit corporation, chamber of commerce, or downtown
development corporation. See id. at § 21-43-105.
276. See Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 7-10 (describing how conflict
among property owners over composition of DMA became the central concern in New
York City Council consideration of NoHo BID).
277. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.981(3) (West 1997) (providing for "a
board for the management of [ I activities" when a city establishes a "principal shopping
district"); Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2403(9) (Michie 1997) (providing for "a development
board or other body" for "control and management of [such] funds" as city council may
appropriate to use of "special service district"). But see Del. Code Ann., tit. 22,
§ 1503(a) (2) (1997) ("authority or management company which will govern such
district"); D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2278(a) (1998 Supp.) ("board of each BID corporation shall
govern the BID corporation").
278. The BID Manual, supra note 93, at 38.
279. See id. at 35, 38.
280. In refusing to provide information concerning executive salaries, the general
counsel of the Grand Central BID's DMA stated: "We believe neither the public nor the
city is entitled to that information .... We're a private agency, not a city agency." Feiden,
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The DMA is formally incorporated as a private not-for-profit corporation.
Nevertheless, it has an important public component since it is called into
existence as part of the BID formation process, 28' depends on funds col-
lected by the city, receives its authority pursuant to a contract with the
city, and is entrusted with the responsibility of managing a public district.
The interplay of public and private in BID governance may get murk-
ier still. The DMA may have formal responsibility for district operations,
but the actual production of BID services is often undertaken by private
firms pursuant to a contract with the DMA. A BID may contract for both
field services, such as security and street cleaning, as well as for manage-
ment services.28 2 This is more common for DMAs with smaller budgets
that are unable to hire a full complement of staff. In these situations, the
actual administration of the BID, including oversight of BID services to
property owners and businesses, is actually handled by another entity,
such as a local development corporation or a neighborhood chamber of
commerce. Indeed, this other entity may be the organization that spon-
sored the creation of the BID.283 Members of the boards of directors of
DMAs, or the appointed managers of BID operations, may have affilia-
tions with entities that provide services to the BID. 284 This can raise the
possibility of self-dealing.2 8 5 Neighborhood organizations may seek to
use the BID formation process to create a mechanism for levying assess-
ments and, by a management contract, channeling the resulting revenues
into the sponsor's treasury.286 Although DMA contracts with private
firms for administrative, policing, sanitation, and other services are sub-
ject to city government oversight, it is difficult to assess the degree of city
government deference to, or supervision of, BID managing bodies. The
proliferation of BIDs and their wide range of activities may strain the ca-
supra note 27, at 30. The DMA relented when the City threatened to disapprove the BID's
proposed bond issue if the information was not provided. See id.
281. The role of a city government in calling a BID managing body into existence was
clearly displayed in New York City in 1998. In July, the city, dissatisfied with the Grand
Central Partnership's stewardship of the Grand Central BID, declined to renew the
Partnership's contract to manage the BID. Ultimately, members of the Partnership board,
including its interim chairman, broke away and founded a new managing body, the
Midtown East District Management Association, intending to satisfy the city. See Terry
Pristin, Charges Fly as Mayor is Accused of Dismantling Grand Central Civic Group, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 4, 1998, at B3.
282. See The BID Manual, supra note 93, at 20.
283. See id. at 55.
284. See, e.g., Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 40-42. Statutes in other states
contemplate that members of a BID's boards of directors, or a BID manager, may have
affiliations with organizations that provide services to the BID. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-1790 (1991) (no prohibition on members of a BID advisory board also serving on the
board of directors of a not-for-profit corporation with which the city may contract to
provide specified services within the district); W. Va. Code § 8-13A-i1 (c) (1998) (same).
285. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 31-32.
286. See ODDA, supra note 97, at 4-5, 11-12 (noting that the organization hired to




pacity of city administrators and elected officials to check the possibilities
of corruption.
Who sits on the boards of these advisory and administrative bodies,
and how do they get to these positions? Some state laws limit member-
ship to owners of real property or businesses in the district.2 87 More com-
monly, states permit other people-particularly residents-to serve, but
require that a majority of board members be property owners, businesses,
persons "having an interest"288 in property in the district, or persons sub-
ject to district assessments. 289 Other states open membership to residents
or electors of the district.290 Many states provide for participation by gov-
ernment officials.2 91
Businesspeople, especially landowners, generally dominate the mem-
bership of these boards, even when that is not required by state enabling
legislation. One study of the eight largest New York City BIDs found that
67% of the members of the boards of directors of BID DMAs were busi-
nesspeople, primarily landlords, property owners, real estate developers,
retailers, bankers, and lenders.29 2 A similar fraction (65.5%) of the
boards of BIDs in five other major cities were businesspeople, with that
figure rising to 75% if "legal professionals" are grouped with business-
people.2 93 The remaining board members were public officials, resi-
dents, members of community boards, and representatives of not-for-
profit organizations. 29 4
287. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-54B-11(b)(5) (1994); Ark. Code Ann. § 14-184-
111 (a) (1) (A) (Michie 1998); Mont. Code Ann. § 7-12-1121 (1997); see also Del. Code
Ann., tit. 22 § 1503(a) (2) (1997) (allowing owners of commercial property or their
designees to be members).
288. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 125.1654 (West 1994) (detailing composition of
governing board of downtown development authority).
289. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2277(a) (1988 Supp.); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 33:2720.3D (West 1988); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 71.794(4) (i) (West 1998). In California, the
advisory board "may" be limited to persons paying assessments. See Cal. Sts. & High. Code
§ 36530 (West Supp. 1999).
290. Oregon does not require an advisory committee for its BIDs, but provides that if
a city creates such a committee "the council shall strongly consider appointment of owners
of property within the ... district to the advisory committee." Or. Rev. Stat. § 223.119
(1997). Connecticut imposes no restrictions on who may serve on the board of
commissioners of a special services district. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7 -339q (West 1989).
291. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-84-519 (1998); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-m(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1999); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 5.3533(1)(1)(h) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
292. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that, on average, 20 out of 30
people on the board were businesspeople).
293. See id. Subsequently, Houstoun reported that boards of larger BIDs tend to be
dominated by developers and major property owners, while boards of smaller BIDs are
more likely to be dominated by merchants. See Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 7. See
also PDC, supra note 69, at 11 (showing different compositions of the boards of smaller
BIDs found in Allentown, Mt. Pleasant, and Pottstown, and of a larger BID in
Philadelphia).
294. See Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 14. Perhaps due to a state law requiring
that four city officials be represented on DMA boards in New York, public officials
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BID boards may be appointed by the city government or elected by a
district-level constituency, with appointment the more common route.
Even with appointed boards, state laws frequently require that all or most
board members be landowners, businesses, or residents of the district. In
some states, appointments must be made from a list prepared by the local
chamber of commerce, 295 or appointees must have expertise in particular
fields like real estate development, finance, or retail.29 6 The largest prop-
erty owners are likely to have representatives on the board.29 7 Even with
elected boards, the election may be limited to the owners of property
subject to assessment,298 or votes may be weighted according to the valua-
tion of the property or the assessments the voters pay to the district.
2 99
Colorado is the rare state in which a board may be elected by district
electors, without a majority of seats committed to property owners. But
such an arrangement can occur only if a majority of district landowners
approve; otherwise, BID boards are appointed. 30 0
Whether elected or appointed, the model for the DMA board is that
of the board of directors of a not-for-profit corporation rather than a city
council. The group that sponsored the BID proposal becomes the nu-
cleus for the first board of directors; in effect, it nominates itself when it
incorporates the DMA and wins city government approval to manage the
BID.30 1 Thereafter, as the terms of the original board members expire,
the board either fills its own vacancies or, if elected, conducts elections in
which those property owners or tenants eligible to vote cast ballots to
elect new board members (or reelect old ones).302 Typically, the board
nominates a slate of directors, and the elections occur at a meeting of the
DMA membership rather than at a public election.
30 3
accounted for about 15% of board members, as opposed to only 8% in the other cities.
See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law. § 980-m (McKinney Supp. 1999).
295. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33:2740.3(D) (1) (West 1988).
296. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 375.064(f) (West Supp. 1999).
297. The Dallas Downtown Improvement District is managed by Dallas CBD
Enterprises, Inc. Its board of directors has 30 members: three represent the City; six
represent tenants, particularly law firms, banks, and accounting firms; and 21 represent
property owners. Any property owner who owns 1/21 of the total taxable real property in
the district is entitled to a seat. The balance of the property owner directors is chosen to
represent each quartile of property ownership by value. See Downtown Improvement
District, supra note 2, at 10-11.
298. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40D, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
299. Even when votes are allocated according to property values or assessments, some
jurisdictions cap the maximum number of votes any property owner may cast or provide
special protections for smaller owners. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-54B-11(b) (5) (1994); 1996
D.C. Stat. 134 § 11 (c); N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-m(a) (McKinney Supp. 1999) (providing
that if, in the election of members of the board of directors of the DMA, property owner
votes are weighted in proportion to the assessments levied against their properties, no
owner shall be assigned more than one-third of the total votes cast).
300. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-25-1209(1) (b), (d) (West Supp. 1998).
301. See, e.g., PDC, supra note 69, at 12.
302. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 11-54B-11(b) (1994).
303. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1710.04(A) (West 1994).
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In many cases, then, the government of a BID consists of both the
municipality, which is technically the governing body, and an advisory
committee or management committee composed primarily of representa-
tives of landowners or businesses in the district. If the state follows the
management committee route, the BID body is particularly likely to be
separately incorporated and to have considerable autonomy in con-
ducting BID operations. Although major actions-such as a change in
boundaries, in the assessment formula, or in the BID's program, or the
issuance of bonded debt to finance a program of capital improvements-
will require city approval, the BID board may be autonomous in practice
even if it is subject to municipal oversight in theory.
II. THE GENEALOGY OF BIDs
BIDs are a relatively recent development in urban governance, but
they have deep roots in legal structures, policy initiatives, and economic
forces that have long shaped America's cities. The BID emerged out of
two local legal institutions-the special assessment and the special pur-
pose district. By drawing on these pre-existing legal forms, BIDs have
been able to secure a distinctive revenue stream and a substantial mea-
sure of autonomy from municipal government. The BID is also an urban
development program. Its organization and functions reflect a half-cen-
tury of efforts to revitalize American cities and, especially, to respond to
the challenges posed by suburban commercial growth. An appreciation
of the genealogy of BIDs may help situate BIDs in the matrix of public-
private relationships central to local government and provide a basis for
considering the current legal and policy debates over BIDs.
A. Special Assessments, Special Purpose Districts, and the Legal Roots of BIDs
The special assessment and the special purpose district are two legal
structures that have long provided mechanisms for funding and manag-
ing local public sector activities outside of the rules and controls applica-
ble to most municipal governments. The special assessment and the spe-
cial purpose district also embody the local tradition of blending public
and private elements. The BID combines aspects of both the special as-
sessment and the special purpose district, but BIDs extend these older
structures well beyond their traditional uses.
1. Special Assessments. - Special assessments have played a role in
municipal finance since the early nineteenth century.30 4 Special assess-
ments have been used to pay for building and improving streets, side-
walks, sewers, street lighting, and utilities abutting, adjacent to, or con-
304. See, e.g., Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation:
Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. Legal Stud. 201, 204-06 (1983)
(special assessments originated in New York at end of the eighteenth century and became
.an increasingly common financing device" after about 1830). See generally Victor
Rosewater, Special Assessments: A Study in Municipal Finance (2d ed. 1998).
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necting the land of the property owners subject to the assessment.30 5 In
theory, these improvements provide both general, or "public," benefits to
the municipality and special, or "private," benefits to the abutting or adja-
cent landowners. The public benefitjustifies public action to provide the
improvement; the private benefit justifies requiring landowners to defray
a portion of the municipality's expenses. 306
The special assessment has elements of both the property tax and
the user fee. Like the property tax, the assessment is imposed on land-
owners, and it is coercive; the benefited landowner cannot choose to
forego the planned improvement and thereby avoid the assessment.
307
But, unlike general taxation-and more like the user fee-the assessment
is justified and measured not by wealth or ability to pay but by the benefit
that results from the improvement. In theory, a landowner may not be
assessed more than the value of the benefit, and the money raised by
assessment goes back to those assessed in the form of a direct benefit to
their land.308 Special assessments are frequently exempt from many of
the state constitutional rules applicable to property taxation, such as the
mandate that taxes be uniformly applied to all taxpayers;30 9 the require-
ment of voter approval of tax increases;310 or the limits some states im-
pose on property tax rates or yields.311 An assessment payer is protected
from municipal rapacity not by substantive and procedural tax limits, but
by the benefit principle.312
BID finances are strongly shaped by the special assessment experi-
ence. Most BIDs receive most of their funds from special assessments on
property owners. Indeed, many state BID laws track special assessment
laws with respect to the formulas used for determining, and the proce-
dures for challenging, assessments. BIDs also rely on the special assess-
ment principle of encapsulation-that assessments collected within an
305. See, e.g., Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Ketchikan, 781 P.2d 567, 569 (Alaska
1989) (special assessment used to finance roads, water, sewers, and telephone and power
lines); Rinker Materials Corp. v. Town of Lake Park, 494 So.2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 1986)
(roadway, drainage, water, and sewer improvements financed by special assessment against
properties "abutting, adjoining, or contiguous to and specially benefitted by" the
improvements); Rosewater, supra note 304, at 64.
306. See Nonvood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 289 (1898); Rosewater, supra note 304, at
93-99.
307. See, e.g., Kirchner v. Giebink, 552 A.2d 372 (Vt. 1988); Rosewater, supra note
304, at 93-94.
308. Similarly, to assure that the assessment is not used to provide a net revenue gain
to the municipality, landowners' payments are capped by the cost of the improvement as
well as by the value of the benefit. See, e.g., Wolfe v. City of Avon, 463 N.E.2d 1251, 1254
(Ohio 1984); Rosewater, supra note 304, at 100-06.
309. See, e.g., Zelinger v. City & County of Denver, 724 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Colo. 1986);
In re Woodstock Special Assessment, 450 N.E.2d 960, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Public Serv.
Co. v. Northwest Rogers County Fire Protection Dist., 675 P.2d 134, 141-42 (Okla. 1983).
310. See, e.g., Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813 S.W.2d 855, 858-59 (Mo. 1991).
311. See, e.g., Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 149 (Cal. 1992).
312. See, e.g., Rosewater, supra note 304, at 99-100, 115-17.
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area must be spent in and for that area. BID assessments may be col-
lected by city tax collectors, but, like other assessments, they are not avail-
able for general city purposes and are not considered a part of the munic-
ipal treasury.
BIDs, however, differ from their special assessment progenitors in
several ways. First, BID assessments are used primarily to finance munici-
pal services in older, established areas rather than to provide physical in-
frastructure for new and growing areas.3 13 Historically, the special assess-
ment was often a one-shot device to fund basic facilities for new areas. As
Professor Stephen Diamond has suggested, the special assessment func-
tioned as a kind of admission charge for residents of newly developed city
districts. Municipal residents in older parts of the city, who had already
paid for their own streets, sidewalks, and sewers, resented being taxed to
finance improvements in newer parts of town.3 14 The newcomers were
forced to shoulder the costs of their infrastructure through assessments,
but then, "[o]nce that entrance fee into the municipal general tax pool
had been paid," public financing of general services and other improve-
ments would follow.31 5 BIDs, however, serve older, commercial areas
rather than newer, residential ones. More importantly, the BID does not
go out of business once new infrastructure is in place. Rather, it provides
security, street maintenance, sanitation, and marketing services on an
ongoing basis. BIDs are, potentially, long-term structures.
Second, many BID expenditures lack the clear benefit to particular
parcels characteristic of the classic special assessment. The most common
methods of calculating special assessments-reflecting the original use of
the assessment to finance abutting street and road improvements, drain-
age, or utilities-are front-footage, square footage, or the number of ser-
vice line connections. 316 BID services, however, provide more diffuse
benefits that run to the district as a whole, but not necessarily to every
individual landowner.3 17 Some BIDs provide programs of assistance
targeted to some landowners or firms but not others. BID expenditures
to cultivate a distinctive image may be in tension with the interests of
particular landowners or businesses whose activities do not fit the image.
313. Although assessments have traditionally been associated with the financing of
infrastructure, they have sometimes been used to finance services. See, e.g., Diamond,
supra note 304, at 233; Eugene McQuillin, 14 The Law of Municipal Corporations § 38.01
(3d ed. 1987).
314. McQuillin, supra note 314, at § 38.01.
315. Diamond, supra note 304, at 238.
316. See, e.g., Rinker Materials Corp. v. Town of Lake Park, 494 So.2d 1123, 1124-26
(Fla. 1986); Mullins v. City of El Dorado, 436 P.2d 837, 841 (Kan. 1968); Lunderberg v. City
of St. Peter, 398 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813
S.W.2d 855, 859 (Mo. 1991); McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 334 A.2d 67, 71 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1975).
317. Those with private carting and security arrangements may receive less benefit
from BID services. Similarly, businesses that do not rely on street traffic or walk-in trade




Even where there is no conflict, it may be difficult to establish a nexus
between BID expenditures and benefits to assessment payers.
31 8
Third, in the traditional special assessment context, the special as-
sessment district is a unit of territory, not of governance. The municipal-
ity determines and implements the special assessment program. An as-
sessment district is ordinarily an object of municipal action, not a
subject-an area, not a legal entity.3 19 The distinctive feature of many
BIDs is the advisory or management body, composed in part of represent-
atives of those subject to BID assessments, entrusted with some responsi-
bility for determining and carrying out the BID's program. These dis-
trict-specific bodies make BIDs institutions of decisionmaking in their
own right, rather than just financing mechanisms for their municipalities.
They distinguish BIDs from most special assessment districts and cause
BIDs to resemble other forms of special districts.
320
2. Special Purpose Districts. - There are nearly 30,000 independent
special purpose districts in the United States, and the special purpose
district is our most common and most rapidly growing form of local gov-
ernment.3 2 1 There are enormous differences among special districts, in
terms of geographical scope, finances, functions, and governance, with
considerable variations across the states and types of districts, so that gen-
eral statements about these districts require qualification and are subject
to error.3 22 But for the purpose of situating BIDs within the structures of
local government, a few general observations should be attempted.
32 3
318. Driven by the legal and political desirability of funding area-wide physical
improvements in growing areas without raising general taxes, states have begun to
authorize the calculation of assessments based on the value of the properties assessed.
These assessments resemble general ad valorem property taxation. See, e.g., City of Boca
Raton v. State of Florida, 595 So.2d 25, 30-31 (Fla. 1992); Bellevue Assocs. v. City of
Bellevue, 741 P.2d 993, 995 (Wash. 1987).
319. See McQuillin, supra note 313, at § 38.46.
320. A municipality authorizing a traditional special assessment may create a board of
commissioners, but that board is primarily concerned with determining the assessment
imposed on individual parcels. It does not develop or implement a program for using the
assessments. In a few states, the legislation authorizing BIDs follows this pattern. The
municipality imposes the special assessment with little formal input from district interests,
and it undertakes the program the assessments finance. In these states, the only role for
BID board commissioners is to determine or review individual assessments.
321. See, e.g., David L. Chicoine & Norman Walzer, Governmental Structure and
Local Public Finance 8-16 (1985) (detailing the growth of special purpose districts and
suggesting explanations for such growth); William G. Colman, State and Local
Government and Public-Private Partnerships 22 (1989) (describing the main functions of
special district governments which operate as entities independent from general purpose
local governments); Douglas R Porter et al., Special Districts: A Useful Technique for
Financing Infrastructure 1-9 (2d ed. 1990) (citing the growth in, and major trends of,
special districts).
322. On the difficulty of making generalizations about special districts within one
state, see generally Mary Kay Falconer, Special Districts: The "Other" Local
Governments-Definition, Creation and Dissolution, 18 Stetson L. Rev. 583 (1989).




Special purpose districts perform a single or a very small number of
closely related functions-hence the notion of the special, or limited pur-
pose district, as opposed to the general purpose city, township, or
county.3 24 Unlike special assessment districts, special purpose districts
are legally independent of other local governments.3 25 They are gov-
erned by their own boards, which are either appointed by the state or by
other local governments or are elected by residents or landowners from
within the district.3 26 General purpose local governments may have a
role in the formation of a district, but the districts typically enjoy fiscal
and programmatic autonomy.327
Most independent special purpose districts finance, construct, and
operate physical infrastructure dealing with water supply, sewerage, trans-
portation, utilities, parks, schools, health facilities, or housing. Some dis-
tricts provide services without engaging in the production of capital im-
provements, but such services account for less than four percent of all
special district expenditures.3 28 Special districts are often authorized to
issue tax-exempt revenue bonds. These bonds are typically backed by the
revenues from the charges for the services the district provides from the
projects financed by the debt. Such user charges are a principal source of
special district revenues.3 29
Special districts are created for a variety of reasons. The special dis-
trict device permits the state to create a government whose territory and
powers are tailored to the scope of the problem to be addressed. Special
districts provide a means of addressing regional problems, such as irriga-
tion, water supply, flood control, electric power, and transportation, with-
out consolidating or otherwise disturbing the autonomy of the cities
within the region.330
Special purpose districts are also used to finance capital facilities in
rapidly growing but unincorporated tracts on the fringe of metropolitan
324. See Kathryn A. Foster, The Political Economy of Special-Purpose Government
12-13 (1997).
325. See id. at 10-11.
326. See id. at 12.
327. See, e.g., James Leigland, External Controls on Public Authorities and Other
Special Purpose Governments, in Public Authorities and Public Policy- The Business of
Government 31, 41-45 (Jerry Mitchell ed., 1992) ("[T]he benefits provided by the relative
operational freedom of these entities outweigh the costs involved in instituting additional
controls.").
328. See Porter et al., supra note 321, at 5.
329. See id. In 1986-87, special districts collected $50.7 billion in revenue, of which
$27.4 billion came from charges for services and utility revenues for utility districts. An
additional $10.8 billion came from intergovernmental grants, and $5.5 billion came from
taxes. Special assessments accounted for only $454 million, or far less than the $3.5 billion
in interest earnings. See id. at 5 fig.6.




areas.33 1 People who prefer to avoid the redistribution and regulation
that may result from a general purpose local government can use special
districts to obtain new physical infrastructure and basic services without
having to incorporate a new municipality.
Special purpose districts are often used "as a means of circumventing
restrictive tax and debt limitations."3 3 2 Many state courts hold that state
constitutional provisions limiting local taxing and borrowing do not apply
to special districts. The goal of evading state fiscal limits explains the
large number of special purpose districts that are territorially cotermi-
nous with existing municipal governments.
33 3
Special districts "may also be created in response to a desire for au-
tonomy and independence by those who have an interest in the peculiar
function or service of the district."3 3 4 This may reflect the sense that a
function will be more effectively undertaken and better financed if an
entire government is specifically devoted to it. Many special district func-
tions are seen as technical or engineering activities so that special districts
may be established on the theory that placing the function in an in-
dependent entity keeps it "out of politics."3 3 5
A BID is a special district but it differs from most other special dis-
tricts in several significant ways. Unlike most other special districts, physi-
cal infi-astructure tends to be a relatively small part of BID programs, and
relatively few BIDs issue debt. BIDs are primarily funded by assessments,
not user charges. Nearly half of all special districts are coterminous with
counties or cities or are regional in scope; the remaining smaller special
districts typically serve unincorporated areas on the urban fringe.
3 3 6 By
contrast, a BID is generally a very small subunit of a city and operates in
the city's commercial heart. Most special purpose districts engage in just
one function, whereas BIDs are authorized to provide a broad range of
services and improvements.
Most special districts have greater legal autonomy from general pur-
pose local governments than do most BIDs, although this is more a mat-
ter of degree than a categorical distinction. The thousands of special dis-
tricts that overlap multiple local governments or operate outside
unincorporated areas are generally free from control by other local gov-
ernments. The states have authority over those districts, but in practice it
331. See City of Scottsdale v. McDowell Mountain Irrigation & Drainage Dist., 483
P.2d 532 (Ariz. 1971) (applying Arizona statue prohibiting the creation of special purpose
districts within six miles of incorporated cities and towns); Nancy Bums, The Formation of
American Local Governments: Private Values in Public Institutions 25-30, 100 (1994);
Foster, supra note 324, at 19-20.
332. Daniel L Mandelker et al., State and Local Government in a Federal System 90
(2d ed. 1996).
333. See Foster, supra note 324, at 18, 123 (finding that 21.1% of districts are
coterminous with municipalities).
334. Mandelker et al., supra note 332, at 90.
335. Id. See also Porter et al., supra note 321, at 42.
336. See Foster, supra note 324, at 109, 123.
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appears that states do not closely oversee their activities. The special pur-
pose districts that are coterminous with general purpose local govern-
ments are likely to have closer ties to the counties or municipalities that
create them. Their governing board members are often appointed by
general purpose government officials. But these districts were often cre-
ated to avoid state fiscal limits; to avoid judicial invalidation of the dis-
tricts, local governments may have to give these districts some measure of
formal autonomy over their program and finances. BIDs, in general, are
more legally subordinate to the localities that create them. Of course, the
actual relationship between a special purpose district and its parent local
government may not match the relationship prescribed in the statute
books. As a result, it is more difficult to determine how BIDs differ from
other special districts in terms of their autonomy from city governments.
BIDs embody the basic elements of the special district device: terri-
torial flexibility, institutional independence and distinctive decisionmak-
ing capacity.3 3 7 The BID is, in effect, a union of the special assessment
district and the independent special district, combining the distinctive
revenue stream of the former with the governance structure and relative
autonomy of the latter. However, BIDs differ from both types of tradi-
tional districts in their focus on urban commercial neighborhoods, in
their provision of services rather than physical infrastructure, and in the
wide range of activities individual BIDs are authorized to undertake.
B. The BiLD as Urban Develpment Program
For more than a half-century, America's cities have struggled to meet
the challenges of suburbanization, new regional growth patterns, and a
changing economy. Cities in most metropolitan areas have suffered de-
clines in population, employment, inflation-adjusted median family in-
come, and retail activity-either relative to the surrounding suburbs, or
in absolute terms.338 A variety of federal, state and local programs have
sought to reverse these declines and restore the cities to their pre-1945
economic primacy. These policies have had, at best, mixed success. Nev-
ertheless, several major themes in urban development policy are highly
relevant to the analysis of BIDs. BIDs can be seen as the latest effort by
cities to meet the economic competition posed by suburban, and, increas-
ingly, exurban growth.
1. BDs and Postwar Urban Development Policy. - Modern American
urban development policy has been oriented toward promoting and sub-
337. As the Pennsylvania Downtown Center noted in urging Pennsylvania cities to
consider the creation of BIDs-known in Pennsylvania as business district authorities-for
their downtowns, because a BID is "a separate legal entity . . . there are financial,
administrative, and political reasons" for creating one. PDC, supra note 69, at 3.
338. See, e.g., Susan S. Fainstein & Norman I. Fainstein, Economic Change, National
Policy, and the System of Cities, in Restructuring the City. The Political Economy of Urban




sidizing capital investment in commercial, industrial, retail, or tourist-pro-
motion activities, rather than in training labor, subsidizing wages, or pro-
viding other benefits to workers or residents.33 9 Urban development
policy has "emphasized the rebuilding and rejuvenation of downtown ar-
eas"340 rather than other city neighborhoods. City governments strive to
make their downtowns attractive as corporate headquarters, offices for
service economy firms, settings for white collar workers, affluent shop-
pers, suburbanites interested in the arts and entertainment, tourists, and
convention-goers.3 41
American cities have long sought to provide an environment condu-
cive to business, but in the past government programs focused on the
construction of public infrastructure-roads, bridges, wharves, streets,
parks, schools, libraries, and utilities-and the protection of property and
maintenance of order.342 These programs provided public benefits gen-
erally, even as they enhanced the ability of a city's businesses to compete
339. See, e.g., Peter K. Eisinger, The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State 29 (1988). The
most dramatic instance of this bias is surely the fate of the federal Urban Renewal
program. Originally conceived of and justified as a housing program that would improve
residential areas by razing substandard structures and replacing them with improved
dwellings, urban renewal became a mechanism for demolishing residential neighborhoods
and replacing them with commercial and industrial developments. See, e.g., Bernard J.
Frieden & Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities 22-37 (1989);
Gregory D. Squires, Partnership and the Pursuit of the Private City, in Urban Life in
Transition 204-05 (M. Gottdiener & Chris Pickvance eds., 1991) [hereinafter Urban Life
in Transition]. Other federal programs, such as Model Cities, Community Development
Block Grants, and Urban Development Action Grants, also tended to focus on promoting
investment in commercial and industrial activity rather than in housing, education, job
training, or assistance to residents or workers. See, e.g., Eisinger, supra, at 106-22. On the
destructive effects of Urban Renewal and Model Cities on the working class and poor in
one city, New Bedford, Massachusetts, see Ross J. Gittell, Renewing Cities 100-01 (1992).
340. Mickey Lauria et al., The Revitalization of New Orleans, in Urban Revitalization:
Policies and Programs 102, 124 (Fritz W. Wagner et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter Urban
Revitalization]. See also Dennis Keating et al., Cleveland: Post-Populist Public-Private
Partnerships, in Unequal Partnerships: The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment
in Postwar America 121, 129-30 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1989) [hereinafter Unequal
Partnerships] (tracing Urban Development Action Grants funds in Cleveland); June
Manning Thomas, Detroit: The Centrifugal City, in Unequal Partnerships, supra, at 142,
153 (noting that funds which could have been spent on developing neighborhoods were
instead used to develop downtown areas).
341. See, e.g., David W. Bartelt, Renewing Center City Philadelphia: Whose City?
Which Public's Interests?, in Unequal Partnerships, supra note 340, at 80, 81; Frieden &
Sagalyn, supra note 339, at 259-85; Keating et al., supra note 340, at 125; Jack Norman,
Congenial Milwaukee: A Segregated City, in Unequal Partnerships, supra note 340, at 178,
200. Downtown strategies are not exclusively commercial; they may entail incentives for
the construction of luxury housing to give downtowns a residential population that can be
a market for downtown retail activity and cultural facilities. But the principal result of the
downtown focus has been the construction of office buildings, convention centers, hotels,
shopping malls, festival marketplaces, and stadiums in or adjacent to central business
districts.
342. See, e.g., Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation
of the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870 (1983) (stating that government's
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with firms elsewhere. In recent decades, however, governments have
turned to providing direct assistance to individual firms and to specific
private projects. Local governments have used eminent domain to clear
and assemble land; issued tax-exempt bonds to fund below-market rate
loans to developers; given tax abatements for particular investments; and
installed roads, sewers, water mains, or streets to enhance sites for devel-
opment. More sophisticated or entrepreneurial local governments help
developers secure private financing or broker the terms of development
deals; work with firms or industries in developing new markets; or even
take equity stakes in development projects. In short, the notion of the
public purpose justifying local government action has evolved from en-
hancement of the business climate generally to targeted assistance to in-
dividual firms.
Structurally, "the cornerstone of economic development strategies of
virtually all U.S. cities" 343 has been the public-private partnership. These
often begin as coalitions of businesses or business leaders,344 particularly
real estate interests, banks, retailers, publishers, and firms with considera-
ble investments in downtowns.3 4 5 These committees would plan for
downtown redevelopment and then seek public regulatory capacity and
public funds to realize those plans.3 46 These private alliances evolved
into public-private partnerships in which public and private officials sit
together to set redevelopment policy. These partnerships may be institu-
tionalized in public development corporations empowered to allocate
federal and state funds, exercise eminent domain, acquire and dispose of
land, issue tax-exempt debt, and use public resources to leverage private
investment.3 47 Alternatively, the public-private partnership may be a not-
"most important function" was to "create a predictable and consistent environment within
which th[e] private market economy would flourish").
343. Marc V. Levine, The Politics of Partnership: Urban Redevelopment Since 1945,
in Unequal Partnerships, supra note 340, at 12.
344. See Perry Davis, Why Partnerships? Why Now?, in Public-Private Partnerships:
Improving Urban Life 1 (Perry Davis ed., 1986).
345. See, e.g., Frieden & Sagalyn, supra note 339, at 18.
346. Examples of downtown business committees include the Allegheny Conference
on Community Development (Pittsburgh), the Greater Milwaukee Committee, Central
Atlanta Progress, Inc., the Greater Philadelphia Movement the "Vault" (Boston), see
Squires, supra note 339, at 205; Levine, supra note 343, at 19-20; the Downtown Council(Minneapolis), see Alex Schwartz, Rebuilding Downtown: A Case Study of Minneapolis, in
Urban Revitalization, supra note 340, at 163, 172-73; and Downtown Denver, Inc., see
Dennis R. Judd, From Cowtown to Sunbelt City: Boosterism and Economic Growth in
Denver, in Restructuring the City, supra note 338, at 167, 178-81.
347. Operating outside the direct control of, and exempt from many of the legal
restraints applicable to, city governments, these public-private institutions "formalize a
cluster of elites" into "the central deal makers in the development process." Michael A.
Pagano & Ann O'M. Bowman, Cityscapes and Capital: The Politics of Urban Development
90, 87 (1995). Part of the impetus for these development authorities came from the
federal urban renewal program. See Norman I. Fainstein & Susan S. Fainstein, Regime
Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Economic Forces, in Restructuring the City, supra
note 338, at 245-46.
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for-profit corporation chartered by business leaders, with boards of direc-
tors composed of business, public, and other institutional representatives,
such as hospitals and universities.
348
Although the postwar decades have been a period of enormous di-
rect public assistance to private investment, cities have sought to limit the
commitment of their treasury funds.349 Cities have used federal and state
grants and have taken advantage of the Internal Revenue Code to issue
tax-exempt debt to pay for below-market rate loans to developers. When
they put their own resources into projects, cities look for methods that do
not entail direct expenditures, such as the lease or sale of city-owned
property to developers or the provision of tax abatements to investors.
A particularly clever device for assisting development without the
outlay of city funds-and a device with ramifications for the emergence
of BIDs-has been the tax increment financing (TIF) district. Property
in a TIEF district is assessed at the same rate as other property in the city,
but the incremental tax revenues attributable to development are re-
served to pay the debt service on bonds used to finance new public im-
provements in the district on the theory that the public improvements
stimulated the development.3 5 0 TIEF is, thus, seen as "'development that
pays for itself."'3 5 1
To be sure, local governments have contributed significant sums to
development projects.35 2 Even off-budget items like the abatements and
loan guarantees have costs in terms of revenues foregone and the diver-
sion of borrowed funds to private developments rather than other munic-
ipal needs. Still, municipal leaders appear to prefer to help development
as much as possible without direct outlays to developers. Although most
big city mayors have agreed with downtown business leaders on the pri-
macy to be accorded to the central business district, direct assistance to
big developers, investors, builders, and retailers is not always politically
popular. Downtown leaders have a great deal of influence at city hall, but
they do not cast a lot of votes on Election Day. In an era of tight budgets
and fiscal stress,35 3 off-budget assistance may be more politic.
348. Although they generally lack the power of eminent domain or the ability to issue
tax-exempt debt, these organizations can receive public grants and loans and commit
public support to private endeavors. See Gittell, supra note 339, at 72-88; Pagano &
Bowman, supra note 347, at 88-89.
349. See, e.g., Frieden & Sagalyn, supra note 339, at 155-57, 248-49.
350. The assessed valuation of property in a TIF district is frozen. Revenues generated
at the frozen valuation level continue to flow into municipal coffers, but revenues resulting
from applying the tax rate to an increase in valuation are reserved to pay for bonds that
funded investment in the district. See, e.g., James R_ Paetsch & Roger K Dahlstrom, Tax
Increment Financing: What It Is and How It Works, in Financing Economic Development:
An Institutional Response 82, 83 (Richard D. Bingham et al. eds., 1990).
351. Id. at 82.
352. See, e.g., Frieden & Sagalyn, supra note 339, at 155.
353. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd & John Yinger, America's Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health




BIDs reflect the postwar urban development experience in several
ways. They are intended to benefit business activity rather than residents
and are focused on business districts rather than residential neighbor-
hoods. They utilize a public-private partnership structure. 354 Many BIDs
were sponsored by the very corporate alliances and public-private part-
nerships that have been active in downtown revitalization programs. The
creation of a BID may be a part of a larger downtown renewal plan, with
the BID formed to provide a higher level of public services to the mall,
office park, convention center or tourism-oriented entertainment district
that was the centerpiece of the downtown plan. Most importantly, BID
programs carry forward the notion that assistance to business-including
recruitment and retention of firms and the promotion and marketing of
the goods and services of local firms-is in the public interest.
Yet, BIDs differ significantly from other postwar urban development
programs. First, although BIDs are business-oriented, they are not neces-
sarily downtown-oriented. Although the pattern in some cities is one big
downtown BID, in many cities there are multiple BIDs. Many of New
York City's forty BIDs, for example, are centered on neighborhood com-
mercial strips that are far from the midtown and lower Manhattan busi-
ness districts, both physically and economically. 355 The activities of the
BIDs outside central business districts are aimed less at enhancing the
city's standing in the global economy, and more at helping businesses
whose customers generally come from adjacent residential areas. They
are less likely to be dominated by the city's power elite than by neighbor-
hood landowners, shopkeepers and organizations who may have been ig-
nored by development efforts focused on downtown.
Second, unlike many of the urban development projects of the last
several decades, BIDs focus on the provision of street-level services and
small-scale improvements to the public environment of streets, sidewalks
and parks rather than the creation of hotels, convention centers, sports
arenas and other megastructures.35 6 The BID approach to urban devel-
opment more closely resembles the older tradition of improving the ur-
ban environment generally than the postwar approach of providing di-
rect subsidies to specific firms.
Third, BIDs minimize the diversion of general public revenues to
business interests. BIDs resemble TIF districts in the way they encapsu-
late revenues raised within a particular area to fund programs in that
354. According to a BID information guide published by the State of New Jersey, "a
BID is a public-private partnership." NewJersey Dep't of Community Affairs, supra 175, at
4.
355. See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Improvements on a Small Scale; Brooklyn BID Makes
Strides Despite Its Modest Budget, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1999 at BI (spotlighting activities
of North Flathush Avenue BID).
356. See ODDA, supra note 97, at 2 ("[R]ather than funding . . . physical




area. But even TIF projects entail the diversion of public revenues to
private development projects.3 5 7 By contrast, BIDs draw relatively little
public money from outside the districts. BID assessments are public
money, but it is the district's public money specially collected for BID
purposes, not that of other city, state, or federal taxpayers.
Finally, BIDs represent a change in development strategy. Many de-
velopment programs seek to attract new investment by reducing private
sector costs, particularly the tax or regulatory costs imposed by govern-
ment.3 58 BIDs, by contrast, operate by increasing costs on district busi-
nesses or property owners, who are required to pay assessments in addi-
tion to what they owe in municipal taxes. In theory, of course, the
economic benefit of BID services offsets the cost of the assessments, so
that BIDs should on balance reduce business costs. But in an era when
incentives to business usually mean tax cuts, the notion that tax increases
that fund improved public services might be a means of attracting and
retaining business-and that many businesses apparently agree-is a
striking departure.
2. Bringing the Suburban Shopping Mall Downtown. - The develop-
ment of BIDs has been particularly shaped by the effort of urban down-
towns to meet the challenge posed by their great nemesis-the suburban
shopping mall. The BID is, in effect, an economic development device
that attempts to use the special assessment and the special district struc-
ture to provide common area amenities and create a centralized manage-
ment structure for business areas along the lines of a shopping mall.
Sometimes competition from existing malls or a plan to open a new mall
in a nearby suburban area is the immediate impetus to BID formation
activities.359 More generally, the mall and its cousins the theme park and
the festival marketplace are models for the kind of integrated service de-
livery, area-wide management, and strategic planning that downtowns be-
lieve they need if they are to survive in an era of intense interlocal compe-
tition for business investment and commercial activity.
6 0
357. On the relationship between TIF districts and BIDs, see Briffault, Sublocal
Structures, supra note 53, at 512-14, 521.
358. The paradigmatic version of the tax cut and regulatory relief strategy of urban
development is the enterprise zone. For a comparison of BIDs and enterprise zones, see
id. at 509-11, 521.
359. See, e.g., Ross Farrow, Downtown Merchants Split on Sharing Tab to Attract
Shoppers, Sacramento BeeJune 5, 1997, at N1; RobertW. Goodson, A BID for Downtown,
Legal Times, Apr. 21, 1997, at S36.
360. See PPS, supra note 11, at 35 (the BID "borrows heavily from the successful
experience of suburban shopping centers"); see, e.g., Bradley, supra note 1, at 11
("purpose for BIDs grew out of models for shopping center management"); Hudson, supra
note 148, at 63 (BIDs are "modeled somewhat after shopping Center management");
Feldmann, supra note 14, at 18 (discussing plans for BID in Washington, D.C.); Hadad,
supra note 56, at A13 (quoting president of International Downtown Association on
downtowns "competing against shopping centers, office parks and theme parks"); Alan S.
Oser, Business Improvement Districts: Banding Together for Local Betterment, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 10, 1991, § 10, at 5 (Rockefeller Center as model for Grand Central BID); New
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The suburban shopping mall model has influenced BIDs in three
ways. First, BIDs' focus on services rather than on the creation of new
infrastructure reflects the understanding that "physical improvements
alone will not enhance [d]owntown" 3 61 sufficiently and that, instead,
"shopping center-type services" are needed to attract and retain busi-
nesses and customers.3 62 The hallmark of the shopping mall and the
theme park is a clean, safe, orderly environment "in which the emphasis
on safety and tidiness is supposed to make visitors feel secure and happy
so they'll spend money and come back."3 63 Paul Levy, the executive di-
rector of Philadelphia's Center City District BID, has suggested that shop-
ping malls and theme parks are "setting higher standards" for the cleanli-
ness and safety of public spaces.364 BDs are created first and foremost to
supply the high-quality services needed to create the sense of a clean,
well-lighted place-a "'managed environment'" 365-that malls, private
office and retail complexes and theme parks have led shoppers, office
workers, tourists and business investors to expect.3 66
Second, and consistent with the notion of a managed environment,
the mall provides a model of the institutional structure for managing
business areas. BDs do more than assure that downtown receives house-
keeping services. They provide a mechanism for hiring a staff of profes-
sionals who can oversee those services, consider new services and bring
together downtown interests to consider and address area-wide con-
Jersey Dep't of Community Affairs, supra note 175, at 3 (BIDs create business advantages
"enjoyed almost exclusively by shopping malls"); The BID Manual, supra note 93, at 5
(private developments such as the South Street Seaport and Rockefeller Center are
'models looked to by many"); PDC, supra note 69, at 9 (BID "is an attempt to permit
business districts to organize using the principles of shopping centers to compete in
today's world").
361. National League of Cities, Accepting the Challenge: The Rebirth of America's
Downtowns 8 (1994).
362. Lawrence 0. Houstoun, Jr., Six Tests for State Enabling Legislation, in IDA,
supra note 10, at 36. See also PDC, supra note 69, at 4 ("Planning and management have
replaced brick and mortar orientations for downtown programs.").
363. Fehr, supra note 180, at A20 (citing views of leaders of Washington, D.C.'s new
downtown BID).
364. Paul R. Levy, Philly's Center City District Brings Vision to Life, Nation's Cities
Wkdy., Aug. 25, 1997, at 3. According to Richard Bradley, one-time President of the
International Downtown Association and executive director of the Washington, D.C., BID,
"[t]he common area maintenance practices in suburban shopping centers and
competition from these centers spurred downtowns" to create BIDs. See Williams, supra
note 34, at 1. Williams also cites an alternative model of common management of
commercial space occupied by a wide variety of independent users-the office building-
in quoting developer Donald Hunter: " 'What property managers can do in their own
lobbies but not up and down the street can, in fact, be done through the BID
mechanism.'" Id.
365. Fehr, supra note 180, at Al (citing views of leaders of Washington, D.C.'s new
downtown BID).
366. See Zukin, supra note 23, at 65 (for both urban downtowns and suburban malls,
the goal is "cleanliness, security, and visual coherence").
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cers.3 67 BID proponents repeatedly describe the BID as more than a
device for providing common area amenities, important as that is, and
see it instead as a "serious organizing and management tool."
3 68
Third, and growing out of the vision of the BID as a mall-like man-
agement device, BID proponents seek to emulate the ability of shopping
center and theme park managers to engage in strategic planning for their
properties. In their view, part of the success of the mall is due to the
ability of a mall's management to look beyond the interests of particular
shops. This includes leasing to tenants whose businesses complement
each other and fit the overall themes of the mall and sponsoring special
events and engaging in activities that promote the interest of the mall as a
whole.3 69 Accordingly, they argue that urban business interests need
some centralized management which can "make downtown a market-
place and not simply a collection of individual stores."
3 70
Like the mall and the theme park, then, the BID is intended to pro-
vide high-quality common area amenities, serve as a management struc-
ture for business-related services and engage in strategic planning. BID
directors and administrators undertake long-term forecasting;37 1 commis-
sion market analyses; recruit businesses to enhance what the BID staffs
believe is the proper mix of stores within the district;372 develop and im-
plement design standards intended to help market the district; and spon-
sor special events and promotional, advertising and merchandising activi-
ties that treat the district as an economic unit.373 They lobby city hall for
enactment, or more effective enforcement, of laws dealing with peddling,
street vendors and sex shops, and rules dealing with noise and sidewalk
367. Paul Levy, the executive director of Philadelphia's Center City District, notes that
a BID provides downtown property owners "a legal mechanism, analogous to a mall
maintenance corporation." Levy, supra note 364, at 3.
368. The BID Manual, supra note 93, at i.
369. The view that suburban malls benefit from centralized management, and urban
downtowns suffer from its absence, is not limited to BID proponents. The urban
sociologist William H. Whyte writes that downtowns need
more kinds of stores-specialty stores in particular. But the retail mix is generally
a matter of happenstance .... with too many mismatches between stores and the
market. ... Shopping mall managements do not sit and wait for good tenants to
show up. They go out after them. Downtown people should do the same.
William H. Whyte, City: Rediscovering the Center 321-22 (1988). Whyte argues that cities
err in "trying to compete with the shopping malls by copying the physical form of them"-
such as enclosure within one large climate-controlled structure. "What they should be
copying is the centralized managements of them: their ability to coordinate tenant
selection, promotion, leasing, and market research." Id. at 323.
370. PPS, supra note 11, at 35.
371. See, e.g., Kevin Diaz, Minneapolis Maps Out Downtown's Future, The Star Trib.,
Dec. 22, 1996, at BI (15-year plan for Minneapolis calls for expansion of downtown
business improvement districts: "[I1f downtown is going to face down the competition for
people, it needs a unified strategy, just as suburban mall merchants market themselves
jointly.").
372. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 248, at B6.
373. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 148, at 63.
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obstructions. New York's Grand Central BID employs "'the services of a
retail designer, a leasing specialist, and a zoning and enforcement special-
ist to work with retailers to improve their visual impact on the [D]istrict
and to ensure that their presentation complies with applicable City code
provisions.'- 3 74
The example of the shopping mall and the theme park drives many
BIDs to seek a distinguishing look. They dress their sanitation and secur-
ity workers and "goodwill ambassadors" in distinctive uniforms, hang ban-
ners sporting the BID name and logo, and adopt design criteria for street
signs, street lighting, benches, trash receptacles and other street furni-
ture. A BID may attempt to persuade businesses and landowners to abide
by common rules governing store signs, awnings, security grates and win-
dow displays that are consistent with the district's marketing strategies, 37 5
or arrange for loans to enable firms within the districts to bring their
storefronts into compliance with BID design criteria.3 76 Some have per-
suaded landowners to take the BID's interests-as determined by BID
directors and managers-into account in decisions concerning the use of
privately owned land.37 7
The model of centralized downtown management also exercises an
influence over BID programs. Although much of the concern about
BIDs as a device for privatizing the public sector focuses on their provi-
sion of traditional municipal services, particularly security, sanitation and
street maintenance, and on their forays into social services, the trajectory
of BID development appears to be away from "public" services and more
towards serving as an institutional structure for the downtown business
community in the manner of a private shopping mall, office building
owner or real estate asset manager.3 7 8
BIDs are not alone in looking to the shopping mall and the theme
park as models. As the architecture critic Paul Goldberger has noted,
many contemporary cities promote designs and specific projects-per-
forming arts centers, festival marketplaces, enclosed shopping, hotel and
office spaces-that create urban centers suffused with suburban values.
374. Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(quoting Joint Stipulation of Parties, Ex. P at 11).
375. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 252, at 4 (8th Street BID "drafted uniformed signage
guidelines" and seeks to ban solid steel roll-down gates).
376. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 255, § 1, at 5 (Center City District arranging below-
market-rate loans for firms willing to make storefront improvements recommended by the
BID).
377. See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 258, at 1 (BID coerced realtor to close down a
Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise, which was replaced by a public plaza).
378. NewJersey Dep't of Community Affairs, supra note 175, at 3. Not all businesses
want such management. One commentator complains that "[i]ndependent store owners
cringe at hearing words like organization, management and assessment. . . . In all
communities, a core of recalcitrants must always be fought, but the reason for creating a
B.I.D. is to insure that if a working majority of downtown business people want action, a
minority can't squelch it." Zacharias, supra note 176, at 39.
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The success of the shopping mall/theme park model "stands as proof
that our culture has not discarded the most important urban value of all,
the desire for physical proximity to others in a shared place. '379 People
want the attractive features of urban life-"energy, variety, visual stimula-
tion, cultural opportunities, the fruits of a consumerist culture"-if they
can obtain them in a clean, safe, controlled environment, and without
the crime and poverty characteristic of traditional urban settings.380 The
rise of the mall/theme park model underscores both the importance of
basic services, like security and sanitation, to the success of urban areas,
and the danger that the pursuit of these values can undermine the open-
ness, spontaneity, and diversity that have been the hallmarks of tradi-
tional urban life. Even as he criticizes the "sealed-off, private" nature of
contemporary mall-based urban development, Goldberger ruefully ac-
knowledges that "the traditional, dense, truly urban city" may have little
choice if it is to survive "in the face of competition from out-towns, sub-
urbs and suburbanized cities in which disengagement is valued above
engagement."3 8 '
The shopping center model emphasizes the "private" side of BIDs-
the desire on the part of BID proponents and managers to emulate a
distinctly private institution. But BIDs are not shopping malls or theme
parks. Physically, most operate in open-air environments-public streets
and sidewalks, public parks and squares-which are not physically en-
closed and which may not be closed off to the general public. BIDs do
not own the property in their districts, they do not charge admission to
their districts, and they do not limit physical access to paying customers.
They may outfit their employees in distinctive uniforms, and they may
implement design criteria for public property in the districts, but they
generally lack the power to impose those standards on private landown-
ers, to review the leasing decisions of landowners, or to otherwise control
land uses within their districts. BIDs may lobby city hall for new regula-
tions and they may jawbone private landowners concerning their leasing
and design decisions. But ultimately lacking both the police power and
the power that comes from property ownership, they are dependent on
either municipal government action or voluntary landowner compliance
to achieve their goals.
Other sections of this Article have demonstrated how BIDs combine
both public and private elements. The shopping mall model points out
how BIDs lack some of the key attributes of both public and private
sectors.
379. See Paul Goldberger, The Rise of the Private City, in Breaking Away The Future
of Cities, Essays in Memory of Robert F. Wagner, Jr. 141 (Julia Vitullo-Martin ed., 1996).
380. Id. at 136-37.
381. Id. at 140.
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Ill. BIDs iN COURT: FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs IN BID
GovRNANcE AND FRNANCES
A BID can be seen as a deal between a municipal government and
business district property owners or firms. The property owners or busi-
nesses agree to pay extra taxes. In return, the city lets them use the
money raised by those taxes to finance supplemental services for the dis-
trict. The BID advisory board or management committee provides a
structure which assures that BID property or business interests control
the expenditure of those funds.3 8 2
Two aspects of this deal may be subject to constitutional attack. First,
by assuring landowner or business control of BID boards, state enabling
legislation may violate the one person, one vote doctrine of the federal
Equal Protection Clause. 383 The one person, one vote question is both a
challenging legal issue and a metaphor for the broader concern about
the undemocratic nature of BID governance. The Supreme Court has
applied one person, one vote to local governments but has also exempted
certain special districts from the requirement.38 4 The Court's doctrine
in this area is murky, and the BIDs' distinctive combination of public and
private elements is in tension with the Supreme Court's analytic frame-
work. If one person, one vote applies, then states will either have to fully
enfranchise district residents in BID elections or shift control over BID
management to elected city governments. Either result could undermine
the willingness of property owners or businesses to support BIDs. If one
person, one vote does not apply, other mechanisms are needed to assure
the democratic accountability of BIDs.
Second, BID assessments may run afoul of state constitutional rules
limiting taxation. Most states exempt assessments from restrictions on
local taxes, but it is not clear whether BID assessments should be treated
like ordinary assessments or, instead, like taxes. If BID assessments are
382. In those states where there is no mechanism through which owners or firms may
give or withhold their consent, there is no formal deal. Moreover, since BIDs bind district
owners or businesses who opposed the district's creation, the business or property side of
the deal must refer to business or property interests collectively rather than to every single
firm or owner.
383. Related to the one person, one vote issue is the question of whether the
formation of a BID implicates the right to vote protected by the federal Voting Rights Act.
Claiming that the process that culminated in the approval of a Jackson, Mississippi BID
constituted a change in the state's election procedures, five local voters challenged the
state's failure to obtain Justice Department preclearance of the formation of the BID,
which would be required under section five of the Voting Rights Act if the district-level
election that authorized the BID involved "voting" within the meaning of the Voting Rights
Act. In an unpublished decision, a federal district court dismissed the case for lack of
standing and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. See Parker-Weaver v. Fordice, 119 S.
Ct. 791 (1999), aff'g mem., Parker-Weaver v. Fordice (S.D. Miss. 1998) (unpublished). See
text accompanying notes 77-81, supra, for a description of Mississippi's BID formation law.
384. See generally Briffault, Who Rules at Home?, supra note 50 (examining the
extension of federal constitutional protection of the right to vote to the local level).
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subject to state tax rules, some BIDs would be put out of business.3 8 5 In
addition, BID assessments produce intra-local differences in the level of
property taxation which, in turn, lead to variations among city neighbor-
hoods in the quantity or quality of public services. Like one person, one
vote, the legal status of BID assessments is intertwined with a broader
policy issue-whether BIDs foster undesirable inequities in the treatment
of different neighborhoods.
A. One Person, One Vote and the Election of BID Governing Boards
It is quite fitting that the leading decision concerning the constitu-
tionality of BID voting rules should involve New York's Grand Central
BID.38 6 Collecting $9,705,000 in assessments in fiscal 1997,87 the Grand
Central BID has the largest assessment base of any BID in the United
States. Stretching between 35th Street and 54th Street, and between First
and Fifth Avenues, in midtown Manhattan, the BID encompasses approx-
imately seventy-one million square feet of commercial space, or approxi-
mately nineteen percent of Manhattan's total office space.3 88 Approxi-
mately 250,000 people work in the district although fewer than a
thousand people live there. 38 9 The BID has undertaken an extensive pro-
gram of security, sanitation, social services and assistance to business, as
well as an ambitious capital program of street improvements. It has been
a leader on issues of urban design and public amenities, installing hun-
dreds of benches, bicycle racks, news racks, street signs, directions for
tourist destinations, planters and trees.
39 0
Grand Central is not only the largest BID in the country; it has been
the most controversial.3 91 Its debt-financed capital program was an early
source of city concern.392 As noted in Part I, in 1995 the BID was em-
385. Treating BID assessments as taxes for some purposes would not always be fatal to
BIDs. BIDs have flourished in New York even though the state's BID legislation imposes a
cap, comparable to the ceiling on real property taxes, on BID assessments. See N.Y. Gen.
Mun. L. § 980-k(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
386. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998).
387. See NY COM, supra note 2, at 41. Including funds from a bond issue, grants,
contributions, private contracts and service fees, the Grand Central District Management
Association had an income of over $12 million in fiscal 1995. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 112.
By fiscal 1996, that had risen to $14.3 million.
388. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 95.
389. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 774-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
390. See David W. Dunlap, Street Furniture Designs Stuck in Gridlock, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 9, 1998, § 11, at 16.
391. See Bruce Lambert, After Rapid Growth, B.I.D.s Enter a Time of Turmoil, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 31, 1995, § 13, at 6 (describing Grand Central as "the lightning rod for the
anti-B.I.D. sentiment"). For critical treatments of the Grand Central BID, see Cities Within
Cities, supra note 181, at 86-93; Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 32-39; Barr,
supra note 9, at 399-404; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 314-24. For more positive accounts,
see Kelling & Coles, supra note 35, at 113-14; MacDonald, supra note 13, at 33-41.
392. See Feiden, supra note 27, at 1.
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broiled in a contretemps, which eventually cost it a half-million-dollar fed-
eral grant, over inappropriately mingling security and social service func-
tions in its homeless outreach program.3 93 A federal district court
subsequently found that the BID's use of formerly homeless and jobless
people, who were paid a "training" stipend rather than the minimum
wage, to perform a variety of clerical, administrative, maintenance, food
service and outreach work in its homeless services program violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act and NewYork's minimum wage law.3 94 Its inter-
nal management practices were sharply criticized by a City Comptroller's
audit.3 95 The BID's management, known as the Grand Central Partner-
ship, also manages two other large midtown BIDs-34th Street and
Bryant Park-thereby creating the impression that the BID wields undue
power.3 96 The BID's management often stressed its private nature,39 7
and appeared to purposely push the envelope of independence from
public control.
New York law requires a majority of the seats on the board of direc-
tors of a BID's district management association to be reserved for prop-
erty owner representatives.3 98 Residents of the Grand Central BID al-
leged that the disproportionate representation of property owners on the
Grand Central District Management Association ("GCDMA") board vio-
393. See James Traub, Street Fight, The New Yorker, Sept. 4, 1996, at 36.
394. See Archie v. Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 504, 524-36 (S.D.NY.
1998).
395. Comptroller's Audit, supra note 159, at 19-35.
396. See Vivian S. Toy, Further Restraint Is Sought For Improvement Districts, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1997, at B3. Grand Central's executive director, Daniel Biederman, also
managed the other two BIDs and was sometimes known as the "Mayor of Midtown." See
Greg Sargent, Midtown Has One Mayor: Rudy Wins Showdown With Daniel Biederman,
N.Y. Observer, Sept. 28, 1998, at 1. Commentators and public officials appear to have been
particularly galled by the fact that Biederman received three separate salaries which
together exceeded the compensation paid the mayor. See BID's Blind Faith in Dan
Biederman, Crain's N.Y. Bus., Aug. 3, 1998, at 8; David Firestone, An Admirer of Giuliani
Feels His Wrath, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1998, at B6.
397. See, e.g., Manshel, supra note 24, at 106 ("The essential theory of the BID
program ... lies in allowing a private entity the freedom... [to] supplement traditional
governmental activities in new ways. BIDs .... were intended to function independently of
government."). Grand Central's management criticized the City Comptroller's
.unwillingness to recognize that these new vehicles for urban redevelopment (BIDs)
should operate more like private companies than government agencies." Comptroller's
Audit, supra note 159, at 58.
398. Commercial and residential tenants and, in New York City, four municipal
officials are also guaranteed representation on the board. The owner and tenant members
are elected in "class" votes: Commercial tenants elect the commercial tenant
representative(s); residential tenants elect their representative(s); and property owners
elect their representatives. A BID board may adopt a by-law that weights the votes of
property owners, in proportion to the assessments levied against their properties, in the
election of board members. Even with property-weighted voting, no owner may control




lated the one person, one vote doctrine.3 99 On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the federal district court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the residents' claim.40 0 One and a half years later, a di-
vided Second Circuit affirmed.40 1 In an opinion by Judge Kearse, the
court found that due to the district's "limited purpose," "[1]ack of
[s]overeign [p]ower," and "[1]imited [r]ole and [r]esponsibility,"40 2 the
"City's [c]ontrol [o]ver GCDMA," 40 3 and the "disproportionate effect"
the BID had on property owners,40 4 the BID fell within the special district
exception to one person, one vote. As a result, the state could constitu-
tionally mandate a property owner majority on the BID board.40 5
Kessler's claims that the Grand Central BID has a "limited purpose,"
"limited role and effect," and "disproportionate effect" on property own-
ers reflect the Second Circuit's effort to fit the case to the Supreme
Court's local government jurisprudence.40 6 Kessler's findings, however,
are difficult to square with the BID's powers and its potential impact on
district residents. The "lack of sovereign power" and "city control" argu-
ments better describe the differences between BIDs and the local units
that have been held subject to one person, one vote, and provide a more
satisfactory justification for exempting BIDs from one person, one vote,
but they raise empirical and theoretical problems of their own.
40 7
399. At the time of the suit, the Grand Central BID board consisted of 31 members
representing property owners, 16 representing commercial tenants, and 1 representing
residential tenants, in addition to the 4 public members. The Grand Central BID also
provided for assessment-weighted voting for property owners. See Kessler v. Grand Cent.
Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 766 (S.DN.Y. 1997).
400. See id. at 763. The district court considered and rejected arguments that the
plaintiffs lacked standing and that the action was not ripe. Plaintiffs, who resided in
cooperative apartments, were shareholders of the cooperatives, and thus arguably property
owners. Citing New York state cases dealing with cooperative shareholders, however, the
court viewed the plaintiffs as more akin to tenants than property owners and rejected the
argument that they lacked standing. See id. at 768. Defendants argued the suit was not
ripe because plaintiffs had never attempted to gain a majority of seats on the Grand
Central board. As such an attempt would have been barred by the board's by-laws and by
city and state laws, the court easily rejected the ripeness argument. See id. at 769-70.
401. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998). Judge
Kearse was joined by Judge Walker. Judge Weinstein, sitting by designation, dissented.
402. Id. at 104-05.
403. Id. at 106.
404. Id. at 98.
405. Implicitly, the Second Circuit assumed that the district managing board,
although formally a private not-for-profit corporation, is a state actor subject to
constitutional requirements. Only the district court expressly addressed the state action
question, noting that "[a]lthough GODMA is a private entity, state law provides for its
establishment and operation, and GCDMA operates pursuant to its contract with the City."
Thus, the board is "a state actor for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause." Kessler, 960
F. Supp. at 766 n.7. The Second Circuit never considered the issue and assumed
throughout that GCDMA board elections were subject to the Equal Protection Clause.




Kessler was shaped by the Supreme Court's efforts to apply the one
person, one vote to the messy arrangements of local governance. Unlike
the states, local government is characterized by fragmentation, specializa-
tion, and overlap. Many places fall within the jurisdiction of two or more
localities, and many local units exercise limited authority or have power
over a narrow set of activities. In Avery v. Midland County,408 the very case
in which the Supreme Court first held that one person, one vote applies
to local governments, the Court also indicated that "a special-purpose
unit of government assigned the performance of functions affecting de-
finable groups of constituents more than other constituents" might be
exempt from the rule.409 The Court insisted that one person, one vote
was not a "uniform straijacket" intended to prevent "mechanisms of local
government suitable for local needs and efficient in solving local
problems."410
In Avery, the Court rejected the argument that due to the greater
impact a county government had over rural areas-the urban area within
the county had its own city government and was governed primarily by
that city-rural residents could be given a disproportionately large voice
on the county governing board. Instead, the Court found that since the
county could exercise "general governmental powers over the entire geo-
graphic area served by the body," county government elections were sub-
ject to one person, one vote.411 Avery indicated that all cities and coun-
ties are subject to one person, one vote, and shortly thereafter the Court
held that one person, one vote applies to special purpose districts as well.
Leaving open the possibility that "there might be some case in which a
State elects certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from
normal governmental activities... that a popular election in compliance
with [one person, one vote] might not be required,"412 the Court con-
cluded that neither a local school board 413 nor a regional junior college
district 414 fell into that category.
Subsequently, in two cases involving water districts that finance and
operate capital facilities, the Court found that a state could limit the
franchise to landowners, and, indeed, could allocate votes according to
assessed valuation. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District,4 15 the Court upheld a California law that limited to landowners
the right to vote in elections for the governing board of a water storage
district. The district, which undertook water projects and stored and dis-
tributed water for agricultural purposes, was financed by assessments
408. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
409. Id. at 483-84.
410. Id. at 485.
411. Id.
412. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 (1970).
413. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
414. See Hadey, 397 U.S. at 53-54.
415. 410 U.S. 719, 745 (1973).
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against landowners and by charges for water sold to landowners. The
Court determined that the water storage district "by reason of its special
limited purpose and of the disproportionate effect of its activities on
landowners as a group" was not subject to one person, one vote. 416 In
Ball v.James,4 17 the Court held that one person, one vote did not apply to
elections to the governing board of a water reclamation district. In addi-
tion to storing and delivering water to landowners, the district generated
and sold electric power. Most of its power customers were not landown-
ers, and most of its revenues came from power sales. Nevertheless, the
Court held that the district was a special, limited purpose district and that
landowners were so disproportionately affected by its activities that the
franchise in district elections could be limited to them.
41 8
Salyer and Ball articulate a two-pronged test, echoed by the Second
Circuit in Kessler, for determining whether a local government body is
exempt from one person, one vote, the test: Does the government serve
a "special limited purpose", and does it "disproportionately" affect those
who are enfranchised?
4 19
Taking the second prong first, it is certainly true, as the Second
Circuit found, that the Grand Central BID, like most BIDs, is financed
largely by assessments paid by property owners. Indeed, property owners
play a greater role in financing the BID than they did in financing the
water district in Ball, since the water district received more revenue from
purchasers of electric power than from assessments paid by property own-
ers.420 But that does not mean that property owners are disproportion-
ally affected by the BID. Landowners may be able to pass along at least
part of the cost of BID assessments to their tenants. If BID activities cause
property values to rise in the district relative to the city as a whole, land-
owners at some point ought to be able to charge their tenants a higher
416. Id. at 728. The landowner voting rule was reviewed under the more relaxed
rational basis test and was easily sustained. See also Associated Enters. v. Toltec Watershed
Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (upholding similar landowner voting rule in
Wyoming under rational basis test).
417. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
418. Id. at 370-71.
419. Ball, 451 U.S. at 363; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 720-21.
420. Although landowners supplied only a small fraction of the district's revenues,
they were "the only residents of the District whose lands are subject to liens to secure
District bonds" and the only ones subject to the district's power to levy acreage-based taxes.
Ball, 451 U.S. at 370.
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rent.42 1 Indeed, in City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,4 22 the Supreme Court
invalidated state laws limiting the vote on local bond issues to local prop-
erty taxpayers in part because "a significant part of the ultimate burden"
would be passed along by residential property owners to their tenants and
by commercial property owners to residents in the price of goods and
services.4 23 Although the timing and extent of the ability of landowners
to pass through BID assessments is unclear, at least some portion of BID
costs is probably borne by BID tenants.
Nor does a BID make its impact felt solely through the imposition of
assessments. The services financed by BID assessments also affect both
property owners and non-owners. The Supreme Court employed a simi-
lar analysis in finding that the vote on local bond issues, which concerned
the financing of public facilities, could not be limited to taxpayers. 424
BID policing strategies, social service programs, street maintenance and
repairs and economic development activities can have a direct impact on
district residents and on the quality of life in the district.425
To be sure, Kessler's analysis of "disproportionate effect" precisely
tracks the approach the Supreme Court took in Salyer and Ball. The
problem is not with the Second Circuit but with the Supreme Court. Kess-
ler simply highlights the fact that in some one person, one vote cases, the
Supreme Court assumed that the costs and benefits of a local district are
widely diffused throughout the community, while in other cases, the
Court evaluated a district's "effect" entirely in terms of who is subject to
district assessment. The "disproportionate impact" prong of Salyer and
Ball, thus, is less a tool of analysis and more a rhetorical flourish ap-
421. Judge Kearse's opinion noted that any rent increases "will be limited by factors
such as rental market conditions, the terms of individual leases, or City and State rent
control and rent stabilization regulations." Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158
F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 1998). That may be true, but ultimately BID assessments, as a
component of landowner costs, affect the price that tenants pay for renting space in the
district. See also Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 17 (property owners may
support BIDs "because the assessment can be passed along to the commercial tenant").
The real question, in terms of plaintiffs' one person, one vote claim, is whether residents
may be burdened by BID assessments. In most BIDs, assessments are imposed only on
commercial property, so that even if the landowners are able to pass the assessments along,
those costs affect only commercial tenants, not residential tenants. In those situations,
landowners may not bear the whole financial burden but residents bear no burden at all.
In Kessler, however, the Grand Central BID assessed residential as well as commercial
property, so to the extent that assessments were passed along in cooperative maintenance
charges, residents bore a share of the costs of district operations.
422. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
423. Id. at 210-11.
424. See id. at 206 (discussing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969)).
425. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (for
purposes of one person, one vote analysis, parents and taxpayers are not "primarily




pended to the principal question of whether the district has a "special
limited purpose."4 2
6
Salyer and Ball focused on whether a district undertook "normal
functions of government," which Ball defined as including "the mainte-
nance of streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare
services." 427 BIDs engage in most of these activities, other than the oper-
ation of schools. The Grand Central BID, in particular, provides security,
sanitation, street maintenance and social welfare services.428 These are
the classic activities of urban government.
Moreover, the Salyer-Ball exemption reflects the Supreme Court's
view that the water districts in those cases were of a "nominal public char-
acter." Although technically public, they were "essentially business enter-
prises" created to provide water and power services akin to those pro-
vided by private utilities.429 A BID, however, is not a proprietary
enterprise that delivers goods or services to individual landowners for a
fee directly measured by the amount of the good or service supplied.
The amount of street patrolling or sidewalk cleaning a property owner
receives from a BID does not depend on the size of the assessment.
Rather, the BID provides these services to the district as a whole. So, too,
the benefit an individual property owner may enjoy from BID-sponsored
street fairs, marketing campaigns, and business recruitment efforts may
have little or no relationship to its particular assessment. A BID is created
to serve the interests of landowners,430 but it acts less like a private enter-
prise that serves individual clients for a fee and more like a government
that provides area-wide services financed out of area-wide charges.
Judge Kearse, writing for the majority, determined that Grand Cen-
tral had a "[1]imited [r]ole and [r]esponsibility,"43' despite its provision
of security, sanitation and social services, because the BID was not the
sole or even the primary provider of these services in the district. BID
security and sanitation-the most "municipal" of BID activities-were en-
tirely supplemental to policing and trash collection provided by the
city.43 2 But this will often be the case when two local governments, such
426. Ball, 451 U.S. at 363; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 720-21. For a fuller statement of my
argument that the disproportionate effect test is circular, see Briffault, Who Rules at
Home?, supra note 50, at 370-71.
427. Bal, 451 U.S. at 366.
428. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgrnt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1998).
429. Ball, 451 U.S. at 368.
430. The Kessler majority's first argument in support of the exemption of the GCDMA
from one person, one vote is that although the Grand Central BID has undertaken many
complex problems, its purpose-the promotion of business-is a limited purpose. See
Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104. As Judge Weinstein noted in dissent, however, "[t]he phrase
'promotion of business' is too amorphous to provide any substantive limitation on the
BID's activities." Id. at 126. BIDs do not promote business simply by providing services to
business. Rather, like a municipal government, they promote business, in part, by
improving the public environment in which business operates.




as a city and a county, operate in the same jurisdiction. Avery clearly re-jected the argument that where urban residents are fully enfranchised in
the election of the city government that is their principal local service
provider, they are not entitled to equal voting rights in the election of the
county government which also has jurisdiction over them. Rather, Avery
indicates that when more than one local government unit engages in
"normal government functions" in the same area, one person, one vote
presumptively applies to each such unit.
Salyer and Ball implicitly rely on the application of a public/private
distinction to the services undertaken by special district governments.
Such a distinction is analytically unsound since virtually all local govern-
ment services could be provided by both public and private entities. The
Supreme Court, in Salyer and Ball, denied the public nature of water stor-
age and delivery. But given the existence of more than three thousand
local governments specially created to undertake water management
functions, it is difficult to say that such a widespread governmental activ-
ity is not a normal function of government.433 Conversely, as the exist-
ence of private security forces, private carting services and private schools
demonstrates, many classic government functions may also be discharged
by private enterprises. If the Salyer-Ball analysis is applied to BID services,
then BIDs ought to be placed on the public, not the private, side of the
line. But the very attempt to classify governments along a public/private
continuum according to the nature of the services they provide lacks ana-
lytical rigor and leads to arbitrary results.
Yet, BIDs do differ from the local governments that have hitherto
been subject to one person, one vote. The difference is suggested by
Kessler's invocation of the Grand Central BID's "lack of sovereign
power"434 and its subjection to city control.43 5 Unlike cities, counties and
many special districts, particularly school districts, governed by one per-
son, one vote, BIDs lack the authority to tax, they lack the authority to
make laws and they generally lack the authority to regulate private behav-
ior. They may undertake traditional governmental services, but they have
relatively limited authority over those services. BIDs may undertake polic-
ing, but they have no power to criminalize behavior or to perform such
typical law enforcement functions as making arrests, conducting investi-
gations or obtaining search warrants. 436 They provide trash collection
services but they have no power to regulate the disposal of waste prod-
ucts, to conduct health and safety inspections or even to issue citations
for violations of city codes. 43 7
433. See Briffault, Who Rules at Home?, supra note 50, at 374, nn.137-138.
434. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104.
435. These concerns were central to judge Scheindlin's analysis in her opinion for the
district court. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 960 F. Supp. 760, 773
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
436. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 105.
437. See id. at 104.
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Moreover, BIDs are subject to considerable municipal control. They
can undertake only those activities authorized by the district service plan
approved by the city, and their expenditures are limited by the district
plan as well. Additional improvements or services, increases in district
spending or changes in the method of assessment require the approval of
the city government.4 38 New York City BID contracts for improvements,
goods, and services are "subject to all applicable provisions of the law
relating to the letting of contracts by the municipality."43 9 BIDs must file
annual reports with the Department of Business Services ("DBS") and
submit to audits by an Audit Committee set up under the City Charter.
440
The city, not the BID, levies and collects the BID's assessments.
44 1 The
city determines whether a BID may issue debt. Representatives of city
officials sit on the BID's managing board. Indeed, the district managing
authority's power to manage the BID derives entirely from a contract
which builds in a structure of city oversight and which is subject to nonre-
newal upon expiration.
BIDs are public bodies, providing traditional municipal services, but
they are relatively junior public bodies. To borrow the language, albeit
not the analysis, of Salyer and Ball, they are "special limited purpose dis-
tricts" not because the services they offer are not traditional public serv-
ices but because BID boards have so little policymaking authority with
respect to those services. Their authority over the citizenry is so narrow,
and their autonomy relative to city government is so constrained, that
they do not "govern" in any meaningful sense.
442
438. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-i (McKinney Supp. 1999).
439. Id. § 980-1.
440. See Manshel, supra note 24, at 105.
441. Under New York law, the BID's assessments are counted against the state
constitutional ceiling on municipal taxes, and any BID debt is counted against the state
constitutional ceiling on municipal debt. See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 980-k (McKinney
Supp. 1999).
442. Unlike the BID managing board which depends on the city to impose the
assessment and provide the revenue which funds BID operations, the school district in
Kramer had the power to force the villages within the district to raise taxes, and the district
board had "significant control over the administration of local school district affairs...
including prescribing the courses of study, [and] determining the textbooks to be used
...." Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1969). Similarly, the junior
college board in Hadley had the power to levy and collect taxes, issue bonds, hire and fire
teachers, supervise and discipline students "and in general manage the operations of the
junior college." Hadleyv.Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 53 (1970). Compare Fumarolo
v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 566 N.E.2d 1283, 1295-98 (Ill. 1990) (neighborhood school
councils with authority to hire and evaluate the principal, recommend textbooks and
disciplinary and attendance policies, evaluate teaching resources and review principal's
expenditure plans held to have "broad, important, and general ... powers" over local
school operations and thus subject to one person, one vote) with Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 1102-03 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing amended law giving school
councils no power, direct or indirect, to tax, limiting authority to select local principal and
to "determine school expenditures... within budgetary limits set by the [city] board of
education" is not subject to one person, one vote). See also Hellebust v. Brownback, 42
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This analysis may be subject to challenge on both empirical and the-
oretical grounds. First, as an empirical matter, it can be argued that BIDs
have considerable autonomy in practice.44 3 Although the city govern-
ment plays a central role in the process of BID formation, the city's in-
volvement often drops off sharply once the BID is in operation.444 The
Finance Committee of the New York City Council sharply criticized the
lack of effective oversight by DBS, the city agency responsible for supervis-
ing the BIDs. Although city representatives sit on the BID boards, a tiny
handful of DBS staffers are stretched thin representing the mayor on the
boards of all forty BIDs in operation as well as working with sponsor
groups seeking to create additional BIDs.445 Most of the reports BIDs
must file with city monitors address BID finances, not the effect of BIDs
on the nonowner interests in their districts. The extensive report on the
Grand Central BID conducted by the New York City Comptroller focused
entirely on the adequacy of BID internal management controls and com-
pliance with state and city laws and regulations, not on BID policies or
decisions concerning BID services. 446
F.3d 1331, 1332-35 (8th Cir. 1994) (elected state board of agriculture, with powers to
regulate and to enforce state laws concerning meat and dairy products, pesticides, the use
and diversion of water and weights and measures used by commercial enterprises, had
such broad regulatory authority as to trigger the application of one person, one vote).
443. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 128-29 (2d Cir. 1998)
(Weinstein, J., dissenting).
444. According to the City Council, "[wIhile there is tremendous interaction between
. . . DBS and the BIDs during the approval process, the Administration has failed to
allocate the sufficient resources needed for DBS to conduct effective oversight of ongoing
BID activity." Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at iv-v.
445. As the Report noted, DBS is "hampered by staffing limitations," with one
assistant commissioner and just two full-time staff members, supplemented with part-time
support from other staffers, required to "speak to each BID on a weekly basis, attend BID
meetings, monitor BID budgets, and provide guidance to any BID going through the
establishment process." Id. at 99. In a February 25, 1997 interview, Assistant
Commissioner of Business Services Barbara Wolff advised me that fewer than five full-time
equivalent city employees in the Department of Business Services are charged with the
responsibility of both working with BID sponsors to develop new BIDs and overseeing the
forty BIDs currently in existence. Interview with Barbara Wolff, Assistant Commissioner of
Business Services, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 25, 1997).
446. The Comptroller's Audit spent three pages summarizing the BID's
accomplishments and more than thirty pages on the BID's "weaknesses in corporate
governance," inadequate internal audit procedures, and failure to comply with New York
City's contract procurement requirements. See Comptroller's Audit, supra note 395, at
14-16 (BID accomplishments); 19-35 (weaknesses in corporate governance); 41-50
(noncompliance with City procurement rules); 54-55 (need for an internal auditor). The
City Council staff report also focused primarily on the BIDs' compliance with legal
requirements, BID management conflicts, and the quality of BID services for property
owners and businesses, but gave little attention to the impact of BIDs on nonowner
residents. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 16-93. Apart from its discussion of
the Grand Central homeless services controversy, the Council report was largely concerned




BIDs lack "sovereign power,"447 but, as Judge Weinstein contended
in his Kessler dissent, they do enjoy considerable discretion in carrying out
the activities authorized by the district service plan.4 48 For the most part,
BIDs formulate their own programs, which they then persuade the city to
authorize. BIDs also seek to influence city policies and services. The
Grand Central BID describes as part of its mission the deployment of
"team specialists [who] monitor and pursue action against undesirable
uses (e.g., pornography), illegal street vending, and illegal practices like
oversized signs and bogus 'going out of business' sales." 449 "Pursue ac-
tion" typically means pressuring the city government to take action.
450
The BID also sought more vigorous enforcement of rules that would ex-
clude sidewalk food vendors from the district.45 1 The Times Square BID
has trumpeted its "advocacy" role in pressing for city regulation of sex-
oriented adult-use establishments in that district.
452
BID assessments are levied and collected by the city, but the steady
income from the assessments is, in practice, a source of autonomy. The
funds enable BIDs to hire professional staff to plan the future develop-
ment of the districts, formulate and implement design criteria, and lobby
for the districts' interests with the city government. As a result, BIDs can
undertake initiatives that affect the overall appearance and quality of life
in their districts even in the absence of the power to directly tax and
regulate district residents. The BID's vision of the district's appearance
and development may be at odds with the views of other community orga-
447. The Second Circuit's use of the phrase "sovereign power," see 158 F.3d at
104-05, to distinguish BIDs from cities, counties and special districts subject to one person,
one vote was an unfortunate mistake. It is a truism of local government law that no local
government has sovereign power. As a matter of federal constitutional law, all local
governments are technically creatures of their states, enjoying delegated power, and
subject to the authority of the state to amend or abolish local powers and the localities
themselves. Even in those states which have conferred home rule power on local
governments, those localities are not "sovereign." What I suspect the Court meant, and
what I believe is a better description of local powers, is that localities like cities enjoy broad
policymaking autonomy, including the power to adopt taxes, make laws and regulate
behavior within their jurisdictions.
448. See 158 F.3d at 115-16, 124-30.
449. NY COM, supra note 2, at 41.
450. The 34th Street BID-which shares management with the Grand Central BID-
sued New York City to compel it to enforce municipal regulations against oversized and
unlicensed newsstands. See 34th St. BID Sues Over Newsstand, 39 Real Est. Wkly., Feb. 24,
1993, at 5B. For another instance of litigation between a BID and its parent local
government, see Mary Cummings, Coalition and Builder Battle in Riverhead, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 12, 1998, § 14 (Long Island), at I (in dispute over proposed new mall on outskirts of
Riverhead, Long Island, at one point the Riverhead BID sued the town challenging the
process by which it had approved the mall).
451. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 318. Farther downtown, the Village Alliance BID
pressed for the removal of "junk peddlers" from the East Village's Astor Place. Andrew
Jacobs, Kaleidoscopic Astor Place: Will the Funk Go?, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1996, § 13, at 6.
452. NY COM, supra note 2, at 45. Similarly, the Fifth Avenue BID fought to
eliminate an exemption from a ban on street peddling intended to help disabled veterans.
See Martin, supra note 256, at B3.
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nizations.45 3 Yet, unlike these other organizations, the BID is funded by
tax dollars which can give it an advantage in presenting its views to city
decisionmakers and the media.454
Indeed, it could be argued that the relationship of the BID to the
city is akin to that of the city to the state: The junior body is theoretically
subordinate to its hierarchical superior but in practice enjoys sufficient
policymaking autonomy that one person, one vote ought to apply. This
would track Avery, in which the Supreme Court rejected the argument
that due to the "extensive power" state governments wield over local
units, the norm of democratic governance would be fully satisfied by the
application of one person, one vote to the state legislature and need not
be extended to localities.
The question is not free from doubt-andJudge Weinstein may have
been correct in determining that the question should have been re-
manded for trial rather than determined on summaryjudgment 4 55-but
I am inclined to agree with Kessler that BIDs or, more precisely at present,
New York City BIDs lack real autonomy.
BID authority is fundamentally limited. BIDs provide services, and
they certainly enjoy some discretion with respect to the terms of service
delivery, but they may not regulate private behavior or levy or collect
taxes. They can recommend actions-and their proposals may be highly
influential-but the implementation of their recommendations requires
approval by an elected city government and the city government does not
automatically endorse BID requests. 45 6 In Avery, the state had "dele-
gate[d] lawmaking power to local government;" 457 BIDs, however, lack
that power.
New York City, in particular, has been taking a more adversarial pos-
ture toward its BIDs, with the Grand Central BID a particular target of
municipal criticism. The City Council has conducted two critical exami-
nations of BID activities, 458 and the Comptroller has been auditing BID
operations.4 59 Reacting to Grand Central's ambitious capital program,
453. See, e.g., Allon, supra note 253, at 6 (describing conflict between 14th Street/
Union Square BID and Union Square Community Coalition over plans for Union Square
Park-community group prefers to expand park and reduce traffic, "but to the business
group, fewer traffic lanes means less business"). See also Mark Francis Cohen, The Gritty
and the Gentry Battle for a Waterfront's Soul, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1996, § 13, at 10
(describing conflict between BID sponsor and Community Board over development of Red
Hook district in Brooklyn).
454. In fiscal year 1997, New York City's BID assessments totalled $46.1 million, or
$8.3 million more than the combined fiscal year budgets of the five borough presidents
and 59 community boards. See Comptroller's Audit, supra note 395, at 3.
455. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 133 (2d Cir. 1998).
456. See Manshel, supra note 24, at 105.
457. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968).
458. See Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 7-10. The Council was
particularly critical of the management of the Grand Central BID. See id. at 32-40.
459. See Frederick Gabriel, City Crackdown Leads to Audits for NY's 40 BIDs, Crain's
N.Y. Bus., Aug. 18, 1997, at 1.
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the Giuliani administration prohibited BIDs from issuing bonded
debt.4 60 In April 1998, the Commissioner of Business Services issued a
new directive requiring BIDs to notify DBS of all their activities, new ini-
tiatives, budget changes and even contacts with other city agencies. 46 1 In
July 1998, the city dramatically underscored its willingness to oversee and
control its BI)s when, citing the Grand Central Partnership's failure to
comply with city rules and regulations, it terminated the Partnership's
contract to manage the BID. 4 62 The city has since been engaged in ma-
neuvers to replace the Partnership with a more compliant managing
board.4 63 In Mayor Giuliani's New York, at least, it appears that BIDs are
subordinate to city government in practice as well as in theory.
464
460. See Levy, supra note 170, at 22.
461. See Philip Lentz, Giuliani Directive Puts the Handcuffs on BIDs: Gives Dep't. of
Business Services Right to Approve Districts' Activities, Crain's N.Y. Bus., Apr. 6, 1998, at 4;
Letter from the Commissioner of the Department of Business Services, City Tightens
Control of BIDs, 4 City Law 46 (1998).
462. See Thomas J. Lueck, Business Improvement District at Grand Central is
Dissolved, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1998, at BI. Despite the headline of the New York Times
article, the city technically did not dissolve the Grand Central BID. Instead, it declined to
renew the Grand Central Partnership's contract to manage the BID. The BID remains in
place and if another entity can be found to manage the district, or if the Partnership could
be reconstituted to the satisfaction of the city, then, simply by entering into a contract with
the new or reconstituted management body, the city could enable the BID to resume
operations.
The city's interest in reining in the Grand Central BID was signaled several months
before the termination of the Grand Central Partnership's contract when the Giuliani
administration indicated it would not approve a 3.9% budget increase, backed by an
assessment increase, requested by the BID, and also would not approve the customary five-
year extension of the Grand Central Partnership's contract for managing the BID, but
might instead renew the contract for just one year. The city also sought to require the
BID's president to step down as manager of two other midtown BIDs. See Lentz, supra
note 171, at 1.
463. See Pristin, supra note 281, at B7. Mayor Giuliani's actions against the
Partnership have even drawn criticism from editorial boards and columnists who normally
support the Mayor. See, e.g., Heather MacDonald, BIDding Adieu, City J., Autumn 1998,
at 6; This Was Not Rudy's Finest Hour, N.Y. Post, Dec. 6, 1998, at 7. As this article was
going to press, The Grand Central Partnership, in an effort to make amends with the city
and reestablish its contractual relationship, announced that it was hiring as its president
Mayor Giuliani's Finance Commissioner to replace the controversial Daniel Biederman.
See Terry Pristin, Finance Commissioner to Head Grand Central Business Group, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1999, at B7. The once-obstreperous Grand Central BID may have been
brought back into the fold of city government.
464. This analysis, of course, turns entirely on the scope of BID authority and
municipal control under New York law and on the extent of city oversight and control in
practice. If a state were to give a BID independent regulatory or taxing authority, or a city
were to automatically rubber-stamp BID requests and fail to oversee the operations of a
BID within its borders, the case for treating such a BID as autonomous and therefore
subject to one person, one vote would be quite powerfiul. If, as some BID proponents have
urged, BIDs are given greater authority to "manage" their districts, in the manner of a
shopping mall owner managing a mall, then the BIDs would be more vulnerable to a one
person, one vote challenge. The logic of the exemption of BIDs from one person, one
vote is, thus, in some tension with the efforts of BID proponents who would like to make
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The second, more normative, challenge asks why the lack of "sover-
eign power" and the subordination to city control are relevant to the
question of whether one person, one vote applies. In Avery, the Supreme
Court sought to reconcile the values of democratic control with the free-
dom of states and localities to pursue "innovation, experiment and devel-
opment among units of local government."465 In extending one person,
one vote from states to localities, the Court focused on the "policy and
decisionmaking" autonomy of local governments-on the "delegation of
power to local units" that operate outside the scope of direct state con-
trol.466 One person, one vote was held to apply to locally representative
bodies that have the power to govern within their communities. But re-
spect for the freedom of states and localities to innovate, to experiment
with new mechanisms "suitable for local needs and efficient in solving
local problems,"4 67 led the Court to refrain from imposing one person,
one vote as a "uniform straitacket" on all local governments.
One person, one vote is required where elected local governments
have power to govern-to make policy, mandate payments, and coerce
compliance-and can act outside the close control of a higher-level dem-
ocratic government. For the rest, that is, for localities with more limited
authority over the people within their jurisdiction, federalism-specifi-
cally, the "extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating vari-
ous types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon
them"4 6 8 -and the value of promoting experimentation in the forms of
local governance counsel in favor of permitting states and local govern-
ments to create new local structures outside the scope of one person, one
vote.
BIDs are a new local form that include a very old local tradition-a
tradition in sharp tension with contemporary democratic values-of
property owner voting. In the BID setting, property owner voting is tied
to extra levels of district property owner taxation, as well as mechanisms
for city oversight and ultimate city control. Although the property own-
ers paying BID assessments may be able to diffuse those costs throughout
the district, the assessment payers do bear the costs of the BID in the first
instance. Their support is typically critical for the establishment of the
BID and for its continuation. A state could reasonably conclude that
BIDs are a useful means of providing urban services and that property
owner voting control would facilitate creation of the BID.4 69 As long as a
the BID a downtown management entity. The more power BIDs get to directly affect the
development of their districts, that is, the more the BID comes to resemble the "private"
shopping mall manager, the more it has the powers of governance and would have to be
subject to constitutional norms.
465. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
466. Id. at 481.
467. Id. at 485.
468. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978).
469. In his Kessler dissent, Judge Weinstein argued that property owner voting control
is not necessary for the creation of BIDs since two states, Colorado and Florida, provide for
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BID's regulatory and fiscal powers are limited, and the city government
has the capacity to oversee and control BID operations, property owner
voting may be a constitutionally permissible component of local govern-
ment innovation. 470
The determination that BID elections are not subject to one person,
one vote does not mean that the BID is not a public body or that BIDs do
not present questions of democratic accountability. BIDs are public-bod-
ies, often performing traditional public functions, but their authority and
discretion are limited, and they are at least formally subject to oversight
and control by elected municipal governments. Moreover, requiring one
person, one vote would not assure democratic control of local govern-
ment activities. More likely, states and cities would swiftly replace laws
providing for elected boards with laws directing that governing boards be
appointed by city hall. Indeed, in many jurisdictions BID boards cur-
rently are appointed, rather than elected. The one person, one vote re-
universal suffrage in BID elections. See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d
92, 132 (2d Cir. 1998). Judge Weinstein, however, misread the Colorado and Florida
statutes he cited. In Colorado, a BID governing board will consist of persons elected by the
electors of the district only if a petition signed by owners of least 50% of the assessed value
property in the district so provides. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-1209(1) (d) (Supp. 1996).
Otherwise, the board is not elected but appointed by the governing body of the
municipality. Colorado's largest BID, the Downtown Denver Business Improvement
District, is governed by such an appointed body, which is composed primarily of private
sector representatives. As one study found, "[w]hile the BID's legal framework resembles
that of a public agency, it thus far functions like a non-profit organization controlled by
business and property owners." Houstoun, BIDS, supra note 1, at 152. The Florida
statutes Judge Weinstein cited dealt not with BIDs but with "community development
districts." These are districts authorized to finance and operate capital infrastructure for
developing communities. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 190.001-.049 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999).
They are frequently created and operate in advance of the incorporation of municipalities
in rapidly growing areas on the urban fringe as part of the development process, and may
ultimately become incorporated. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 190.047 (West 1987). In their
critical initial years of operation, they are governed by boards of supervisors elected by
landowners on a one acre, one vote basis. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 190.006(2) (b) (West Supp.
1999). The Florida Supreme Court rejected a one person, one vote challenge to such
acreage-based elections, finding that the districts did not exercise "general governmental
functions." State v. Frontier Acres Community Dev. Dist. Pasco Co., 472 So. 2d 455, 457
(Fla. 1985).
470. This analysis is strongly shaped by the legal and factual context presented in
Kessler. If a BID was authorized to exercise independent regulatory or taxing authority, the
case for treating it as an autonomous government subject to the one person, one vote
requirement, would be significantly stronger. Nor does this analysis dispose of all legal
questions presented by the limitation or denial of the right to vote to nonowner or
nonbusiness residents in BID elections. For example, an election may fall within the scope
of the right to vote protected by the Voting Rights Act even if it is not subject to the Equal
Protection Clause's one person, one vote requirement. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 390-91 (1991). The question of whether a BID formation election is subject to the
Voting Rights Act has been litigated but without an opinion on the merits. See Parker-
Weaver v. Fordice, 119 S.Ct. 791 (1999) (affirming district court dismissal, for lack of
standing, of suit challenging Mississippi's failure to seek Justice Department preclearance
of BID enabling legislation).
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quirement does not apply to appointed bodies,471 and there is little to
prevent city governments from packing appointed BID boards with dis-
trict landowners and merchants. 472 There is no reason to think such
boards will be any more accountable to district residents than boards
elected by district business interests.473
Conversely, some democratic accountability may be obtained even
without democratic BID elections if the city is committed to effective con-
trol of its BIDs. Under those circumstances, though, democratic control
will occur at the city level rather than at the district level. Democratic
accountability is ultimately about the relationship between a city and a
BID. That relationship is considered more fully in Part IV.
B. State Tax Limitations and BID Assessments
Most of the litigation against BIDs comes not from propertyless resi-
dents, but from the property owners or firms said to be benefited by
BIDs. These plaintiffs are concerned not about governance or services,
but about the higher level of taxation BIDs entail.
The legal basis for these challenges is provided by various state con-
stitutional provisions restricting local taxation. Many state constitutions
require "uniformity of taxation"; that is, the assessment and taxation of
similar properties at the same rate. A BID assessment can create a uni-
formity question when a property located within a BID is required to pay
a charge while a property of comparable value outside the district, but
within the same city, is not. Many state constitutions also impose substan-
tive and/or procedural limits on local taxation. States may cap the level
of local property taxation or the amount of local property revenues as a
percentage of local property values. States may require a local vote to
increase property taxes above a certain level. A BID assessment could
subject a property owner to more taxation, or produce more revenue,
than is permitted under a tax limit. If a BID charge is imposed without a
referendum, that could violate a state's requirement of voter approval for
new taxes.
BIDs have sought to repel these attacks by asserting that BID charges
are special assessments and, therefore, exempt from many of the state
471. See Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967).
472. See Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106-09 (1989) (Missouri law imposing
property ownership qualification for appointment to board created to propose municipal
government restructuring failed rational basis test). Though Quinn might invalidate a law
limiting BID boards to landowners or merchants, a rule giving assessment payers a
dominant, albeit not an exclusive, voice might pass constitutional muster. If not, a locality
could simply make it a practice, without a legal requirement, of giving majority
representation on BID boards to assessment payers.
473. Publicly appointed boards are as likely to be dominated by private sector
interests as boards elected by businesses or property owners. When a city government
appoints a board, typically "it appoints men and women recommended by the board's
original organizers." These boards "function with as much of a private sector perspective
as they would if they were selected by their peers." Houstoun, ULI, supra note 3, at 11.
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constitutional norms applicable to general taxation. As previously noted,
although a special assessment is a compulsory charge, state courts tend to
treat an assessment as more like a fee for a service than a tax that goes
into the coffers of government. Special assessments are limited to re-
couping the costs the assessing locality incurs in providing the benefit,
and by the requirement that the benefit a payer receives must be as large
as the assessment he or she pays. These rules, which are part of the very
definition of a special assessment, presumably protect against govern-
ment exploitation of taxpayers, and thus relieve localities using assess-
ments of the need to comply with the uniformity rule, a tax ceiling, or a
referendum requirement.
As noted in Part II, BID assessments may differ from traditional spe-
cial assessments. Whereas the latter are generally used to fund physical
infrastructure aimed at improving access to, or the usefulness of, abutting
or adjacent parcels of land, BID assessments often fund services such as
policing, public events, strategic planning, marketing and promotions
that serve a district as a whole but lack close connections to individual
parcels. These differences raise the question of whether BID activities
provide the kind of benefits needed to justify an assessment.
Moreover, the nature of BID activities makes it more difficult to de-
termine the amount of the benefit to individual payers, or, indeed,
whether all payers are benefited in proportion to their assessments. Busi-
nesses that do not rely on street traffic or walk-in trade may see little ad-
vantage in activities that promote clean, safe and active streets. BID pro-
grams to plan business strategy or develop the district's image may do
little for firms whose businesses do not fit the image. Some BIDs have
developed complex financing formulas, varying assessments according to
location within the district, size of the parcel, or use of the property, in an
effort to calibrate the payment to the benefit. Many BIDs, however, use
relatively simple criteria, such as square footage, front footage, assessed
valuation or property tax payments as the basis for the imposition of an
assessment.474 These formulas do little to assure that each parcel or firm
receives a benefit equal to its assessment. Thus, even if assessments may
be used to finance area-wide business-oriented services in theory, they
may be vulnerable to claims by individual payers who assert that assess-
ment-financed activities do not benefit them in practice.
State courts have, so far, agreed that BID charges are assessments,
and, thus, can neither run afoul of uniformity clauses,475 nor be invali-
474. See, e.g., Houstoun, BIDs, supra note 1, at 30-35.
475. See S.O.L. Club, Inc. v. City of Wflliamsport, 443 A.2d 410, 411-12 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1982); City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39, 49 (Wash. 1990).
See also McGowan v. Capital Ctr., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 642, 649 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (BID
assessment not subject to Mississippi constitution's uniformity requirement and not
violative of federal equal protection clause). But cf.Jensen v. City & County of Denver, 806




dated for failing to abide by constitutional limits on tax increases. 476 In
so doing, they have accorded relatively little significance to the differ-
ences between BID assessments and more traditional special assess-
ments.4 77 In the leading case of City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men,
Inc.,478 the Washington Supreme Court dismissed the argument that as-
sessments could be used to finance only permanent capital improvements
and not services. The city had imposed an assessment to finance two pro-
grams of the Downtown Seattle Retail Core Business Improvement
Area-a "marketing program" aimed at decorating and beautifying pub-
lic places, maintaining signs, advertising and improving public relations,
and a "maintenance program" providing street cleaning, graffiti removal
and security services. The court held that the city was free to authorize
the use of the assessment to fund services, including those that provide
primarily "aesthetic improvements,"4 79 so long as the assessment-funded
activity actually provided a benefit to property.480
Turning to whether the assessment-funded services actually bene-
fited the plaintiff store owners, the court followed state precedents that
presume that assessment-funded activity provides a benefit at least as
great as the charge for it, and that place the burden on the plaintiffs to
prove that the assessment "substantially exceeded their benefit."48 1 As
the court explained, "[i] t is presumed that a local improvement benefits
property unless the challenging party produces competent evidence to
the contrary. The burden of proof shifts .. . only after the challenging
476. See Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 606-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
See also Quapaw Cent. Bus. Improvement Dist. v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 390, 392
(Ark. 1994) (Arkansas constitution's limitation on maximum rate of general property
taxation does not apply to improvement districts).
477. Courts have distinguished BID charges from taxes in other settings. In Federal
Reserve Bank v. Metrocentre Improvement Dist. #1, 657 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1981), the court
considered whether the Federal Reserve Bank was subject to a BID assessment. Federal
agencies are normally immune from state and local taxation but, under federal law, may be
required to pay "taxes upon real estate." Id. at 186-87 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 531). The court
concluded that the waiver of immunity from real estate taxes did not apply to special
assessments, as opposed to taxes, and that a BID assessment was more like an assessment
than a property tax. See id.
In Easley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 130 (Neb. 1983), the court considered
whether publicly owned land within the proposed district ought to be counted in the
assessable property base for the purpose of determining whether the fraction of district
property owned by landowners protesting formation of the BID was sufficient to block the
BID. The court observed: "It is axiomatic that, ordinarily, public property is exempt from
general purpose taxation." But tax-exempt property may be subject to a special assessment
"levied by reason of special benefits conferred upon the property." Id. at 131. The
publicly owned property could be subject to a BID assessment and thus had to be counted
in determining the sufficiency of the protests. See id. at 135.
478. 787 P.2d 39 (Wash. 1990).
479. Id. at 46. See also S.O.L. Club, Inc. v. City of Williamsport, 443 A.2d 410 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982) (BID assessment used to finance purely aesthetic improvements is not
subject to a uniformity clause challenge).
480. See Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d at 45-47.
481. Id. at 47.
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party presents expert appraisal evidence showing that the property would
not be benefitted by the improvement."48 2 The .fact that the BID assess-
ment funded area-wide services did not change the presumption and the
allocation of the burden of proof developed in earlier assessment cases.
Moreover, the Seattle BID had adopted a very complex assessment struc-
ture that took into account type of use, square footage, and location
within the business improvement area in determining the assessment im-
posed on particular property owners. 483 Although plaintiffs argued that
the assessment formula was designed to limit the assessments imposed on
large department stores, thereby placing a disproportionate burden on
smaller retailers,48 4 the court found that the challengers had not sus-
tained "their heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of the ordi-
nance's constitutionality."4
8 5
Similarly, in Evans v. City of San Jose,48 6 the California Court of
Appeal held that the requirements of Proposition 13, California's famous
voter-initiated tax limitation, did not apply to BID charges. San Jose au-
thorized a BID proposed by the San Jose Downtown Association, and im-
posed an assessment, consisting of charges to hotels and apartment build-
ings, for the BID's downtown promotion activities. The plaintiff, who
owned an apartment house within the district and had filed an unsuccess-
ful written protest against the BID's formation, asserted that the BID
charge was unconstitutional because it had been levied without the refer-
endum that Proposition 13 requires for special taxes. California courts
had previously determined that special assessments are not "special taxes"
within the meaning of Proposition 13, but the plaintiff contended that
the San Jose assessment was neither a charge on real property nor used to
finance public improvements specifically benefiting assessed real prop-
482. Id. at 48.
483. See id. at 42-43. The ordinance created five different classes of business space-
developed ground floor business space, individual commercial retail sales space at the
basement level or on the second or third floors, major multilevel retail stores, parking
garages and surface parking lots, and other uses. Each classification was assessed separately
for the BID's marketing program and for its common area maintenance program.
484. The ordinance creating the BID and authorizing the assessment assessed large
multilevel department stores for their ground floor footage and for just one other floor,
while other, smaller retailers were assessed on all their floors. In addition, there was a
ceiling of $28,000 on the amount of assessment to be imposed on any one business
regardless of square footage. See id. at 43. Two of the three department stores in the
business improvement area had their assessments capped by the ordinance. See id. at 51
n.48.
485. Id. at 51. See also Mound Hardware v. City of Spokane, No. 16487-0-11, 1997
Wash. App. LEXIS 1940, at *6-7 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) ("[lit is presumed that an
improvement is a benefit, an assessment is no greater than the benefit, an assessment is
equal or ratable to an assessment upon other property similarly situated, the assessment is
fair and evidence of appraisal values and benefits is necessary to rebut these
presumptions.").
486. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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erty, and therefore it was not a special assessment at all and so not ex-
empt from Proposition 13.
Evans agreed with the plaintiff that "[t] he assessment on businesses
for downtown promotion is not a true special assessment."487 Neverthe-
less, the court found that the BID charge, although not based on prop-
erty and not used to provide a benefit with a close nexus to property, was
more like a special assessment than a special tax. Like a special assess-
ment, the San Jose assessment was intended to benefit a "discrete group,"
rather than the city as a whole; and, as with a special assessment, the
group benefited was the group subject to the assessment.488 As in Rogers
Clothing for Men, the court deferred to the determinations of the state
legislature and the city council "that downtown promotion inures to the
benefit of businesses and landlords within the BID .... -489 The fee was,
thus, exempt from Proposition 13's referendum requirement.
In the absence of clear legislative language subjecting BID charges to
the restrictions applicable to general taxes, BID impositions are usually
treated as assessments rather than the taxes they resemble.490 Rogers
Clothing for Men and Evans are important since they involved BIDs whose
programs and charges differed most sharply from the traditional uses and
structure of the special assessments. These BIDs focused on marketing
and promotion activities, rather than physical improvements, and their
charges were imposed on business activities rather than property.
The state court treatment of BID charges as assessments is not unrea-
sonable. Although the assessment was traditionally used to finance capi-
tal investment, in theory an assessment is distinguishable from a tax sim-
ply because it provides a special benefit to the payer. Since services can
provide a benefit, assessments need not be limited to physical improve-
ments. Indeed, in the past, assessments had on occasion been used for
services, particularly the maintenance of improvements. So, too, even
before the advent of BIDs, local governments had attenuated the connec-
tion between an assessment and the benefits to specific parcels of land.
In recent years, cities and counties have used the special assessment to
finance facilities such as parks, arterial roads, and off-street parking that
provide benefits less tightly tied to particular parcels.49' These uses did
not challenge the theory of the assessment since property may be bene-
487. Id. at 607.
488. See id.
489. Id. at 608.
490. Some states have assimilated BID assessments to taxes for some purposes. In
New York, assessments count toward the state constitutional cap on local property
taxation-with no apparent harm to the proliferation of BIDs in that state. See N.Y. Gen.
Mun. Law § 980-k(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999). See alsoJensen v. City & County of Denver,
806 P.2d 381, 384-85 (Colo. 1991) (finding BID assessment subject to, and consistent with,
the Colorado Constitution's Uniformity Clause).
491. See, e.g., Heavens v. King County Rural Library Dist., 404 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1965)
(striking down law assessing property to pay for construction of libraries).
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fited by an improvement in the vicinity of the parcel even if the improve-
ment does not abut or physically connect to the assessed property.
Nevertheless, by using assessments to pay for activities that are both
area-wide in scope and operational instead of capital in nature, BIDs have
pushed out the envelope of assessment uses. In so doing, they have
greatly benefited from judicial use of rules-such as the presumption of
benefit and the placement of the burden of proof on challengers
492
-
that first crystallized when assessments were used primarily to fund im-
provements with a tighter nexus to particular parcels. Moreover, the
precedents set in cases involving BIDs may give local governments even
greater discretion to use assessments and BID-like entities to finance area-
wide services free of the restrictions of state constitutional restrictions on
local taxation.
Strikingly, in validating the BID assessments, these courts focused
less on assuring that individual payers actually benefit to the extent of the
charges imposed on them and more on determining that the benefits
flowing from the charges were confined largely to the district subject to
assessment and did not spread to the rest of the city. As Evans empha-
sized, the test of the legality of the assessment was whether a "discrete
group is specially benefited by the expenditure of these funds."4
93 Rogers
Clothing for Men noted that the assessments paid for "activities that took
place within, and advertising that benefited, the Business Improvement
Area,"49 4 and concluded that the "assessments were local in nature rather
than general."49 5 In other words, for these courts, the critical distinction
was not between benefit to "private" property versus benefits for "public"
purposes, but benefit to the district as opposed to benefit to the city as a
whole.
The emerging legal test of a BID assessment appears to be distinctive
benefit to a district, rather than benefit to each payer. Courts have al-
lowed states and local governments to use BIDs to move the special assess-
ment further along the continuum from its original inspiration as a com-
pulsory fee for an improvement that provides a fairly concrete benefit to
the payer to something more like a tax that funds general governmental
services for a neighborhood. In effect, these cases say that BID assess-
ments can be used to fund public benefits so long as the benefit is con-
fined to the district in which the assessments are collected. Ironically, the
492. See Mound Hardware v. City of Spokane, No. 16487-0-Ill, 1997 Wash. App.
LEXIS 1940, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997) ("[T]he services provided by the PBIA
[Parking and Business Improvement Area] are presumed to benefit all property owners
and businesses within the area, and thus to be a valid assessment."). As one BID executive
recently observed, a BID's calculation of the benefits used to determine assessments
"doesn't have to be accurate. It just has to be supportable [in court]." Donald Shea,
Comments at Conference on Business Improvement Districts: Mastering the Basics and
Exploring Innovation (May 3, 1998) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
493. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607.




very public service inequality that so troubles many BID critics is essential
for the legal exemption of BIDs from the rules limiting local taxes.
In California, BID assessments are now subject to Proposition 218, a
voter-initiated measure that amended the California Constitution in 1996
to require any local "agency" proposing an assessment to notify each
landowner by mail of the amount of assessment to be levied against that
parcel and to include in the mail a ballot enabling the owner to register
his or her support or opposition to the assessment.49 6 If a majority of
those returning ballots, weighted according to the financial obligation of
the affected property, -oppose the assessment, it may not be imposed.4 97
Proposition 218, thus, authorizes property owners to protest BID assess-
ments as well as to protest the formation of the BID. It enables a majority
of those voting to block an assessment, rather than requiring opposition
from a majority of those eligible to vote.498 Given that California requires
signatures representing a majority of district assessments to initiate BID
formation,499 it is unclear whether the Proposition 218 vote will block
many assessments.5 00 Still, it places a new burden on BIDs to obtain af-
firmative support from property owners. It also takes the important step
of assimilating assessments to taxes by applying the California constitu-
tional principle of voter approval of new or increased taxes to assess-
ments-with the twist that voter approval of assessments means approval
by property owners.5 01
Proposition 218 also requires an assessing agency to calculate the
"proportionate special benefit derived by each identified parcel" subject
to assessment, with proportionate special benefit "determined in relation-
ship to... the capital cost of a public improvement, the maintenance and
operation expenses of a public improvement, or the cost of the property
related service being provided. '5 02 This could constrain the ability of
BIDs to use assessments for activities-such as "promotion of public
496. See Cal. Const. art. XIII D, § 4(c-d).
497. See Cal: Const. art. XIII D, § 4(e).
498. Requiring a majority from those eligible to vote in order to block a BID
assessment would mean that nonvoter property owners are counted as supporters of the
assessment. Under Proposition 218, nonvoters are simply not counted. See Cal. Const. art.
XIII D, § 4(c) (requires agency to tabulate all ballots it receives and then determine if
there is a "majority protest").
499. See Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36,621(a) (West Supp. 1999).
500. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, City OKs Tarzana's Improvement District, LA Daily
News, Aug. 6, 1998, at N3.
501. See Cal. Const. art. XIII D, § 4 (g). Proposition 218 provides that if the property-
owner-only mail-in ballot is held unconstitutional, then assessments may be authorized
only if they receive approval from both two-thirds of the general electorate and through
the property-owner mail-in ballot process. See id. If, however, voting on assessments is
encompassed within the constitutional protection of the right to vote, so that the limitation
of the franchise to property owners is unconstitutional, then requiring the approval of
both non-owner residents and property owners is unlikely to be constitutional either. See
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
502. Cal. Const. art. XIII D, § 4(a).
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events [and] tourism," "marketing and economic development," and "re-
tail retention and recruitment"5 0 3-that do not provide direct benefits to
property, or that provide benefits that are difficult to apportion to indi-
vidual properties according to traditional assessment formulas like front
footage or assessed valuation. Or it could require California BIDs to
make more of an effort to come up with defensible projections of the
likely benefit of a particular program for each assessed parcel.5 0 4 On the
other hand, given the liberal reading California courts have given to the
concepts of special benefit and improvement, 50 5 this provision of Propo-
sition 218 could be nullified by a liberal interpretation of "property re-
lated service" 50 6 and by judicial deference to BID calculations of the ben-
efit that each parcel will reap from a district's tourism promotion or
business recruitment program.
It is not clear whether Proposition 218 applies to BIDs funded by
special assessments against businesses, such as those validated in Rogers
Clothing for Men and Evans. Proposition 218 defines an assessment as a
"levy or charge upon real property,"50 7 so taxes against businesses appear
not to be affected by the Proposition's rules governing assessments. Anti-
tax groups, like the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and the San
Diego Taxpayers Association, however, contend that assessments against
businesses are "special taxes" and, thus, under a different provision of
Proposition 218, must be approved by two-thirds of the electorate in a
referendum. 50 8 Evans had exempted BID charges against businesses
from Proposition 13's requirement of voter approval for "special taxes"
because the proceeds were reserved for the "discrete group" paying the
charges rather than made available to the city as a whole, and, thus, were
more like an assessment against property. But that was before the ratifi-
cation of Proposition 218's new limitations on assessments against prop-
erty. Proposition 218 defines "special tax" as "any tax imposed for spe-
cific purposes, including a tax imposed for specific purposes, which is
503. Cal. Sts. & High. Code § 36,613 (a, c-d) (West 1999).
504. According to Marianne Giblin, executive director of the Downtown Los Angeles
Property Owners Association, the entity that manages the Los Angeles Fashion District
BID, Proposition 218 "puts a more stringent requirement" on the nexus between cost and
benefit and is likely to "put an end to the sweetheart deals" in which some BID parcels
were underassessed relative to the benefits they received. Marianne Giblin, Comments at
Conference on Business Improvement Districts: Mastering the Basics and Exploring
Innovation (May 3, 1998) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Giblin noted that
Proposition 218 can have one benefit for BIDs since it requires public properties, which
had hitherto been exempt from assessment, to pay into assessment districts, unless they are
shown to receive no special benefit. See Cal. Const. art. XIII D, § 4(a).
505. See, e.g., Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 149-52 (Cal. 1992) (upholding
assessments for maintenance of public parks).
506. Cal. Const. art. XIII D, § 4(a).
507. Cal. Const. art. XIII D, § 2(b).
508. See Mike Allen, Business Improvement Districts Threatened?, 18 San Diego Bus.
J. 1, June 9, 1997, at 1; Terry Rodgers, 1st Court Test of Prop. 218 May be Here, San Diego
Union-Trib., June 11, 1997, Ed. B-i, at 7-8.
1999]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
placed into a general fund."5 09 It is not clear whether "placed into a gen-
eral fund" includes assessments that are collected by a city but earmarked
for a business improvement district. The issue may receive judicial clarifi-
cation in a suit brought by a taxpayers' group against the City of San
Diego, which has sixteen BIDs financed by assessments against
businesses. 510
These cases, and the uncertainties created in California by Proposi-
tion 218, shed new light on the theme of public versus private that runs
through the story of BIDs. In deferring to the determinations of state
and local legislatures that BID programs benefit businesses or property
owners in the districts-over the protests of owners who claim they have
not been benefited-state courts have implicitly underscored the public
nature of BID assessments. Both Evans and Rogers Clothing for Men noted
the role of local governments in creating the BIDs and authorizing the
assessments. The BIDs were seen as implementing the municipal interest
in delivering special services to the business district, not as devices for
promoting the autonomy of the business district. The practice ofjudicial
deference to legislative bodies in matters concerning assessments better
explains the validation of BID charges than does any notion of the BID as
a quasi-private body. So, too, the adoption of Proposition 218 suggests
that for at least some California voters, the problem with BIDs and similar
entities is that their charges finance programs that are potentially too
"public," that is, programs that provide benefits that are spread broadly
across districts rather than tied tightly to specific parcels or assessment
payers.
By the same token, the state taxpayer cases suggest that the "public-
private" tension immanent in the proliferation of BIDs is notjust a matter
of private property versus public government but is also a question of the
role of discrete taxing and spending districts within cities. The BIDs sur-
vived these challenges because their assessments, although collected pur-
suant to municipal authorization, were devoted to the benefit of the dis-
tricts in which they were collected and were not used to fund programs
for the "community at large."51' In effect, the notion of private benefit to
individual assessment payers was transmuted into the private benefit of
the assessment districts. If California's business-financed BIDs escape the
application of Proposition 218, it is likely to be for the same reason-that
the BIDs' funds are devoted to the districts rather than the city as a
whole.
509. Cal. Const. art. XIII C, § I(d).
510. See Ray Huard, Taxpayer Group Sues San Diego Over Prop. 218, San Diego
Union-Trib.,July 4, 1997, Ed. B-1, at 1. In an initial ruling, the Superior Court determined
that Proposition 218 did not apply to business fee-funded BIDs. See Mike Allen, Business
Improvement District Edict Favors City, 19 San Diego Bus. J., Apr. 20, 1998, at 1.
511. City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39, 46 (Wash. 1990).
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IV. BIDs AND PUBLIC VALUES IN URBAN GOVERNANCE
Critics of BIDs assert that the districts undermine public values cen-
tral to urban governance. BIDs, they argue, violate longstanding public
norms of democratic accountability and equitable provision of public
services. As previously noted, the issue of accountability underlies and
drives the one person, one vote challenge, but one person, one vote and
democratic accountability are not interchangeable. However the consti-
tutional issue is resolved, the accountability question will remain. Cities
can take steps to oversee BIDs more effectively and to protect the public
interests implicated by BID operations. The issue of accountability is ulti-
mately a matter of the willingness of city governments to engage in more
vigorous monitoring and control.
The public service inequality question is the mirror image of the
legal challenges to BID assessments: BID property owners and businesses
are required to pay additional taxes, but they receive additional serv-
ices-services based not on some municipal determination of need but
on the BID's willingness and ability to pay. BIDs, thus, by definition, cre-
ate intralocal inequalities in public services. Although interlocal differ-
ences in tax base and tax rates have long produced interlocal differences
in the quantity and quality of public services, BIDs make willingness and
ability to pay a formal factor in the provision of services within a city. So
far, however, the degree of inequality is relatively modest. BIDs often
provide benefits to people outside the districts and to their cities as a
whole. The issue remains troubling and requires a careful consideration
of the tradeoff between the norm of intralocal equality and the benefits
of providing extra services to the business districts that are often critical
to the well-being of a city.
A. BIDs and Democratic Accountability
BIDs present three different problems of accountability: accounta-
bility to district residents, to city govemments and to the BIDs' business
or property owner constituents. First, BIDs have an impact on all district
residents. BID services-the provision of cleaner, safer streets and the
repair of dilapidated parks-will often be highly beneficial to district resi-
dents. Other BID activities may cause resentment. BID marketing strate-
gies and development policies can conflict with the preferences of resi-
dents and current commercial tenants,5 12 and BID order maintenance
activities can be controversial. Moreover, although only landowners are
subject to assessment in districts funded by property assessments, these
512. See, e.g., Zukin, supra note 23, at 35 (community board opposition to BID's
program of capital improvements); Allon, supra note 254, at 6 (conflict between 14th
Street/Union Square BID and Union Square Community Coalition over whether to
expand park if that would reduce access to local businesses); Joe Sexton, Standoff Over
Red Hook Renewal: Businesses Fear a Plan to Remake a Neighborhood, N.Y. Times, Jan.




owners are often able to pass the assessments along to tenants. Despite
these broader impacts on residents and commercial tenants, BID boards
are generally dominated by representatives of assessment payers and ac-
cordingly see themselves as instruments for the advancement of interests
of assessment payers. District residents and commercial tenants may have
little opportunity within the structure of the BID to see that their con-
cerns are taken into account.
Second, BID activities can affect other city neighborhoods. BID se-
curity and order maintenance programs may displace crime and social
problems onto adjacent communities. 513 Similarly, BID programs, such
as the financing of police substations, can attract the investment of addi-
tional city services into the district. BID marketing and development pro-
grams may draw customers and investment away from other areas of the
city.514 BID efforts to promote a sense of district distinctiveness may de-
tract from the unity of the city as a whole.
Most state laws provide ample opportunities for municipal oversight
and control of BIDs. The municipality has broad discretion over whether
to create the BID in the first place, and the municipality can shape the
BID's boundaries, finances and service plan. Changes in boundaries or
assessment structure require municipal approval, and representatives of
city government may sit on the BID's board. In many states, the munici-
pality has power to dissolve the BID at any time. Where the BID is ap-
proved for a limited term, the municipality may decline to renew the dis-
trict at the end of its term.
Yet, it is unclear how vigorously municipal governments actually
oversee their BIDs. 515 Municipalities generally devote more attention to
the creation of BIDs than to checking on BIDs once they are operational,
and the administrative resources for overseeing BIDs are often quite lim-
ited. Cities look to BIDs to provide the public services that some land-
owners or commercial interests insist they need in order to remain in the
city. BIDs provide these services without burdening the local public fisc.
Thus, city governments are, to an extent, dependent on BIDs, and many
have promoted the formation of BIDs. At a time of intense interlocal
competition for investment, it may be difficult for city governments to be
513. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 7, at 319; Deutsch, supra note 105, at 9 (quoting
Bryant Park BID director Daniel Biederman, "We felt guilty when we evicted the bad guys
from Bryant Park, since we know we didn't eradicate them."). But see Joseph Hanania,
Next LA. Making BIDs on the Future, LA. Times, Jan. 7, 1997, at B2 (quoting consultant's
remarks that successful BIDs have beneficial spillovers and stimulate development in
adjacent areas).
514. See, e.g., Devin Leonard, Dazzled by Times Square, Nasdaq Boss Frank Zarb May
Snub Wall Street, N.Y. Observer, Jan. 11, 1999, at I (describing efforts of the
Downtown-lower Manhattan BID to lure the National Association of Securities Dealers to
lower Manhattan, rather than the Times Square area).
515. See, e.g., IDA, supra note 10, at 28; Houstoun, Betting, supra note 2, at 18
("[E]ven where city councils approve board members, meaningful accountability, checks
and balances, and public scrutiny usually are absent.").
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both supervisors and critics as well as promoters and cheerleaders of
BIDs.
Third, questions have arisen concerning the accountability of BIDs
to their own assessment-paying constituents. Indeed, the two New York
City Council studies of BIDs gave more attention to the relationship be-
tween BIDs and district property owners than to any other aspect of BID
accountability.5 16 This "internal" BID accountability problem is the prod-
uct of several factors. District property or business interests are not mon-
olithic. There can be conflicts between office building owners and retail
property owners, between commercial property owners and residential
property owners or between small owners and large owners over assess-
ment formulas, service priorities and development strategies.5 17 The
combination of small district size and the power of coercive taxation
raises the classic Madisonian possibility of tyranny by a majority faction-
with the added fillip that in those districts where a small number of own-
ers pay a large proportion of the assessments and voting is based on as-
sessed valuation, the dominating majority may actually represent a small
fraction of the total parcels in the district. Conflicts between assessment
payers and BID officers and directors may compound the potential for
conflicts among assessment payers. Many BIDs are sponsored and man-
aged by pre-existing public-private partnerships, chambers of commerce,
merchants' associations, and local development corporations which bene-
fit financially from the guaranteed income provided by BID assessments.
BIDs may lease space or purchase services from, or make grants or loans
to, these organizations or other community-based entities whose officers
or directors serve on BID boards.518 The New York City Council Report
found that "It]he common affiliations between BIDs and these other or-
ganizations raise concerns regarding potential conflicts of interest, the
improper utilization of BID funds and, in the case of BID managers, the
actual time spent working for the BID." 519 The Council Report suggested
that in some instances BIDs may be "cash cows" for these affiliated
organizations.5 20
Smaller property owners may be particularly vulnerable to exploita-
tion by larger payers and managers. Small owners may have formal vot-
ing rights on BID boards, but if votes are allocated according to assess-
ments, and property values are concentrated in relatively few hands, they
may easily be outvoted by a small number of large owners. With compul-
sory assessments, exit from the BID is far more difficult than quitting a
chamber of commerce or downtown association. It is difficult for individ-
ual small owners to monitor BID activities; their assessments are small-
516. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at iv; Managing the Micropolis, supra
note 96, at 8-10.
517. See, e.g., Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 7-10.
518. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 31-42.
519. Id. at 31-32.
520. See id. at 32.
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just a tiny fraction of their taxes-relative to the time and effort it would
take to effectively investigate BID operations. In theory, the requirement
that a landowner paying a special assessment must receive a benefit at
least as great as the payment ought to provide some protection from ex-
ploitation. But, as Part III indicates, courts tend to defer to legislative
determinations of benefit. Moreover, it may not be financially worth-
while for small payers to litigate over the uses of their assessments. Again,
in theory, dissatisfied owners can seek to dissolve a BID, or to veto its
renewal, but small owners are difficult to organize, particularly when the
burden falls on them to gather the votes needed to cross the statutory
threshold of legally significant opposition.
BID accountability is, thus, a real cause for concern. The problems,
however, are not insurmountable, and may be addressed by relatively
modest legal and administrative reforms. The most important action-
one which would serve the interests of residents, assessment payers, and
the city as a whole-would be the adoption of a sunset requirement.
BIDs should be created for fixed terms and forced out of business at the
end of that term unless reestablished by the city pursuant to a process
similar to that required for initial creation of the BID. An appropriate
term length would be five years-long enough for the BID to get under-
way without its organizers having to immediately divert their efforts to
reauthorization and long enough for BID programs to show some bene-
fits, but not so long as to insulate the BID from its constituents. 52 1 A
sunset and reauthorization requirement would give both assessment pay-
ers and residents the opportunity to register their views concerning the
impact of the BID. It would provide the occasion to force a city to recon-
sider the BID, and to reassess its costs and benefits for district businesses
and property owners, for district residents, and for the city as a whole. To
make the reauthorization process meaningful, BIDs should be required
to demonstrate adequate notification to all district interests-residents
and commercial tenants, as well as assessment payers-of the impending
reauthorization, and the city should not act until after such notice and a
public hearing.522
Further, cities need to devote greater resources to oversight and con-
trol in the periods between authorization votes. BIDs are creatures of city
government, established to provide city services, and to promote the city's
interest in the well-being of its business areas. Cities have plenary author-
ity over BIDs. Cities need to take more seriously their obligations to mon-
521. As noted in Part I, many states already limit BIDs to a term, limit the period of a
BID's assessment or, as in New York, limit the duration of the contract with the district
management association. A sunset requirement, thus, would not be a drastic departure
from existing law, although not all states that impose terms require a full reauthorization
process, and many states do not limit the duration of BIDs at all.
522. The New York City Council has found that procedures for notifying property
owners of the pendency of a BID proposal are often flawed and that property owners may
fail to receive proper notice. See Managing the Micropolis, supra note 96, at 20-30.
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itor their creatures and agents, and to take appropriate administrative
action to make BIDs more responsive to democratic controls. Cities
should ensure that there is both a city council committee and an execu-
tive branch agency responsible for overseeing BID activities, with staffing
commensurate with the number and size of the city's BIDs. City govern-
ments should require BIDs to submit annual reports on BID programs
and finances both to the city and to district property owners. Similarly,
cities should adopt-or require their BIDs to adopt-rules limiting the
conflicts of interest posed by the non-BID affiliations of BID managers
and directors. 523
The New York City experience provides some basis for the hope that
cities can rise to the challenge of overseeing their BIDs. The city govern-
ment has long been highly supportive of its BID program, and has ac-
tively promoted the formation of new BIDs. More recently, as questions
of accountability have arisen, the city has begun to give greater attention
to the finances and management of existing BIDs. Mayor Giuliani barred
BIDs from incurring any new debt.524 The City Council issued two criti-
cal reports, along with recommendations for new legislation to improve
city oversight and BID accountability. The City Comptroller issued a criti-
cal audit of the Grand Central BID and announced he would audit all of
the city's BIDs. 52 5 In April 1998, Mayor Giuliani directed BIDs to discuss
"all activities and initiatives" with the city's Department of Business
Services "at the first opportunity and prior to their development by any
committee or approval by the [BID] board of directors."526 Finally, in a
dramatic signal of its determination to monitor and control New York's
BIDs, the city, citing persistent noncompliance with municipal directives,
declined to renew the contract of the Grand Central Partnership to man-
age the city's largest BID in the summer of 1998.527
These actions effectively demonstrate that a city can vigorously over-
see its BIDs and take the administrative actions necessary to translate for-
mal legal control into real public accountability. Indeed, they raise the
danger that the city may be too aggressive in its efforts to control the
BIDs. The city must take care to assure that closer oversight does not
strangle the ability of BIDs to undertake the initiatives in such areas as
public safety, street cleaning, street furniture and design, public events
and hospitality to visitors that have made such a contribution to urban
523. Some BIDs have adopted such policies. See, e.g., Deborah M. Clubb, CCC
Adopts Rules to Help Avoid Conflicts of Interest, Memphis Com. Appeal, Apr. 10, 1998, at
Al (Memphis BID adopts a conflict of interest policy).
524. See Levy, supra note 170, at 22.
525. See Gabriel, supra note 459, at 1.
526. See Lentz, supra note 461, at 4. The headline of this Crain's article appears to
overstate just how far the new city policy restrains the BIDs.
527. See Lueck, supra note 135, at BI.
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life. Micromanagement of BID operations can be as damaging to urban
governance as lax oversight and inadequate municipal control.528
The developments in New York City, which has more BIDs than any
other locality in the country, indicate that cities have the legal capacity to
effectively oversee BIDs. The real questions are political and pragmatic:
whether cities will actually exercise their powers and seek to assure BID
accountability, whether oversight staffs will be given adequate resources
and whether elected governments can increase their monitoring without
interfering with the ability of BIDs to implement their programs.
Similarly, the solution to the problem of BID accountability to dis-
trict residents will require more active city monitoring and control. State
laws should require that district residents and neighborhood organiza-
tions be given notice of a proposal to form or renew a BID and be invited
to testify at public hearings considering these questions.5 29 Some seats
on BID managing boards should be reserved for representatives of neigh-
borhood residents or organizations. But given the financial basis of
BIDs-their dependence on assessments imposed on property owners or
firms within the district-it is inevitable that property owners or firms will
want the dominant voice in determining whether they will be assessed
and how their assessments will be spent. Certainly, it is highly unlikely
that property owners would support a program that would subject
them-and only them-to additional taxation without some guarantee,
such as majority representation on the board that spends the money, that
the additional taxes would go to programs that benefit them. As a result,
it is up to the democratically elected city governments that create the
BIDs to protect the interests of district residents. City governments have
the legal authority to do so: The real issue is whether they have the will to
take the legal and administrative steps necessary to oversee their BIDs.
Many of the measures that can increase accountability to city govern-
ment-annual reports, outside audits, conflict of interest rules and sunset
and reauthorization requirements-can benefit assessment payers as well.
Cities should require BIDs to disseminate greater information to assess-
ment payers concerning their programs, operations and the meetings
and procedures of their managing boards. Cities should restrict the abil-
ity of BIDs to contract with organizations that are affiliated with BID man-
agers and directors. Assessment payers would also benefit if the rules of
BID formation and renewal required BID proponents-and the BID itself
in a reauthorization proceeding-to demonstrate affirmative support
from the district-level private sector before a BID could be established or
renewed. As noted in Part I, although much of the popular literature
concerning BIDs assumes that a majority of district businesses or property
528. See Thomas J. Lueck, The Mayor's Reach, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1998, § 1, at 33
(quoting concerns of City Council Finance Committee Chair Herbert E. Berman over
Mayor's directive requiring BIDs to report more frequently to the Department of Business
Services).
529. See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 1-2276(d) (1998).
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owners must vote to approve the creation of a BID, in many states there is
no such requirement, and the formal role for district-level private inter-
ests is limited to vetoing a BID that has already been approved by the city
legislature. A veto procedure puts a considerable burden on smaller
property owners or businesses to find out about the proposed BID, organ-
ize and collect the necessary petition signatures-activities which must be
carried out in a limited time period. District property or business inter-
ests would be better protected, and BID accountability to the district-level
private sector promoted, if BID proponents had the burden of mustering
the necessary show of support for formation and reauthorization of a
BID.5 3 0
The hardest issue of BID-assessment payer relations derives from the
public, not the private, nature of BIDs. Instead of undertaking classic
assessment-funded activities that provide discrete benefits to individual
payers in exchange for assessments tied to the particular payer's benefits,
a BID provides services to a district as a whole. These are "public" serv-
ices-public, that is, within the limited perimeters of the districts. With
the nexus between a particular property owner's payment and benefit
attenuated, the possibility arises that the property owners or businesses
who control the BID can exploit weaker interests and use BID assess-
ments to support programs which primarily benefit the dominant owners.
Such a possibility is inherent in any institution with the power to coerce
contributions. 53 1 BID spending may favor some district interests over
others because the BID may be too accountable to the small number of
owners who pay the majority of a district's assessments. 53 2 The only ways
to prevent such tyranny by the BID majority are either to shift decision-
making to the city government, to limit the range of BID activities to
services characterized by a tight benefit-payment nexus or to eliminate
530. It is debatable whether business or property owner sentiment should be gauged
by reference to the percentage of firms/parcels or the percentage of assessment payments.
As noted in Part I, some states look to percentage of firms/parcels, some look to
percentage of assessments or assessed valuation, and some look to both in determining the
sufficiency of support for, or opposition to, BID formation. Similarly, some provide for the
allocation of votes on BID boards according to assessments while others treat all firms or
owners equally. Given that participation in formation and governance is limited to
businesses or property owners because only they are subject to district assessments, there is
some logic to scaling the weight of petition signatures and votes to the size of the
assessment burden. On the other hand, property owners are often able to pass assessments
along to tenants, so there may not be a correlation between assessment size and financial
burden. Moreover, in some districts a small number of owners who pay a high proportion
of the assessments may be able to dominate the BID to the detriment of smaller payers.
Neither "one dollar, one vote" nor "one parcel, one vote" is a clearly compelling rule. The
measure of property owner support may be more a matter of local politics, and of
concentration in local property ownership, than a matter of principle.
531. "Exit" from the district is not an option unless the firm or owner wants to incur
the costs of physically moving from the district or organizing with other firms or
landowners to secure the district's termination.
532. Again, the assessment payer majority may refer to a majority of firms or parcel
owners, or to the payers of a majority of a district's assessments.
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compulsory assessments. Any of these "solutions" could significantly un-
dermine the ability of BIDs to take the initiative, provide area-wide sen-
ices and improvements or function as structures for the articulation and
implementation of district solutions to district problems.533 If any of
these approaches were adopted, a BID would cease to be a BID, and the
benefits of BID programs might be lost. Nor is it clear that such drastic
action is necessary. Although the potential for internal exploitation ex-
ists, and some cases of abuses have been identified, there are relatively
few reported incidents given the large number of BIDs.
At present, it does not appear that the problem of majority exploita-
tion is so great as to require a drastic curtailment of BID financing or
decisionmaking capacity. Sunset and reauthorization requirements,
more active city oversight, controls on conflicts of interest of BID manag-
ers and directors and the greater dissemination of information concern-
ing BID programs and finances to BID constituents ought to be sufficient
to protect the interests of assessment payers. If not, and if the spread and
maturation of BIDs demonstrate that the problem of exploitation is more
serious than it has been to date, then cities will have to reconsider
whether BIDs are an appropriate instrument for dealing with business
district problems.
B. BIDs and Inequality in Local Public Services
BIDs almost certainly cause some inequalities in service delivery. In
many cities, as part of the process of establishing a BID, the city govern-
ment pledges that it will not reduce the services the district received prior
to the formation of the BID. BID-financed services will be increments to
existing city-provided services, so that BIDs receive more policing, gar-
bage pickups, street cleaning and other services than the city government
would otherwise provide.
Some BIDs complain that, such baseline services agreements
notwithstanding, cities do cut back on municipal services, such as sanita-
tion, once BIDs are in place.53 4 In those situations, district property own-
ers pay more money for the same services they would otherwise receive,
and cities are able to redeploy municipal resources from more affluent to
less affluent areas.
Conversely, the existence of a BID may result in a district receiving
more municipally provided services, and not just BID services. The con-
troversy over the new police substation for the Wall Street area concerned
the ability of a BID to use its funds to persuade New York City to redeploy
city police resources in a manner more beneficial to the BID, and to en-
533. There are a small number of so-called "voluntary" BIDs-in effect, associations
of area businesses or property owners who commit to contributing funds for hiring
supplemental cleaning crews. See, e.g., Mayor Dennis Archer to Announce Detroit's First
Downtown Business Improvement District Initiative, PR Newswire, Sept. 21, 1998, (visited
Jan. 15, 1999) <http://dialog.carl.org> (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
534. See Cities Within Cities, supra note 181, at 79.
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able the Wall Street area to jump ahead of other neighborhoods that
were seeking new substations but were counting on the city to pay for
them.53 5 Less dramatically, BIDs are quick to discover neighborhood
problems, like potholes and broken street lights, and are effective at re-
porting these problems to responsible city agencies and pressing for the
necessary repairs. The BID is a sort of "ombudsman with resources" for
forcing city agencies to do their jobs in BID areas.53 6
Except for municipal evasion of a baseline services agreement, the
formation of a BID means an area will be receiving more services than it
would have otherwise. If the area was not underserved in the first place,
then the area will receive more services than a comparable non-BID
neighborhood. More important, these services are based on the district's
willingness and ability to pay, rather than on need for the service. Thus,
the rise of BIDs creates a connection between neighborhood wealth and
the quality of local public services. BIDs raise the troubling prospect of
establishing a practice that could justify inequalities in public services
among the different neighborhoods within a city based on neighborhood
ability to pay. The local public service inequalities that BIDs create, how-
ever, may be mitigated by four factors.
First, BIDs are not so sharply distinct from their surrounding neigh-
borhoods that only BID constituents benefit from BID-provided services.
Most BIDs are commercial districts. In the words of the executive direc-
tor of the Times Square BID, "BIDs are here to draw people into our
neighborhoods."5 37 They depend heavily on other city residents to come
to the districts to work, to shop, to seek entertainment or to enjoy public
amenities. Thus, all city people who come into the districts, whether or
not they reside in the BID, benefit from BID programs that make districts
cleaner, safer and more vibrant.538
Second, BIDs can benefit their cities as a whole. Most BIDs are lo-
cated in downtown or central business district areas that attract workers
and shoppers from the metropolitan area, tourists, convention-goers, and
other visitors more broadly. Purchases made within BIDs increase city
535. See, e.g., More Police on Wall Street, supra note 210, at A18; Robert Polner &
Dan Morrison, A Cozy Union: Alliance's Links to City Officials Raise Eyebrows, N.Y.
Newsday, Feb. 23, 1998, at A3. The political turmoil created by the news that BID funding
would enable the Wall Street area to obtain a new police substation may have led to the
city's decision to use city funds to pay for another new substation in a middle-class black
neighborhood in Queens. See Lisa Rein, Queens to Get New Police Base, Daily News (N.
Y.), Feb. 18, 1998, at 5.
536. Interview with Gretchen Dykstra, Executive Director of Times Square BID In
New York, N.Y. (July 14, 1998).
537. See id.
538. Most BID programs are unlikely to have negative effects on surrounding areas. It
is implausible to think that BID trash collection and street cleaning will displace litter
elsewhere. It is conceivable that BID policing activities will cause criminal activity to shift
to adjacent neighborhoods. There is not much evidence that this has occurred, but it is a
possibility worth considering in evaluating the overall impact of BIDs on their cities.
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sales tax revenues; so, too, increased commercial activity within a BID
enhances property values and, thus, can increase property taxes. BIDs
seek to make downtowns and other commercial districts more competi-
tive with suburban malls and edge city developments as sites for offices,
stores, and entertainment and cultural activities. BIDs can draw new in-
vestment and businesses into the cities, or at least stanch the flow of com-
mercial activity exiting the city. This provides the city with financial bene-
fits and can provide a critical boost to urban morale.53 9
Third, existing measures of service need may understate the require-
ments of business districts. Commercial areas and downtowns have rela-
tively few full-time residents, yet they attract enormous numbers of office
workers, shoppers, tourists and visitors. As previously noted, the Grand
Central area had fewer than one thousand permanent residents but more
than 250,000 weekday working commuters, not to mention shoppers,
tourists and other people who pass through the district without living
there. As a result, their cleaning and policing needs are well out of pro-
portion to their resident population. To the extent that the allocation of
municipal services is based on population, these areas may actually be
underserved, so that BID programs may be necessary simply to keep these
areas adequately maintained.
Fourth, it would be wise not to exaggerate the level of inequality pro-
duced by BID expenditures. BID budgets are rather small compared to
municipal budgets. In fiscal 1997, BID assessments in New York City,
which has the largest BID program in the country, came to less than $50
million-or less than two-tenths of one percent of the city's $34 billion
budget.5 40 Moreover, a part of BID spending is devoted to marketing,
promotions and other direct business-related services that would be irrel-
evant to residential areas. The differences in service expenditures be-
tween BID and non-BID districts within cities are probably far less than
the differences in expenditures between high-wealth and low-wealth mu-
nicipalities in the same metropolitan area.
BIDs do produce service inequalities, but they can also shore up a
municipality's tax base, provide services and public amenities that city res-
idents, as well as businesses and property owners, can use and enjoy, and
ultimately benefit the rest of the city. Most BIDs promote the general city
interest in maintaining and revitalizing downtowns without the tax cuts,
low interest loans or diversion of municipal treasury funds that have
marked other downtown development programs in the last several de-
cades. Certainly, it would be better to raise the quality of services within
cities generally to bring all neighborhoods up to the level of the BIDs.
But that is not likely to be an option in today's fiscally constrained urban
environment.
539. See, e.g., Deborah Sullivan, Gauging Success: LA. to Start Monitoring Districts,
Daily News of L.A., Mar. 1, 1998, at N18 (Pasadena Director of Finance details sales tax and
property tax revenue increases in Old Pasadena BID).
540. See Comptrollers' Audit, supra note 159, at 3.
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Downtown property owners are unlikely to support increases in the
general level of city taxation as most of the added revenue would go to
services outside business areas and to programs that do not benefit busi-
ness activity directly. Instead, property owners unable to establish BIDs to
finance supplemental services and improvements are likely either to (i)
provide themselves with supplemental services privately, on an individual
basis, through agreements among the largest owners, or through organi-
zations like chambers of commerce; (ii) seek to use the local political
process to divert general city revenues to the business districts; or (iii)
give up on obtaining the additional services and relocate from the cities
to those suburbs or exurban areas that provide better services, or at least
comparable services at lower tax rates.
Under the third alternative to BIDs, the city would lose the taxes the
businesses generate as well as the other benefits-such as employment
and opportunities for shopping and entertainment-such businesses pro-
vide. Ultimately, the city would lose residents as well. This basically de-
scribes the postwar pattern of suburban rise and urban fall.
Under the second possibility, which basically follows the pattern of
the downtown economic revitalization strategy of the postwar decades,
business districts would get additional services but at a cost to other areas
in the city-a cost largely avoided by BIDs' primary reliance on assess-
ments imposed on property owners or firms within the business districts.
The first option, if successful, would provide the business districts the
services they need. These services would be provided without the use of
public funds, but there would still be service inequalities between the
business districts and other areas. It is, however, difficult for any but rela-
tively affluent landowners to furnish their own additional safety or sani-
tary services on an individual basis or through voluntary collective organi-
zations. The few instances of "voluntary" BIDs involve areas where one or
a small number of property owners own most of the property in the
area.5 41 In other situations, coordinating large numbers of owners and
overcoming the free rider problem without coercive taxation are likely to
pose insuperable difficulties. Moreover, should a voluntary BID succeed,
the inequality problem would also be created. The BID's access to the
mechanism of public taxation means that it will be more effective than a
chamber of commerce in collecting funds, but the result is no more une-
541. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 105, at 9 (the Durst Organization, a commercial
realtor in New York, "laughingly" operates a "DID-the Durst Improvement District,"
which provides patrolling and cleaning services to the city blocks adjacent to its midtown
office buildings). In the area around the University of Pennsylvania in West Philadelphia,
the University, which is the principal property owner in the neighborhood, has taken the
lead in organizing other universities, hospitals, not-for-profit organizations, and
governments that own property but are tax-exempt and thus, under Pennsylvania law,
cannot be assessed for a BID into a BID-like entity. Eighty percent of the $3.4 million
budget for this University City District is provided by five-year contractual commitments of
the dozen largest property owners, led by the University. See Paul Stahnke, Conference on
BIDs (May 3, 1998).
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qual than if these services were provided by a voluntary organization of
neighborhood landowners or businesses.
At present, BIDs produce relatively limited inequalities, and these
inequalities may be justified by the benefits BIDs provide their cities. The
real inequality concerns posed by the rise of BIDs are more long-term.
First, the existence of BIDs could lead businesses and property owners in
commercial areas to use BDs to provide more of the services their areas
receive. They would then reduce their support for existing levels of gen-
eral taxation. If business areas could fund more of their services through
district taxes, they might seek to lower general municipal taxes, thereby
reducing revenues available for services elsewhere in their cities. This
could drive down the baseline level of city services and thus increase the
degree of inequality between BID and non-BID areas, and between more
affluent BIDs and their poorer cousins.
Second, although BIDs are reserved for areas where the primary
property uses are business-related, the districts could become a model for
other types of special assessment or special service districts that would
serve upper-income residential areas. Park advocates have proposed the
creation of "park enhancement districts" that would apply the BID model
to parks in residential areas.5 4 2 In New York City, Upper East Side real
estate interests, citing the successes of BIDs, proposed the creation of an
Upper East Side Security District that would have collected supplemental
assessments to fund additional security for that affluent residential neigh-
borhood.5 4 3 Although the proposal ultimately foundered in the face of
intense opposition-including opposition from within the proposed dis-
trict 544-a similar neighborhood security district, funded by neighbor-
hood-level assessments, was created by the city of Chicago for the Mar-
quette Park neighborhood after years of pressure by neighborhood
residents. 545 Neighborhood "tax election districts," in which property
owners subject themselves to additional taxes to pay for extra police pa-
trols, appear to be in use in Louisiana as well.5 46
Together, the expanded use of BIDs in business areas and the devel-
opment of BID-like entities in residential areas could undermine the
norm of equality in the provision of urban public services. In large cities,
citywide taxes provide for a measure of redistribution from more affluent
neighborhoods to poorer areas. Taxes are usually based on some mea-
sure of ability to pay, such as property values or incomes, while "the legal
542. See BIDs, PEDs, and Special Districts: A Better Way to Pay for Parks?
GreenSense: Financing Parks and Conservation, Spring 1995, at 1.
543. See Joyce Purnick, Plan for Private Police Force Sets off Alarms on Upper East
Side, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1995, at A25.
544. See, e.g., Bruce Lambert, Private Security Proposal is Fading, N.Y. Times, July 9,
1995 § 13, at 6; Purnick, supra note 543, at A25.
545. See Phillip J. O'Connor, Marquette P. Guards Yield First Arrests, Chi. Sun-
Times, June 1, 1995, at 6.
546. See Deann Smith, Crime-wary Neighborhoods Passing Taxes for Protection,
Baton Rouge Advocate, Oct. 11, 1998, at Al.
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doctrine of equal service provision presumptively obligates the [city] gov-
ernment to offer the same level of service to all residents."5 4
7 The doc-
trine of equal service provision is not often judicially enforced, and in
some cities, some areas are, no doubt, better served than others. But this
may be due to bureaucratic decision rules or municipal politics rather
than formal city policy. In general, "municipal governments more often
... achieve a rough equivalence of service packages among their neigh-
borhoods."5 48 If BIDs were to lead to more neighborhoods providing
more of their own services out of neighborhood resources, this could cre-
ate within city boundaries the interlocal, and especially, city-suburb, pub-
lic service inequities characteristic of most American metropolitan
areas.
549
This specter of intracity metropolitanization is difficult to assess. At
present, BID functions are restricted, and BID budgets are just a small
fraction of city taxes, with assessment levels often tightly limited by state
law. There are huge categories of local government expenditures, such
as education, that are entirely outside the bailiwick of BIDs. Downtown
interests have generally resisted redistributive taxation. Although the
existence of a BID might stiffen commercial district opposition to general
municipal taxation, it is unclear whether those interests would have the
political clout to drive down the general level of taxation for the support
of city services-after all, it was their inability to obtain more general city
revenues for business district services that led them to champion the self-
assessment that BIDs entail.
BIDs pose much less of a threat of service inequality than would the
extension of the BID model to residential areas.550 To be sure, residen-
tial neighborhoods, in which property ownership is widely dispersed, are
likely to be harder to organize than commercial districts, and homeown-
ers unable to shift the supplemental assessments on to tenants or custom-
ers may be more resistant to paying additional charges. In many jurisdic-
tions, there is no current legal authorization for residential improvement
districts. Still, the Marquette Park and Louisiana police district examples
suggest that residential BIDs can be created. If the residential version of
the BID were to be more widely authorized, it might spread; with more
people benefiting from both BIDs and residential special services districts
there could be a greater constituency for driving down the level of gen-
547. Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1185,
1197 (1996).
548. Robert L. Lineberry, Equality and Urban Policy: The Distribution of Municipal
Public Services 181 (1977).
549. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 18-39 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism
I] (the quality of local services can vary tremendously from locality to locality within a
metropolitan area according to the taxable wealth of each locality).
550. As one commentator observed, New Orleans, which has taken the lead in
establishing residential policing districts, was also one of the first cities in the United States
to create a business improvement district. See Smith, supra note 546, at Al.
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eral municipal taxation, and shifting responsibility for the provision of
municipal services to BIDs and residential improvement districts(RIDs) .551 If RIDs, like BIDs, were to be funded primarily from district
assessments, that really would be a formula for reproducing city-suburb
fiscal inequities within cities. 55 2
There is much less justification, in terms of the well-being of a city as
a whole, for a RID than for a BID. RIDs are unlikely to be places in which
other city residents work, shop or seek entertainment, so other city resi-
dents would not benefit directly from RID amenities in the way they bene-
fit from BIDs. Similarly, residential districts are unlikely to draw shop-
pers, tourists or workers from outside the city, so there is less benefit to
the city's tax base. Still, RIDs could provide city residents with an alterna-
tive to exit to the suburbs, and, thus, they could help cities hold on to
their more affluent residents. So long as residents in these areas are sub-ject to general municipal taxation, RIDs might have some benefits for the
municipal fisc. It would be a more difficult question whether the service
inequalities attendant on RIDs, and the challenge to the norm of equal
service provision within municipal boundaries, could be justified in terms
of the benefits to the city as a whole of the retention of middle- and up-
per-income residential taxpayers.
The service inequalities currently produced by BIDs are relatively
modest-they are far less than the inequalities that mark city-suburb rela-
tions-but the rise of BIDs has disquieting implications for the future of
urban public services. With politically fragmented metropolitan areas
and cutbacks in intergovernmental assistance, cities are largely left to
their own devices. They depend on their own resources to fund services
for their residents. As a result, a city must attract and retain businesses
and more affluent residents in order to maintain its tax base. Businesses
and more affluent residents, however, are likely to demand better serv-
ices, and they are more capable of exiting to suburban communities
where better services at lower taxes are available if their demands for bet-
ter municipal services are not met. BIDs offer a mechanism for providing
better services without raising general tax rates, but at the price of pro-
ducing some intracity inequality and undermining the notion that public
services are to be distributed within a city based on criteria other than
ability to pay.
551. For a proposal for small-scale residential "block-level improvement districts"(BLIDs), see Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 Duke L.J. 75
(1998).
552. One way to mitigate the inequalities such districts would create, and to make the
residential neighborhood improvement district an option for low-income neighborhoods,
would be for city governments to match neighborhood-based assessments with a
contribution of municipal treasury funds. The city-neighborhood matching formula couldbe on a sliding scale so that funds raised in the poorest neighborhoods would be subject to
the greatest city multiplier. Such a program could provide an incentive to, and a reward
for, efforts by poorer neighborhoods to organize themselves.
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As the fiscal and service pressures on municipalities grow, and the
"lesson" of BIDs spreads, more municipalities and more urban neighbor-
hoods could turn to BID-like structures. Should that occur, cities would
be faced with an increasing tension between the norm of service equality
and the reality that some inequality may be necessary to secure the tax
base necessary to provide the funds to pay for more basic levels of services
for poorer residents. Some trade-off between equality of services and ad-
equacy of service may become a central feature of urban politics and fi-
nance. Greater intracity service inequalities may become necessary to
hold down interlocal, especially city-suburb, inequalities. BIDs per se are
not a significant source of inequality but they are a warning that the com-
bination of interlocal competition for tax base, sharp interlocal inequali-
ties in the distribution of taxable wealth, and local dependence on local
wealth to fund local programs has placed the norm of urban service
equality under siege.
The anxiety about BIDs also reflects a legitimate concern about the
quality of municipal services, particularly in poorer, working class and
middle class areas.553 BID-funded inequalities might be acceptable if the
basic level of services city residents receive was considered adequate.
When everyone is receiving appropriate levels of policing, street cleaning
and street repair, park maintenance and other municipal services, then it
might be acceptable to enable those areas wishing to pay more taxes in
exchange for additional services to do so. But where services are per-
ceived to be inadequate, BID-funded inequalities become very troubling.
Moreover, if BID and BID-like devices enable businesses and property
owners in commercial areas to solve their own service delivery problems
without attending to the needs of the rest of the city, then there is also a
danger that the business community, which has historically been a major
force for urban political action, will no longer even be interested in city
service issues.
At this point, BIDs are more a consequence than a cause of the ero-
sion in the quality of urban services. Indeed, by reminding city residents
and businesses of just how important high-quality services are to urban
quality of life, BIDs could stimulate new fiscal support for public services.
Alternatively, by cushioning the impact of municipal cutbacks on more
affluent areas, BIDs and BID-like entities could eventually contribute to a
reduction of general tax base support for public services. The impact of
BIDs on public service levels outside the districts needs to be closely
watched and carefully assessed as the number of BIDs grow, and as ex-
isting BIDs become part of the long-term structure of urban governance.
553. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 131-32 (2d Cir.
1998) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION: BIDs AND THE URBAN PUBLIC SPHERE
Many commentators have characterized BIDs as a form of privatiza-
ion that encroaches on the urban public sphere. This claim of privatiza-
don has two strands. First, "private" refers to the private sector. With
private property owners and businesses playing the leading role in setting
BID goals and managing BID operations, critics fear that BIDs represent
another front in the steady ideological advance of the private, and retreat
of the public, sector that has marked the debate over governance in the
last quarter-century. 55 4 From this perspective, the successes of BIDs in
cleaning streets, improving safety and providing amenities, in counter-
point to the asserted failures of municipal government, are troubling be-
cause they threaten to delegitimate the local public sector. Second, "pri-
vate" refers to the tight focus of BIDs on activities and services within
their districts, and especially the reservation of BID revenues for the lim-
ited purpose of benefiting the BID rather than the broader "public" of
the city as a whole.555 This view of BIDs may acknowledge their status as
governments, but, related to the concern that BIDs promote intralocal
inequality, it stresses their parochial focus on the needs and concerns of
smaller, and more affluent, enclaves. BIDs privatize in the sense that they
balkanize their cities, as well as in the sense that they transfer power to
the private sector. Taking the two strands together, BIDs-like the gated
residential communities with which they are often linked-are said to
"raise larger questions about the meaning of community and the public
realm in contemporary America."55 6
There is more than an element of truth to both aspects of the priva-
tization critique. BIDs give a considerable formal role to private sector
interests, and they often present themselves as private or quasi-private en-
tities. BID management entities are designed to resemble corporate
firms. BIDs pursue quasi-corporate marketing strategies, and some look
to such private sites as shopping malls or Disney World as models for a
new urban order. Moreover, BIDs are focused on the particular interests
of their districts.
Nevertheless, this privatization critique is overstated. It misses the
considerable public role in creating, empowering and controlling BIDs.
Moreover, the privatization claims exaggerate the extent to which BIDs
represent a departure from local governance generally. Private interests
have been powerful forces within local governments, and the philosophy
of localism-that is, the empowerment of small, narrowly-focused polit-
ical units-has been central to the law and politics of American local gov-
554. See Lasdon & Halpern, supra note 21, at A29.
555. See Wolfson, supra note 41, at 21 (discussing how BIDs "narrow" the public
sphere).
556. Stark, supra note 22, at 64. More hyperbolically, the rise of BIDs has been linked
to the emergence of militias and of home schooling as "signs of sickness" of our public
institutions. See Sheri Berman, Civil Society and Political Institutionalization, 40 Am.
Behav. Sci. 562, 571 (1997); Stengel, supra note 43, at 35-36.
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ernment. Finally, it is not clear that a limited private role and a sharp
public/private separation is necessary to promote the urban public
realm. By promoting the public's use and enjoyment of the streets, parks,
squares and other public spaces that are at the heart of urban living,
BIDs-whatever their place on the public-private continuum-can en-
hance the public environment and contribute to an enrichment of the
public life.
First, BIDs are public entities. Their most critical power, the power
that distinguishes them from chambers of commerce and downtown busi-
ness partnerships and that is most responsible for their effectiveness, is
the public power of coercive taxation-a power generally wielded by mu-
nicipalities on the BIDs' behalf. BIDs are created by public governments
in a process in which their boundaries, programs, finances and govern-
ance structures are shaped by government decisions. The best argument
for exempting BDs from one person, one vote is that the districts are
subordinate to city governments. So, too, one of the reasons BIDs have
succeeded in repelling state constitutional challenges to their assessments
is the state court practice of deferring to city decisions concerning assess-
ments. The successes of BDs in raising funds and delivering services are
as much a testimony to the ingenuity of the public sector in designing
public institutions and enabling them to secure new resources for the
support of public amenities as evidence of the supposed superiority of
private enterprise over public efforts.
Second, neither the role of private sector interests nor the narrowing
of public focus on discrete districts make BIDs radically more "private"
than other forms of local government. Private property owners and firms
have long played a leading role in organizing local governments.
5 5 7 As
noted in Part II, many localities are special purpose governments
designed to provide special benefits to landowners, and are formally con-
trolled by landowners. Property owners also play an important role in
general purpose local governments because of local governments' reli-
ance on property taxes for local revenues.
558
All local governments are in some sense private, relative to the states
and the nation, because of their small size, legal independence and polit-
ical accountability to local constituencies. Local governments are public
institutions, but each locality is designed to pursue the interests of a fairly
small fragment of the public. As a rule, local governments are relatively
autonomous wvith respect to finances, service delivery, regulatory author-
ity and political control. Local governments are largely dependent on
their own resources for revenue. Certainly, more affluent localities have
little or no obligation to provide financial assistance to their neighbors.
Many localities are incorporated simply to deny surrounding areas access
557. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 331, at 98-108 (1994).
558. See, e.g., Dick Netzer, Property Taxes: Their Past, Present and Future Place in




to local taxable resources. 559 Local governments may engage in exclu-
sionary zoning or impose impact fees to keep out newcomers who would
cost the communities more in additional public services than they would
provide in new taxes, much as they deploy their tax and zoning powers to
induce new investment that would expand their tax bases.5 60 The nature
of local governance further contributes to parochialism since local offi-
cials are elected by people physically resident within local boundaries.
Although local governments are nominally creatures of the state, local
electoral control tends to increase the salience of local interests, rather
than the broader regional or state public interest, in local government
decisionmaking.
Even the most "public" of local governments-the cities and coun-
ties that provide services to their entire population and whose elections
are subject to one person, one vote-are relatively "private" from the per-
spective of a metropolitan area or state. These local governments are
characterized by different levels of service reflecting differences in local
wealth and by political accountability to distinctly local constituencies
rather than to the broader metropolitan area that may be affected by
local actions.
All local governments, then, are composed of public and private ele-
ments, with the private deriving from small population and territorial
size-relative to state or metropolitan area-as well as from the long-
standing fiscal connections to landowners. BIDs have a greater "private"
component than the city governments that create them. They are territo-
rially sublocal and organizationally focused on the interests and concerns
of landowners or firms. Yet, they are not fundamentally different from
other forms of local government. Indeed, as indicated in Part II, as a
formal legal matter, BIDs are in a sense simply a new type of special
district.
Despite the concern about BIDs as privatization, BIDs have far less
power than local governments generally, and they are far less independ-
ent of their cities than local governments are of their states. Under gen-
eral incorporation laws, local residents may be able to create local govern-
ments without obtaining the approval of the state or of existing local
governments affected by the incorporation of a new locality.5 6 1 Local
governments possess independent regulatory authority, particularly over
land use.562 Land and people within one local government are generally
exempt from taxation by other local governments.5 65 By contrast, BIDs
559. See Bums, supra note 331, at 37-40, 80; GaryJ. Miller, Cities By Contract 15-16,
76-82 (1981).
560. See, e.g., Mark Schneider, The Competitive City: The Political Economy of
Suburbia 125-75 (1989).
561. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism Part I, supra note 549, at 74 (explaining
municipal incorporation procedures).
562. See id. at 19.
563. See Briffault, Boundary Problem, supra note 48, at 1129.
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generally lack the power to create themselves, expand their programs, or
unilaterally increase their tax bases. Many have limited terms, and nearly
all lack regulatory authority.
BIDs may produce a degree of balkanization within cities, but so far
they have caused far less inequality, parochialism, and fiscal and service
fragmentation than is characteristic of interlocal relations in most metro-
politan areas in the United States. Unlike metropolitan area local gov-
ernments, BIDs are subject to a powerful "metropolitan" government-
the city government that creates them, defines their programs, controls
their funding, and, if so inclined, oversees their operations. The private
qualities of BIDs are thus limited and subject to constraint in a way that
the private qualities of most local governments are not. Indeed, the city-
BID relationship could provide a model for the structure of metropolitan
governance in which a strong regional body would define the powers,
monitor the actions, and finance and provide the bulk of regional serv-
ices, while subunits provide supplemental, self-funded services to discrete
areas. Governance in metropolitan areas would be far more consistent
with public values if metropolitan area local governments were as limited
and subordinate as BIDs are.
Third, and most importantly, BIDs can contribute to the well-being
of the local public sphere. The public sphere does not consist solely of
government decisionmaking. It includes the interactions of people
outside the familiar circles of family, friendship, work or membership or-
ganizations. Public life entails a "fluid sociability among strangers and
near-strangers," arising out of the "ongoing intercourse of heterogeneous
individuals and groups."564 The public sphere, in this sense, includes the
places in which strangers can gather, mingle, and be comfortable with
each other.
Cities have, historically, provided the physical settings-the streets,
sidewalks, parks, squares, town commons and civic centers-where inter-
actions among strangers have occurred.5 65 But to be effective in offering
opportunities for the public sociability that is essential to public life, cities
need to do more than provide spaces that are open to the public. Streets
and other public places must be safe, 566 orderly,567 clean and inviting if
they are to succeed in actually serving as settings for public life.
564. Jeff Weintraub, "The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction," in
Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy 17 (Jeff
Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997).
565. See Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1077
(1996) (noting that one way cities should serve as community-builders is through
cultivation of bonds between strangers).
566. As Jane Jacobs has noted, "[t]he bedrock attribute of a successful city district is
that a person must feel personally safe and secure on the street among all these strangers."
Jacobs, supra note 54, at 30.
567. On the importance of disorder in driving people away from urban areas, see




That is what BIDs do. By providing the political and economic re-
sources for such mundane matters as trash collection, street cleaning,
graffiti removal, policing, assistance to tourists, special events, public en-
tertainment, and amenities like fountains, trees, flowers and street furni-
ture, BIDs help to create public places, or raither, they make nominally
public places truly open, accessible and appealing to the public. They
contribute directly to the physical-social infrastructure of urban public
life. Indeed, their successes are a reminder ofjust how much public life
depends on the commitment of resources to maintaining and enhancing
public spaces.
Public space and publicly-owned spaces are not the same thing.
Some of the most successful public spaces-successful in the sense that
they contribute to a flourishing public life-are privately owned, such as
the English pub, the French sidewalk caf6, the Viennese coffee house, the
German beer garden,5 68 or, closer to home, Rockefeller Center, South
Street Seaport, the Quincy Market Place or the Columbia University cam-
pus. Such places, open to the public, can be "inclusively sociable, offer-
ing both the basis of community and the celebration of it."569 As Jane
Jacobs has noted, "the sight of people attracts still other people;" 570 pub-
lic life requires activity in public. Stores, bars and restaurants draw peo-
ple out of their houses and into the streets, and that, in turn, will attract
more people whose intention and interest has been piqued by the people
gathered in both private establishments and on the public streets.
By the same token, dirty, dilapidated and dangerous streets, squares
and parks are effectively closed to the public even if they are publicly
owned and nominally open. Disorder and physical decay drives people
off the streets and into their homes.571 Indeed, order maintenance has
become an increasingly important goal in contemporary public
policing.5 72
BIDs may pose some risks to public life. The notion of what consti-
tutes order in public places may be sharply contested.5 73 BIDs may seek
to advance a particular vision of public space and of the urban public that
is not shared by all members of the public. As one critic has noted,
"[p] roperty values lie at the heart of the BID's drive for public improve-
ment."574 Their promotion of property values may result in a form of
commercial gentrification, with the stores that serve poor and working
568. See Ray Oldenburg, The Great Good Place xv-xvii (1989).
569. Id. at 14.
570. Jacobs, supra note 54, at 37.
571. Skogan, supra note 567, at 21-50.
572. See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 209, at 562-91 (discussing the role of
community and problem-oriented policing in ameliorating neighborhood disorder).
573. But cf. Skogan, supra note 567, at 21-50 (asserting that understandings of what
counts as disorderly behavior are widely shared across middle class and poor
communities).
574. See Zukin, supra note 23, at 67.
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class customers displaced by more upscale shops.575 Similarly, a BID's
pursuit of order and security may involve efforts to drive out street peo-
ple, peddlers, some forms of entertainment, even garish signs. Where
one group or class finds a festive bazaar atmosphere, another group or
class may see social and visual anarchy. BIDs may represent and advance
the views of the latter group at the expense of the former.
The privatization that BIDs may produce is not so much private sec-
tor or even neighborhood-level control of public space but the extension
of the "Disney World values of cleanliness, security and visual coher-
ence"576 to public streets, sidewalks, squares and parks. The success of
Disney World and similar private developments suggests those values are
shared by a considerable portion of the public.5 77 As the new urban po-
licing's focus on order maintenance strategies and quality of life offenses
demonstrates, this emphasis on order is increasingly influential within
the local public sector generally, and notjust in BIDs. Nevertheless, these
values may not be shared by everybody. The urban public, or. at least
some classes and groups that make up the urban public, may be willing to
tolerate a little more disorder than other people. Many urban residents
welcome the increased sense of order and safety while also regretting the
loss of variety, the disengagement from the urban reality of poverty and
conflict, and the absence of what Paul Goldberger has called "the harsher
edge of traditional urban environments." 578 Although the "new urban
paradigm" of cities that are cleaner and safer but also "flatter and dul-
ler"579 is not limited to BIDs, the districts have played a role in the devel-
opment of this new strand in urban policy. The dominant role of prop-
erty owners, the dependence on special assessments, and the statutory
goal of enhancing the business climate may incline BIDs to adopt order
maintenance programs that are more restrictive than the policies of mu-
nicipal governments and that may make public areas less attractive to
parts of the public.
The possibility that BIDs will reshape public spaces to exclude parts
of the public is real, but it is likely to be mitigated by their lack of formal
regulatory authority and by local government oversight. BIDs may pursue
Disney World values, but they lack Disney World's legal authority. BIDs
are neither private organizations nor independent governments. BIDs
do not own the streets, sidewalks, parks or downtown areas that they man-
age, and they cannot limit access to the areas within theirjurisdiction.580
Similarly, BIDs lack the power to zone, to prohibit land uses or to
575. See id. at 211.
576. Id. at 67.
577. See Witold Rybczynski, City Life: Urban Expectations in a New World 216-17
(1995) (celebrating the "unsophisticated version of urbanity" found in shopping malls).
578. Goldberger, supra note 379, at 145.
579. Id. at 145-46.
580. Cf. Zukin, supra note 23, at 54-55 (Disney admits the public on a paying basis;
"[t]his is the model of urban space driving the public-private BIDs").
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criminalize behavior. BIDs may supplement the ability of local govern-
ment to enforce existing rules, press for more effective enforcement by
the police or other local officials and lobby for new laws that advance the
BID vision of urban public order. But BIDs lack the power to enforce a
vision of public order more restrictive than that permitted by state and
local law, and they require local government support to realize their ef-
forts to change the definition of public order.
The Business Improvement District is very much a government of
our time. Its existence is largely attributable to the fiscal squeeze that has
gripped most cities in recent decades and to the intense competition cit-
ies face from suburban malls, and from each other. BIDs' focus on serv-
ices-on creating safe, clean and inviting public spaces-reflects and re-
inforces the growing contemporary concern with quality of life in urban
government. Local governments are giving new and increasing attention
to such issues as the maintenance of public order, the management of
public places58' and the stimulation of activity in public streets, squares
and parks.58 2 BIDs are central players in the effort to revitalize down-
towns through the provision of services that make downtown public areas
more appealing to people. This services strategy often has its harsh side,
as the crackdowns against vagrants, beggars and peddlers suggest. But it
is a strategy pursued by BIDs and city governments alike-and often
together.583
The BID's combination of public and private elements seems very
much of our time as well. This is an era of experimentation, of redefin-
ing the borders of public and private, of searching for new ways of utiliz-
ing private self-interest to address public problems.584 BIDs involve both
the private sector turning to the public sector to obtain the benefits.of
the public power of taxation to override the free rider problems in fund-
ing services in business areas, and the public sector turning to the private
sector to provide funds, above the levels of general taxation, to revitalize
those city districts that are crucial settings for urban public life.
581. See, e.g., Kelling & Coles, supra note 35, at 194-95 (describing Baltimore's
'order-restoration program," San Francisco's "Operation Matrix," and Seattle's "carefully
crafted ordinances targeting disorderly behavior on sidewalks"); Livingston, supra note
209, at 562-64 ("In community policing, the community, rather than police
professionalism and the law, becomes a principal source of legitimation for many police
efforts directed at ameliorating disorderly conditions.").
582. See generally Frieden & Sagalyn, supra note 339, at 171-316.
583. See, e.g., Keling & Coles, supra note 35, at 199-200 (discussing BIDs' and city
governments' restoration efforts in Baltimore).
584. See John D. Donohue, The Privatization Decision: Public Ends and Private
Means 99-211 (1989); David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector 76-107, 280-310 (1992)




This intermingling of public and private elements raises difficult
legal and policy questions. It presses against the rules governing local
voting rights and local government finances, and it challenges norms
concerning the democratic control of urban government and the equal
treatment of urban residents. BIDs represent a compromise, a trade-off
of basic values in urban governance. They provide a means of improving
the quality of urban public services and enhancing urban public spaces,
while avoiding legal and political limits on tax increases. They also pro-
vide for an increased formal role for private sector interests, limited in-
tralocal service inequalities and the potential to undermine the norm of
equal service provision.
At this point, the public benefits outweigh the costs. This could
change as BIDs spread and develop. Certainly, individual BIDs may
abuse the public trust, and, more importantly, municipal governments
may fail in their duty to oversee their BIDs. Nor does the success of the
particular mix of public and private interests, values and concerns vali-
date all other contemporary public-private hybrids. Even though BIDs
and gated communities are frequently bracketed together, BIDs are not
gated communities. The public sector plays a greater role in their forma-
tion and in monitoring their operations. Moreover, by devoting attention
and financing to urban public spaces, BIDs can enhance urban public
life.
On balance, BIDs have been net contributors to urban public life.
But, perhaps more important than whether my normative evaluation of
BIDs is right or wrong, BIDs embody certain trade-offs-business district
autonomy versus city government control, intralocal inequality versus in-
terlocal competitiveness-that reflect the fundamental dilemmas of con-
temporary urban governance. Both the intermingling of public and pri-
vate elements and the trade-offs that shape the laws and administrative
arrangements that structure the operations of the business improvement
district make it very much a government for our time.
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